Middle East

Britain Must Act To Prevent an Attack On Iran

Ron Tang — Sun, 06 Jul 2008 06:58:00 -0400

All the evidence suggests that an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear sites would be a disaster for the greater Middle East, for the world economy and for western security. It would not even benefit Israel, which is adequately protected by its own nuclear deterrent. On the contrary, by creating new links between Sunni and Shia extremism, it would worsen Israel’s long-term chances of survival. Finally, as last week’s remarks by Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the US joint chiefs of staff, indicated, an attack is strongly opposed by the US military. They would bear the first brunt of… more

Daniel Levy in Mother Jones blog | 'Iran Panic? Talk About It With the Experts'

Communications — Mon, 30 Jun 2008 10:17:00 -0400

New America in the News:
Daniel Levy, a former Middle East peace negotiator, is Director of the Prospects for Peace Initiative at The Century Foundation, and of the Middle East Initiative at the New America Foundation:

"I'm going to look at the Israeli side of the equation as I think this is the direction that any action is most likely to come from, although the blowback would of course most likely impact the US (and perhaps embroil it in a war with Iran). Also I will not address how disastrous the consequences of a military strike would be in my opinion, notably for Israel and its supporters in the US..." LINK

Parag Khanna in Khaleej Times | 'UAE a Rare Success Story'

Communications — Mon, 30 Jun 2008 08:11:00 -0400

New America in the News:

American author and international relations analyst Parag Khanna yesterday called the UAE a "rare success story", attributing it to its geographical location, globalisation and blend of foreign legacies with indigenous power structures.

Speaking on the role of the emirates in the geopolitical market place, Khanna, Fellow and Director of Global Governance Initiative at the New America Foundation, a non-partisan, public policy institute in Washington DC, termed the UAE "a meeting point for first world European technology and third world labour".

"The UAE has a culture of Eurasia. It is a story of foreign legacies blended with indigenous power structures in a post-colonial world. It is also a success story of globalisation, which is rare in post-colonial countries," said Khanna, who was a geopolitical advisor to the United States Special Operations Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2007... LINK

Parag Khanna in XPress | 'UAE more influential'

Communications — Sun, 29 Jun 2008 09:16:00 -0400

New America in the News:
Flooded with oil money and foreign investments, the UAE is influencing international developments like never before, said a visiting US scholar on Sunday.

From putting boots on the ground in war-torn Afghanistan – for reconstruction efforts – to bailing out giant companies from the recent property crash in America, the Emirates is now a ‘player’ in world affairs, Parag Khanna, the director of the Global Governance Initiative, told reporters at the Dubai Press Club... LINK

Making Sense of the Arab-Israel Nightmare

Communications — Thu, 26 Jun 2008 22:30:00 -0400

A New America Event
06/27/2008 - 9:30am

On June 27th, the New America Foundation and the Century Foundation co-hosted “Making Sense of the Arab-Israel Nightmare”, an event which aimed to investigate the status quo, the future available to the Bush Administration, and a measure of “crystal ball gazing” into what one can hope for from the next Administration Special Assistant to Ambassador Morton Abramowitz at the Century Foundation, Jonathan Kolieb, hosted a Q&A-style session with three former practitioners in a lively discussion that explored the lessons to be learned from the current and previous administrations and its implications for the future. The speakers were former State Department negotiator, Aaron David Miller, Director of the Middle East Policy Initiative at New America, Daniel Levy, and former advisor to Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas and current Senior Research Fellow in the American Strategy Program, Ghaith al-Omari. An MP3 audio recording can be downloaded below, while video is available at right.

Kolieb’s first question, directed at Miller, asked what the latter’s assessment was of the Bush Administration what its legacy will be. Miller began by citing former Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and James Baker and the Jimmy Carter Adminsitration as the three most successful American efforts at Middle East peace. What distinguished these three was each made peace a top priority and was tough on each side of the issue. Additionally, each had an exquisite sense of timing and did not over-engage or disengage. Finally, each was tenacious and viewed it through the lens of American national interest. For Miller, Bush is the “great disengager” looking to its other priorities even as opportunities for peace came along. For example, it did not take the opportunity given in Fall 2004 when Yasser Arafat died but rather let chance, randomness, and Ariel Sharon dictate the political terrain. It is now, for him, “painful to imagine” a happy ending to the conflict in the short-term. The next six months should, then, aim to do no harm. It should support codifying whatever Palestinian and Israeli talks on permanent issues occur, the Syrian-Israeli negotiations, and prevent a major confrontation between Hamas and Israel. If these were to pass, there would be a remote possibility of serious and good things happening in the new Adminstrations.

