Jeffrey Lewis

How Many Nuclear Weapons Do We Need?

Communications — Wed, 07 May 2008 08:30:00 -0400

A New America Event
05/07/2008 - 2:30pm

On May 7th the New America Foundation’s Nuclear Strategy and Nonproliferation Initiative joined AAAS’s Center for Science, Technology, and Security Policy for a discussion on the present and future role of nuclear weapons in U.S. and World security. The event featured Dr. Arnold Kanter, Principle and Founding Member of the Scowcroft Group, Dr. Morton Halperin, Director of U.S. Advocacy for the Open Society Institute, and Dr. Barry Blechman, co-founder of the Harry L. Stimson Center. Dr. Jeffrey Lewis, Director of the Nuclear Strategy and Nonproliferation Initiative, moderated the event. An MP3 audio recording can be downloaded below, while video is available at right.

After a brief introduction, Dr. Kanter began by discussing the need for a new nuclear strategy in the U.S. Drs. Kanter, Lewis, and Halperin are part of a team drafting presidential guidance for the future of U.S. nuclear posture. The paper proposes many revisions in the current policy towards nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation treaties. One suggestion offered is that the U.S. and Russia, as the most heavily armed nuclear powers, should lead the way in disarmament. Dr. Kanter stated that the U.S. should offer security to other parties to prevent them from seeking their own nuclear weapons. He asserted that revising U.S. nuclear strategy would be a three part process beginning with unilateral action by the U.S., hopefully with Russia taking complementary measures. This would be followed by reciprocal responses from other nuclear parties. The final step would be far-reaching and binding measures on nuclear security.

Dr. Blechman responded by stating the need for a radical approach to revising nuclear strategy. He laid out a plan calling for elimination of all nuclear weapons in a twenty year time frame by working unilaterally and within international organizations. Dr. Blechman believes that the current dangers facing the U.S., including nuclear ambitions in Iran and North Korea, require a radical approach rather than the incremental steps proposed by Dr. Kanter.

Dr. Halperin debated Dr. Blechman by claiming that the effort to eliminate nuclear weapons is often misplaced. He also stated that full elimination is an unrealistic goal. The debate should be reframed to answer the question: What kind of nuclear program should the U.S. have in a nuclear world? Dr. Halperin also stated that there are unilateral steps the U.S. can take to discourage proliferation abroad, such as reducing the military stockpile and vowing to cease further testing. The event concluded with a lively debate between the participants reflecting the complexity and broad range of opinions on the topic.

-Faith Smith, intern for the American Strategy Program

Jeffrey Lewis on NPR | Syria Revelation Could Affect N. Korea Nuclear Talks

Communications — Thu, 24 Apr 2008 07:26:00 -0400

New America in the News:

NPR | Syria Revelation Could Affect N. Korea Nuclear Talks

. . . But it remains to be seen whether Thursday's intelligence briefing in Congress will help or hinder the negotiations.

Jeffrey Lewis, who runs the Web site armscontrolwonk.com, says it's clear that the briefing is meant to undermine the negotiations.

"Members of Congress who have been pushing hardest to have this information declassified — or at least put out into the public domain in some form or another — are those who want to make the point that North Korea can't be trusted," Lewis says. . .

How Many Nukes Does it Take?

Communications — Fri, 18 Apr 2008 08:15:00 -0400

A New America Event
04/18/2008 - 12:15pm

Most scholars and policymakers favor stemming the tide of nuclear proliferation, even as they acknowledge the pacifying effects of established nuclear arsenals on great power relations. When it comes to nuclear arsenals, how robust must a country's nuclear arsenal be--how much is enough? Some of the key variables in existing studies - e.g., the nuclear "balance of power" - have been poorly conceived, and the data used to measure the nuclear balance and its effect on policy has come from suspect sources. High quality declassified evidence began to percolate just as the Cold War ended and analysts turned their attention to seemingly more important topics.

With an eye toward future potential problems in the U.S.-China relationship, Keir Lieber and Daryl Press will evaluate four major schools of deterrence theory with some of the newly available evidence from the Cold War. Their preliminary findings indicate that we should not be complacent about the deterrent effects of the short-to-medium term nuclear balance between the U.S. and China.

Join the New America Foundation for an engaging and relevant discussion on nuclear deterrence. The American Strategy Program's Nuclear Strategy and Nonproliferation Initiative is designed to build a new bipartisan consensus around a reduced role for nuclear weapons in U.S. security policy and a renewed emphasis on building international institutions to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.

