The Forward

Bush’s Bluffing Has Made Mideast Peace a Bad Bet

Ron Tang — Thu, 12 Jun 2008 08:39:00 -0400

From Taba to Tony, from the Rose Garden to Riyadh, from Geneva to Gaza -- in the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, no American president has been presented with more opportunities for reaching a true and lasting peace than George W. Bush. But with just a half a year to go before he leaves the White House and little indication of a breakthrough, it is all but certain that Bush will leave behind a conflict more intractable than ever, not to mention a situation in Gaza that ranks as the world’s third-largest humanitarian crisis after Somalia and Darfur.

This is more than just an exercise in historical finger pointing. When the 44th president of the United States is sworn in next January, he will inherit a legacy of failed chances at Middle East peacemaking. To borrow a phrase from Abba Eban, the president has never missed an opportunity to miss an opportunity -- to be exact, 21 opportunities over the past eight years to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Twenty-one: That’s blackjack, with no jackpot.

The next president, be it John McCain or Barack Obama, would do well to revisit those missed chances, for they offer an instructive lesson: American diplomacy in the Middle East needs to be about more than lofty rhetoric and half-baked initiatives -- it needs to be about strategically pursuing the path of peace, supporting those that seek peace and following through on the necessary steps to achieve peace.

Taba Summit, January 2001: As Bill Clinton left office and Bush assumed it, the Israeli and Palestinian negotiation teams met in Taba, Egypt, to continue what was started in 2000 at Camp David. The summit dealt with final-status questions and were by far the most robust, complete and hopeful talks between Israelis and Palestinians since Oslo.
Mitchell Report, April 2001: While the second intifada raged on, former Senator George Mitchell headed a fact-finding mission whose report outlined a set of confidence-building measures to end the intifada, stop settlement expansion and bring the parties back to the negotiating table.
Tenet Plan, June 2001: CIA Director George Tenet, hoping to solidify the recommendations of the Mitchell Report, went to Jerusalem to detail a security plan to end the violence and resume negotiations.
Arab Peace Initiative, March 2002: The initiative, also known as the Saudi Peace Initiative, was a watershed in peacemaking efforts. Based on Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, the Arab League unanimously agreed to normalize relations with Israel as the outcome of a negotiated two-state solution. It also included a reference to an agreed-upon solution to the question of Palestinian refugees, signaling that Israel’s objections to a massive return of refugees were beginning to find acceptance in the Arab world.
The Madrid Quartet, April 2002: A quartet of Middle East mediators was constituted with the purpose of multi-lateralizing the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. It combined the political superpower of the United States with the financial backing of the European Union and the international legitimacy of the United Nations, as well as with the balancing influence, as seen through Arab eyes, of Russia.
Rose Garden Speech, June 2002: Bush, to the surprise of many, became the first American president to openly state that a major American foreign policy objective would be to support and bring about a two-state solution and an end to Israeli occupation. A trailblazing speech, it signaled that some in the White House were beginning to understand the significance of the American role in the conflict.
U.N. Security Council resolution 1397, June 2002: The resolution affirmed unanimous international support for the vision outlined in Bush’s Rose Garden speech.
Road Map for Peace, April 2003: Based on the parameters set out by Bush’s Rose Garden speech, the Madrid Quartet developed a comprehensive plan, with the goal of delivering an independent Palestinian state living side-by-side in peace with a secure Israel.
U.N. Security Council resolution 1515, May 2003: The resolution affirmed unanimous international support for the Quartet’s Road Map for a permanent two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Geneva Initiative, December 2003: Drafted by former Israeli negotiators and their Palestinian counterparts, the Geneva Initiative maps out in comprehensive detail a blueprint for a permanent status solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, with goals based on the parameters spelled out at Camp David, as well as on the Road Map and the Arab Peace Initiative. While not an official document, most credit it as the impetus for Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza in 2005.
James Wolfenshohn appointed envoy, April 2004: The former World Bank president was appointed as the Quartet’s special envoy for Israel’s Gaza disengagement. An American Jew trusted by both Israel and Washington, Wolfensohn would resign his post in 2005 in deep disappointment at the way the Bush administration systematically undermined his efforts.
Death of Yasser Arafat, November 2004: While Arafat was revered by Palestinians as the founder of the Palestinian Liberation Organization and Palestinian national movement, his death also entailed an enormous opportunity for change and for greater democratic governance for Palestinians.
Mahmoud Abbas elected president, January 2005: A non-violent pragmatist and long-time advocate of negotiations, after being elected he immediately called for an end to the intifada, a cessation of the armed struggle for independence and the resumption of peace negotiations with Israel.
Sharm el-Sheikh Summit, February 2005: Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak hosted Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, Abbas and King Abdullah of Jordan to re-commit the parties to the Road Map and formally bring an end to the second intifada.
Gaza disengagement, August 2005: The disengagement showed that Israel was capable of and willing to cease its settlement enterprise and withdraw from Palestinian territory. But instead of building momentum for a further withdrawal of settlers from the West Bank and reviving peace talks, the Bush administration expressed understanding for Israel’s painful domestic struggle and rewarded Sharon with the promise that existing demographic realities in occupied territory would be taken into account in eventual final-status talks.
Agreement on Movement and Access, November 2005: Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice negotiated an 11th-hour agreement to improve Palestinian living conditions by creating parameters for better movement and access for Palestinians. The main purpose was to re-open the Rafah border crossing from Gaza to Egypt, a fundamental precondition for a peace deal. The border remains closed.
Baker-Hamilton Commission, May 2006: James Baker and Lee Hamilton’s commission, officially known as the Iraq Study Group, opened up the previously taboo “linkage” discussion by arguing that the “United States will not be able to achieve its goals in the Middle East unless the United States deals directly with the Arab-Israeli conflict.”
Prisoners Document, June 2006: Palestinian prisoners held by Israel from groups including Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine drafted a “National Reconciliation Document.” The signatories agreed to a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders, marking a potentially crucial opportunity to co-opt Islamist militants and create a broad Palestinian consensus in favor of negotiations and territorial compromise.
Mecca Agreement, March 2007: To address the emerging crisis between Hamas and Fatah in the West Bank and Gaza, Saudi Arabia convened national unity talks in Mecca to hammer out a unity government. Instead of embracing the accord, the Bush administration reportedly engaged in a clandestine effort to arm Fatah strongman Muhammad Dahlan against Hamas, which reacted with a military takeover of Gaza that June.
Tony Blair appointed envoy, June 2007: The former British prime minister, with his high profile and stature, was tasked with improving Palestinian governance, economics, and institution -- building. While Washington supported Blair’s involvement, the State Department made clear his mandate did not include that of peacemaker.
… and blackjack, November 2007: Bush convened a major summit in Annapolis, Md., and coaxed Israelis and Palestinians into a commitment to try to reach an agreement by the time he left office in January 2009. Six months later, the president has yet to deliver any real progress.