Miller turned, then, his attention to the future Administration and observed that the legacy Bush bestows will be important. Miller proposed, then, four ways to change the way America approaches the situation. First, it should be a national priority and Israel-Palestine negotiations will go nowhere without a strong American presence. Second, there must be a chance of success because a young administration will not risk a monumental failure and thus Bush must leave his successor with a viable starting-point on the conflict. Third, America is perceived as weak and incompetent in the Middle East and tough and serious diplomacy is the only way to reemerge as a regional power. Finally, it needs tactical flexibility and strategic independence in its conduct with respect to the Israeli-Arab conflict. If there is the perception that America is the lawyer to one side of the conflict, the minimal level of trust will be inexistent. America’s “special relationship” with Israel is valuable but should not be an exclusive relationship which does not criticize inappropriate behavior by Israelis.

Kolieb’s next question, directed at al-Omari, asked for his take on what the last years of the Administration will look like and his suggestions to it. al-Omari initially observed that the current Annapolis process is dependant on the US because of Olmert’s and Abbas’s political weakness. Additionally, if the next President inherits an active conflict and a dead process, it will have little incentive to work at reviving it. The focus of the next six months should, then, be to strengthen the prospects for peace until the next Administration arrives. To achieve this goal, a four-pronged approach is necessary. This mistake of Annapolis was to focus on the big peace deal while ignoring the reality on the ground. The Israeli and Palestinian publics found no substantial movement in their daily experience and thus the deal had no credibility or support. Furthermore, America needs to assess the situation on final status in order to make sure that the parties do not lock up into orthodoxy and constantly revert to opening positions. America’s role is to be a tough third-party negotiator to ensure things do not go backwards. Major political action is necessary, for example, Israel needs settlement freezing and Palestinians need vigorous action to reassure Israel’s security concerns. Confidence building measures are necessary to create a sense that progress is happening. The fourth prong is to avoid a Hamas-Israel war. If there was to be a major invasion, it would kill the process and be a complete failure for Israel. It is, lastly, the responsibility of the current Administration also for the President-elect.

Kolieb’s follow-up question asked what the bright spots were in the current disaster in Palestinian politics. Al-Omari bluntly stated there were no bright spots but insisted the only way to fix it is to have the US stop trying to control it. Palestinian politics is obscure and opaque to Western visions and every attempt at manipulation has ended in failure. The US should negotiate with Abbas but, at the same time, not constrict his domestic readings. If he wants a Hamas truce, then the US should not try to block it and let the Palestinians manage their own affairs.

Lastly, Kolieb turned to Levy for his own assessments and advice of the Bush Administration and the next one. The first thing Levy indicates is to let the cease-fire work and prevent a catastrophe between Israel and Gaza. His reading of the situation sees active American opposition to the cease-fire no longer existing but the latter is still fragile. There have been a half-dozen rockets landing in Israel running parallel to military operations in the West Bank, Gaza, and economic closures. There is furthermore a need to abandon the Clinton approach of forcing an agreement on a peace of paper. The Middle East is still not ready for the kind of deal that America insists upon. While he is pessimistic on the prospects of this happening, he suggests a non-public paper to reflect where the parties are at. Another proposal, although he is again pessimistic on this, is to repeat the Camp David parameters but making it such that it will pass over to the next Administration and does not force the timetable upon the Israelis and Palestinians. If they get the content of the parameters correct and choreograph this with the next President, then these measures would work. However, Levy warns against a managerial approach to the conflict as long as there is occupation and its attendant insecurity. If the decision is for an agreement and the political will exists then one should push forward but, if it does not, an extension of time will not necessarily create it. He concurs with al-Omari in saying confidence building measures would be helpful

Kolieb followed up by asking the status of Israeli politics and whether its instabilities are endemic. Levy responded by observing the immediate term still sees some measure of decision-making capacity despite Olmert’s weakness albeit shallow and unable to create a peace deal with the Palestinians. The road ahead will either see the Kadima party elect a new leader in a primary who will create a new coalition and avoid elections or disunity in the Kadima party leading to elections happening which would bring in Benjamin Netanyahu. The last possibility would be an election loss for Netanyahu although most polls show him winning if there was to be an election. In general, Israeli coalition politics is extremely fractured with thirteen parties answering to often sectarian, sometimes ethnic constituencies. This creates a structural weight for a Prime Minister and serves as a constricting factor in the ability to make big decisions.