Nuclear Mind Reading

Communications — Wed, 09 Apr 2008 05:15:00 -0400

A New America Event
04/09/2008 - 12:15pm

On April 9th, Jeffrey Lewis, director of the Nuclear Strategy and Nonproliferation Initiative, hosted James Acton, a Lecturer in the Centre for Science and Security Studies in the Department of War Studies at King's College London for a talk entitled "Nuclear Mind Reading: Iran's Nuclear Intentions and the IAEA". Acton analyzed the IAEA's ability to assess states' intentas opposed to their capabilitiesand then asked what the IAEA means when it announces that an issue is no longer considered to be outstanding. Finally, he discussed the implications this analysis has for the enforcement of arms control treaties.

Acton began by reconstructing the contentious debate on Article II of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Article II, the injunction that states not manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear explosives, had a central dilemma because of the indeterminacy of deciding what counts as "manufacture." For example, if a state were to develop all the parts but did not assemble them, then does it "count" as a violation of Article II? To overcome these problems, a purpose criteria was introduced which made the intent of a state the deciding factor in determining violations. Acton argued, however, that this intent clause has seriously hurt the ability to enforce nonproliferation agreements.

People often look to the IAEA to judge intent yet, as Acton noted, this mistakes the role of the IAEA. Its self-professed goal is fact-gathering and not to determine intent. The IAEA determines the what of a state's action and not the why. Thus, it is unable to perform the kind of "nuclear mind reading" necessary to determine violations. This is the proper realm of intelligence agencies who can use human and signals intelligence but the IAEA does not and should not have this capacity. Iran exemplifies these problems. The IAEA has recently closed the file on Iran because it says there are no outstanding issues and this has been interpreted to mean there is no intent to acquire a nuclear weapon. The IAEA makes, however, no such claim. Furthermore, whenever the IAEA finds suspicious activity Iran claims innocent usage and thus the definite proof demanded by states is impossible to find. Intent serves, in the end, as a loophole allowing states to side-step compliance. Acton argues that, beyond the Iranian crisis, a dangerous precedent has been set because debates have crystallized around intent without a credible way of assessment.

Acton concluded that the role of intention must be superceded by an objective, rules-based regime. He proposed that, in enforcement by international bodies, states should be penalized on what it has done and not why it acted. This provides an added deterrent effect because states can no longer deploy the motives card. In state-to-state interactions, however, intentions are crucial because one needs to understand why a state such as Iran wants to develop nuclear weapons. This happens when states talk behind the scenes but not publicly. Acton provided, finally, a set of implementation mechanisms to transition to this new process. First, states should stop talking about intent in international forums. The US, UK, France, and Germany have been guilty of this regarding Iran allowing China and Russia to bandwagon upon it to support Iran. Second, rules should equally applied without exemptions for US friends and allies. Lastly, states should consider Pierre Goldschmidt's proposal for a generic UN resolution to create automatic punishments for states found in non-compliance.

- Kailash Srinivasan is an intern for the Nuclear Strategy and Nonproliferation Initiative.

Jeffrey Lewis in The Associated Press | 'Satellite Strike Struck Diplomacy, Too'

Communications — Sun, 24 Feb 2008 14:36:00 -0500

New America in the News:

Satellite Strike Struck Diplomacy, Too (The article appears on websites of Los Angeles Times, Houston Chronicle, Chicago Tribune and FOX News.)

...Missile shields are one reason Washington has long resisted efforts in Geneva to negotiate a comprehensive treaty banning weapons in space. Some U.S. shield designs even envision using orbiting systems to knock out missiles. And the Americans aren't alone.

"Hit-to-kill" technologies are spreading, to China, Japan, Israel and India, for example, noted Jeffrey Lewis, an arms-control expert at Washington's New America Foundation.

"It seems to me we may never have had the opportunity to constrain the technology," he said. "It's pretty hard for me to see that happening now." more

Jeffrey Lewis on The Today Show | 'Navy to Shoot Down Spy Satellite'

Communications — Wed, 20 Feb 2008 16:52:00 -0500

New America in the News:

Navy to Shoot Down Spy Satellite (NBC Today Show)

In its coverage of U.S. plans to shoot down a rogue satellite, NBC Today interviews New America Foundation Expert Jeffrey Lewis.