Grasp the Promise of Annapolis

adminn — Thu, 29 Nov 2007 15:25:00 -0500

Even the most hardened of Middle East cynics could be excused for momentarily feeling a fluttering of hope after witnessing the scenes at this week’s peace conference in Annapolis, Md.

Israel’s much-maligned prime minister, Ehud Olmert, conducted himself with consumate dignity, displaying a rare capacity to combine unabashed national pride with sincere empathy for the other. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, for his part, met Olmert’s outstretched hand with an unflinching commitment to a negotiated resolution of this bloody conflict and to a realization of his own nation’s aspirations that would not be at Israel’s expense. Both men have developed a degree of genuine mutual respect and appreciation, and they were on display at Annapolis.

Only President Bush came up short, sticking to a simplistic good-versus-evil narrative that was not only patronizing, divisive and lacking any resonance with the Arab world, but might very well prove counterproductive. Nonetheless, the Bush administration, and especially Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, can allow itself a gentle pat on the back this weekend: A joint statement was achieved, the conference was well attended, the speeches were uplifting, and Bush personally committed himself to the process.

The self-congratulatory moment, though, should be a fleeting one.

This week’s peace conference assiduously avoided even a flirtation with the serious substance and content of a peace agreement. The warm words at Annapolis will be followed by pledges of hard cash at a donors’ conference scheduled for Paris in three weeks, but after that the testing ground returns to the far more hostile terrain of the Middle East.