Kolieb’s next question was to Miller. He asked how America should deal with the two polities’ systems. Miller is dismissive of the US capacity of being able to soberly assess and act in their politics. A unified Palestinian political voice is a prerequisite for even the beginnings of a resolution. It is, for Miller, a delusion to believe that Israel would make existential concessions. Israeli political fractures have prevented a leader with the moral authority and legitimacy to emerge. Miller concurs, in the end, with al-Omari’s injunction to have the US stop meddling within domestic politics.

The next question had al-Omari discuss the importance of the US. The US is key because it is the only member that Israel trusts and is comfortable in negotiating with. Yet, this should not mean American monopoly but rather a reinvigorated multilateral effort to resolve the Israel-Palestine dispute is necessary. Finally, engaging Arabs is necessary to give them the incentive and a level of dignity so they can be constructive partners in negotiations.

-Kailash Srinivasan, Research Intern for The Century Foundation

Daniel Levy in Inter Press Service News | 'Respite on the Road to Nowhere?'

Communications — Fri, 20 Jun 2008 11:23:00 -0400

New America in the News:
..."A ceasefire means more than stopping fire," said former Israeli peace negotiator Daniel Levy. "For Palestinians, it means actually being able to breathe and opening up the economy."...

"Any effective truce will further enhance the sense of the futility of [U.S.-led] negotiations even though an improved security environment will create a more promising backdrop to those talks," said Daniel Levy... LINK

Daniel Levy in the Chicago Tribune | 'U.S. Envoys Less Active in Mideast'

Communications — Fri, 20 Jun 2008 11:01:00 -0400

New America in the News:
...The threat of military blowback from the U.S. is not what it would be if there weren't 150,000 American troops stuck in Iraq," said Daniel Levy, a former member of the Israeli negotiating team now at the New America Foundation... LINK

Daniel Levy in Inter Press Service | 'US/Mideast: Let's Not Make a Deal'

Communications — Tue, 17 Jun 2008 12:37:00 -0400

New America in the News:

... "[Keeping the two-state solution alive] means saying it's all about settlements, it's all about not further eroding the situation in the territories, not further allowing the creation of an infrastructure of occupation," said former Israeli peace negotiator Daniel Levy, during a panel on Capitol Hill Monday sponsored by the New America Foundation think-tank.

"To the extent to which [a shelf agreement] is still part of the narrative of this administration, that is what should actually be shelved," he said, adding that Bush's vision was "not doable nor desirable" in the present political climate.

If successful, the Annapolis plan would make Israel and a "reformed" Palestinian leadership agree to a "road map" for peace, a "shelf agreement" outlining two separate and contiguous Israeli and Palestinians states, living side-by-side... LINK

Examining the Next Year on the Israeli-Palestinian Front

Communications — Mon, 16 Jun 2008 06:30:00 -0400

A New America Event
06/16/2008 - 12:30pm

On June 16th, the New America Foundation co-sponsored an event with The Century Foundation examining the status quo of the Israel-Palestine conflict and the future it portends. The event hosted was hosted by Patrick Doherty, Deputy Director of the American Strategy Program, featuring three speakers representing the Palestinian, Israeli, and American perspectives on the conflict. An MP3 audio recording can be downloaded below, while video is available at right.

Palestinian activist and former presidential candidate, Mustafa Barghouti offered the Palestinian perspective—outlining the measures taken by the Israeli government in the wake of the Annapolis agreement that is increasingly making the two-state solution impossible. First, contrary to the promises made at Annapolis, the Israeli government has overseen twenty times more settlement expansion than any time before Annapolis. It has recently, for example, signed off on the creation of 7,974 new housing units in East Jerusalem, six times more than for the four years between 2002 and 2006 where 1,600 units were built. Furthermore, the wall that surrounds the West Bank has served as a form of functional annexation as large parts of it reside within the territory. For Barghouti, these expansions increasingly emaciate a potential Palestinian state making it an unviable entity. In addition to these two problems, the increased rate of Israeli military attacks even in the West Bank where there are no rocket attacks are alienating Palestinians and undermines the authority of Palestinian governance and the peace process in general. Since the pre-Annapolis period, attacks have increased by 300% and the checkpoints which constrict Palestinian freedom of movement have increased from 521 to 670. His second line of criticism was of the U.S. The U.S. has, for him, full rights for its bias toward Israel but heavily protests the former’s demand to hold a monopoly on mediating the peace process. In the end, the only solution he finds is a unification of the Palestinian polity under the sign of democracy.