"The Russians and the Chinese in particular really look at this launch as being an anti-satellite test, a weapon to shoot down satellites more than a mitigation measure designed to prevent human harm," said Lewis.

Posturing About the Future of Nuclear Weapons

Communications — Mon, 18 Feb 2008 12:15:00 -0500

A New America Event
05/20/2008 - 12:15pm

In 2009, the United States will undertake another Nuclear Posture Review, the third since the end of the Cold War and the second to be mandated by Congress. Although the goal of the nuclear posture review is to "set forth short-term and long-term objectives of United States nuclear weapons policy,” efforts to match our strategic forces to a pragmatic assessment of the international security environment often founder on operational and political realities. What are the likely issues and challenges facing the 2009 Nuclear Posture Review? What are advantages, disadvantages, and traps of such posture reviews in general?

Join the Nuclear Strategy and Nonproliferation Initiative at the New America Foundation for an engaging discussion featuring Dr. Janne Nolan. Dr. Nolan is currently a professor of international affairs at the University of Pittsburgh, as well as the author of An Elusive Consensus: Nuclear Weapons and American Security after the Cold War, considered to be the definitive study of the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review. Dr. Nolan is a former national security official in the State Department and a representative to the Senate Armed Services Committee, and she has served as a member of several government commissions, including the investigation of the l998 embassy bombings in East Africa. She is the author of numerous books and articles about the politics of national security and teaches at Georgetown University in addition to the University of Pittsburgh’s Graduate School of Public and International Affairs.

The American Strategy Program's Nuclear Strategy and Nonproliferation Initiative is designed to build a new bipartisan consensus around a reduced role for nuclear weapons in U.S. security policy and a renewed emphasis on building international institutions to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.

Jeffrey Lewis in New York Times | 'U.S. to Attempt to Shoot Down Faulty Satellite'

Communications — Fri, 15 Feb 2008 13:11:00 -0500

New America in the News:

U.S. to Attempt to Shoot Down Faulty Satellite (New York Times)

Jeffrey G. Lewis, an arms control specialist at the New America Foundation, warned that China would cite the intercept to justify its antisatellite test last year.

“The politics are terrible,” Mr. Lewis said. “It will be used by the Chinese to excuse their hit-to-kill test. And it really strengthens the perceived link between antisatellite systems and missile defenses. We will be using a missile defense system to shoot down a satellite.”

Space Race With China?

Communications — Tue, 12 Feb 2008 12:15:00 -0500

A New America Event
02/12/2008 - 12:15pm

Before China carried out an anti-satellite test in January 2007, some U.S. policy-makers, including NASA Administrator Michael Griffin and the U.S. House China Working Group, advocated greater cooperation between the United States and China in space. After the test, which created a massive cloud of space debris that angered international space professionals and alarmed the American public, increased references to U.S.-China competition and hints of a new space race drowned out calls for cooperation.

Using the experience they gained from visiting China several times in the last eight months, analysts Jeffrey Lewis and Gregory Kulacki will evaluate the costs and benefits of cooperation and competition between the United States and China in light of the history of Chinese interest in ASAT technology and an assessment of China's growing aerospace industry.

The New America Foundation invites you to join these two space policy experts in an engaging panel discussion and robust question-and-answer session. The American Strategy Program's Nuclear Strategy and Nonproliferation Initiative is designed to build a new bipartisan consensus around a reduced role for nuclear weapons in U.S. security policy and a renewed emphasis on building international institutions to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.

Jeffrey Lewis in The New Yorker | 'A Strike in the Dark; What did Israel bomb in Syria?'

Communications — Mon, 11 Feb 2008 10:51:00 -0500

New America in the News:

A Strike in the Dark; What did Israel bomb in Syria? (The New Yorker)

...Much of what one would expect to see around a secret nuclear site was lacking at the target, a former State Department intelligence expert who now deals with proliferation issues for the Congress said. "There is no security around the building," he said. "No barracks for the Army or the workers. No associated complex."

Jeffrey Lewis, who heads the non-proliferation program at the New America Foundation, a think tank in Washington, told me that, even if the width and the length of the building were similar to the Korean site, its height was simply not sufficient to contain a Yongbyon-size reactor and also have enough room to extract the control rods, an essential step in the operation of the reactor; nor was there evidence in the published imagery of major underground construction.

"All you could see was a box," Lewis said. "You couldn't see enough to know how big it will be or what it will do. It's just a box." ...