If, several weeks from now, the negotiations are perceived to have stalled and the situation on the ground to have deteriorated or just stayed the same, then the smiling Annapolis summiteers will turn ashen-faced and their detractors back home will claim vindication. Such a scenario is all too imaginable; a return to mutual recrimination, blame games and American disengagement would be perhaps the bookmaker’s favorite.

As coincidence would have it, the Annapolis gathering fell on the same week as the 60th anniversary of the adoption by the United Nations General Assembly of Resolution 181. Separated by six decades, these events are in fact intimately and perhaps decisively linked.

Anyone who has supped at the table of Zionist history has that night and the U.N. vote indelibly etched into memory: 33 in favor, 13 against, 10 abstentions. This was the great moment of international recognition for the Zionist cause.

The rest is history: The Arabs rejected partition, brave young Israel survived a war of independence and a threatening alliance in 1967, and the country has since grown middle-aged awaiting an Arab peace partner. All national narratives tend to play fast and loose with the historical record, and ours is no exception.

So where do we find ourselves in November 2007? Sixteen Arab states, including all of Israel’s neighbors, attended the Annapolis conference. This comes five years after the Arab League adopted an initiative that holds out the prospect of recognition and normal relations for Israel with the Arab world once comprehensive peace is achieved.

Even before that, at the Madrid conference in 1991 and at the Sharm el Sheikh summit in 1996, the Arab states stood alongside Israel when the United States convened previous peacemaking efforts. Some dismiss the significance of these developments and point to the curmudgeonly refusal of the Saudis to shake hands, but as Olmert himself quipped this week, “What did you expect, tea in Riyadh tomorrow?” The Arab states have actually softened their own position by taking steps toward normalization in advance of Israel ending the occupation.

The historic success of 1947 was a territorial division whereby 55% of mandatory Palestine would become a national home for the Jewish people, while 45% would be an Arab-Palestinian state. The prospect held out by the Arab initiative and the Annapolis summit is of Arab, Palestinian and world recognition and support for an Israel on 78% of that original territory.

You do the math. The Arab world is saying yes to less than half of what it was offered -- and rejected -- 60 years ago.

Some may ask why we ought to be defeatist now; history, such critics have been known to argue, proves that the longer we hold out, the more we get. This approach ignores the devastating damage done to Israel’s standing in the world and to its security, as well as disregards how the country’s priorities have been skewed by the ongoing occupation and absence of internationally recognized permanent borders.

Are we really prepared to continue paying over the coming decades the human, material and moral price in order to edge the percentage of land we can call ours from 78% to, what, 80% or 81%?

Grasping the promise of the Annapolis conference and the Arab initiative means saying yes to 78% and withdrawing to the 1967 lines on the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and on the Golan Heights. There can be reciprocal and minor modifications to those lines, such as land swaps, that would allow for incorporating the vast majority of settlers into Israel’s new and internationally recognized borders, but the basic parameters of the deal are pretty clear. Israel would be wise to seize the post-Annapolis moment, while the Arab consensus on the Saudi initiative still holds and before there is a further waning of American influence in the region.

It would be cozy and comforting if all this could be achieved in accordance with Bush’s division of the world into moderates and extremists, but that is as intellectually lazy as it is practically unachievable. The challenge to the Annapolis framework is not only the need to summon the political courage to embrace the 78% option, it is also to build a more inclusive process that creates openings for actors who will be crucial to the credibility and sustainability of any secure peace -- in particular Hamas. Engaging Hamas, even indirectly, will not be easy, but Hamas, too, is inching toward an acceptance of the 1967 lines. In the context of an agreement that enjoys Arab consensus, an end of occupation and an acceptance of its own political role, Hamas’s acquiescence is far from inconceivable.

Annapolis represents Israel getting to yes with the Arab world. Now Israel and its supporters in America should declare a resounding yes to 78%. Last time I checked, we were a people who recognized a good deal when we saw one.

Quit the Canard That American Policy Advances Israeli Security

Cecille Isidro — Fri, 25 Aug 2006 17:01:00 -0400

Rejection of hubris has become the defining characteristic of the post-Lebanon war mood and debate in Israel. That is understandable. Israel's civilians in the north faced a daily dosage of 200 missiles, while the military met a surprisingly well-equipped and trained guerrilla force. The mood has been best captured by the Israeli military's outgoing commander for infantry and paratroops, Brigadier General Yossi Hyman, who publicly bemoaned that "we were guilty of the sin of arrogance."