The second speaker, Daniel Levy, Senior Fellow and Director of the Middle East Initiative in the American Strategy Program at New America, gave the Israeli perspective on the situation. His first observation on the status quo was critical of Bush’s appropriation of the failed Clinton legacy. The latter is marked by an attempt to rush a last-minute peace deal after years of disengagement which is hard to see as working in light of how intransigent the conflict has been over the years. In general, Levy does not think conditions are conducive to reaching an agreement on paper between now and the end of the year. Neither Prime Ministers Ehud Olmert nor Mahmoud Abbas have the degree of legitimacy that can hope to sign and sell a historical agreement. The challenge for the next 6 months is, then, two-fold. First, the Administration should attempt to lock in some of the content of what is being negotiated in order to ensure the next round of negotiations do not start from scratch and, second, to try and change the day-to-day situation on the ground to prevent further slippage on the two-state front. One should be modest in expectations that peace agreements being signed in the short-term will guarantee next administrations will follow them. The option available is for Secretary Condoleeza Rice to set out the parameters of the U.S. position. The first caveat is getting it right in content and negotiating this with the next Administration. Finally, there is a need for a honest conversation between the US and Israel. The former should clearly state its desire for a two-state solution and, if Israel is willing, to ask what parameters it wants. If they are not realistic, however, the American President should take the position that it will not force Israel into a position but that it will also not have sham negotiations. Instead, the U.S. will focus on keeping the two-state solution alive and make the conversation about settlements and not eroding existent conditions. The important content agreement is a ceasefire being signed between Hamas in Gaza and Israel (which has occurred since the event). Finally, Levy thinks the US-Israel relationship needs a healthy dose of instrumentalism. The U.S. should realize that the price of slippage is too high. It is bad for the US’s image, its alliance building, and is a gift to its adversaries. From the Israeli side, it should realize that American hegemony is on the decline and Israel has a fundamental interest in permanent borders while American power is such that it can achieve that.

The final speech was delivered by Aaron David Miller, former Middle East negotiator in the State Department, on the American perspective. He had six points. First, no conflict-ending solution is possible in the short-term. Second, there is the possibility of some kind of agreement that will advance the goal for peace and make the situation better. It will not be a comprehensive nor implementable piece of paper but is necessary. Third, a cease-fire in Gaza will be a respite but a road to nowhere because of the crisis in Palestinian politics of a fractured polity. Harmonizing the divisions is the only chance for a realistic agreement. No Palestinian leader can commit the public to conflict-ending issues without legitimacy and no Israeli Prime Minister can make existential concessions to a partner who does not have the monopoly on the forces of violence within its community. Fourth, Israeli and Syrian negotiations are welcome but limited because the reason behind the negotiations have more to do with domestic politics and to maintain quiet on the northern border. Neither side is willing, however, to pay the price needed for an agreement. Furthermore, the U.S. is indispensible to marshal support and broker the gaps but has not been interested in peace. Five, the U.S. acts like a modern-day Gulliver wandering as a superpower while tying itself down. The eight years of Bush has been, for Miller, a “galactic stumbling” in Middle East policy. Sixth and finally, the next President needs a sober assessment of history and reality before going off on adventures in peace-making or transformative diplomacy. Another Clinton-esque late-in-the-day attempt to bridge divides will be catastrophic. An agreement on the cheap is impossible to sell for both Israelis and Palestinians. Miller’s last criticism was of U.S.-Israel relations. Miller supports the “special relationship” with Israel and considers supporting states with similar values an important part of U.S. strategy. Yet, one should not make this an exclusive relationship preventing the U.S. from approaching other actors and being a constant yes-man to bad Israeli policies.

-Kailash Srinivasan, Research Intern for The Century Foundation

US Economic Decline Top Issue

Ron Tang — Mon, 16 Jun 2008 04:35:00 -0400

The most important long-term strategic challenge facing the Gulf Cooperation Council is not the threat of Islamic extremism or the rise of Iran -- it is the continuing economic decline of the United States.

Ever since 1980, when Jimmy Carter, then president, first publicly committed the United States to use military force to defend the free flow of oil from the Middle East, the United States has been the region’s unquestioned hegemon. And ever since the GCC was formed in 1981, its members have relied on the United States as the ultimate guarantor of their security.

To support the US security umbrella,… more