Although the circumstances in the United States are clearly different, a little introspection might benefit those Americans concerned and passionate about Israel. While the laudable United Jewish Communities-led effort to provide assistance to both Jewish and Arab communities in Israel addresses a real need and demonstrates the vitality of heartfelt ties, getting the response right when it come to political policy will prove far more difficult. Washington's reflex to the war with Hezbollah was to stick to the same old narrative: the administration stayed in lock-step with Jerusalem, Congress overwhelmingly passed a 'pro-Israel' resolution, evangelical pastor John Hagee led our Christian 'friends' to Capitol Hill and only the usual suspects were left to snipe from the sidelines. Mission accomplished -- except that the circumstances faced by Israel and the United States following the latest Lebanon war make the smug response anything but the smart response.

At least three trends visible during that long month demand a reflective, not reflexive, approach to its aftermath.

First, Israel has apparently not delivered the goods as expected by some of our more prominent self-styled friends. Disappointment with their under-performing cause celebre has been expressed by columnist Charles Krauthammer and his ilk. Israel, they seem to think, is there in order to unequivocally vanquish our shared foes, whatever the cost in Israeli blood and suffering, and righteous indignation poured forth at Israel's timidity in not taking the fight to the Syrians and in crying off to the United Nations. Suddenly, it seems that for some Israel is to be worshipped only if it serves the greater god of neoconservative transformation.

Second, the ever-growing chorus critiquing the Iraq war and the administration's Middle East policy could no longer pretend that Israel exists on another planet. This conflict was a rude reminder that Israel is, in fact, in the same region. Iraq-war skeptics from both parties -- from Senators Chuck Hagel, Richard Lugar and Joseph Biden, to past masters Brent Scowcroft and Zbigniew Brzezinski -- all offered Middle East policy prescriptions that factored in Israel.

Some, and I believe very mistakenly, have claimed an anti-Israel bias in various calls for re-invigorated peacemaking, but the message is clear: If regional policy needs a re-think, then Israel has got to be part of that story. Israelis should be part of that re-think, as should our allies. Third, the Bush administration at first avoided and then was unable to deliver the diplomatic agility that was called for, and that is bad news for Israel. The United States had no direct channels to or leverage with key actors, and could not commit troops to any cease-fire implementation force. Unilateralism has failed, both here and there.

The idea that current American policy advances Israeli security and national interests is thoroughly discredited -- something that is now openly aired in the Israeli media, and raised, albeit in more discreet circles, by Israeli Cabinet ministers. Iran has been emboldened and regionally strengthened, the growing Israeli debate on possible dialogue with Syria is cut short by "Washington will say no" reminders, and the much-needed international encouragement for renewing a political process with the Palestinians to replace the unappealing options of unilateralism and stagnation lacks American leadership.

It may be awkward, even counter-intuitive, but Israelis and Americans who care about Israel need to find a way to spit out the words that those in the administration who can perhaps still be convinced need to hear: "You may indeed think you're being terribly supportive of Israel, but, uh, actually it isn't going so great. That clash of civilizations thing, well eventually your 130,000 troops will go home and we'll be left carrying the can. What we really need is serious, unwavering diplomatic engagement, perhaps an envoy, and broaden the circle of folks you are talking too, 'bad guys' included. Maybe re-launch a peace process worthy of the name, even a regional Madrid-style conference -- just try it."

Just in case that does not work, a parallel effort must be put into building common approaches with internationalist Republicans and anti-war Democrats, with the aim of creating a shared agenda of stability building and conflict resolution in the Middle East. The threat of an anti-Israel populist and isolationist backlash may well exist, but so too does the opportunity to ally with the Iraq-war skeptics in navigating regional policy away from its dangerous and failed current trajectory.

Of course, there is always the no-think option: continuing the politics of intimidation, merrily counting the co-signatories on meaningless 'pro-Israel' congressional resolutions, and embracing the apocalyptic vision of a 100 Years War in the Middle East that so threatens Israel's well-being. Israelis today do not have the luxury of indulging arrogant fantasies. Neither, I would suggest, do our American friends.