Thank you Chairman Tierney, Ranking
Member Flake, and members of the Subcommittee for the opportunity to appear
I will try and answer three related
In what kind of war is the US
engaged in general and how do the
conflicts in Afghanistan and
play into this war?
Who are the United States
and it allies fighting in Afghanistan?
An important subset of this question is: What are the networks in Pakistan that
support the Afghan insurgency?
Why should the US sustain
its commitments in Afghanistan?
After all, it is now more than seven years after 9/11 and al Qaeda is no longer
headquartered there, but is instead located in Pakistan.
will also suggest some policy proposals that flow from this analysis that are
appended as an annex to this document.
1. In what kind of war is the US engaged in
general and how do the conflicts in Afghanistan
play into this war?
does American policy in Afghanistan
fit into what the Bush administration framed as the war on terror'? President Bush declared an open-ended and
ambiguous war on terror' and took the nation to war against a tactic, rather
than a war against a specific enemy, which was obviously al Qaeda and anyone
allied to it. When the United
States went to war against the Nazis and the
Japanese during World War II Roosevelt and his congressional supporters did not
declare war against U-boats and kamikaze pilots, but on the Nazi state and
war on terror, sometimes known as the Global War on Terror or by the clunky
acronym the GWOT, became the lens through which the Bush administration judged
almost all of its foreign policy decisions, which was dangerously
counter-productive. The GWOT framework propelled the Bush administration into
its entanglement in Iraq, which had nothing to do with 9/11 but was launched
under the rubric of the war on terror and the erroneous claims that Saddam
Hussein had WMDs that he might give to terrorists, including al Qaeda to whom he
was supposedly allied, and that he therefore threatened American interests.
None of this, of course, was true.
Bush administration also painted the GWOT in existential terms. Nine days after
9/11 Bush addressed Congress in a speech watched live by tens of millions of
Americans in which he said that al Qaeda followed in the footsteps "of the
murderous ideologies of the 20th century...They follow in the path of
fascism, Nazism and totalitarianism," implying that the fight against al Qaeda
would be similar to World War II or the Cold War. But this portrayal of the war
on terror was massively overwrought. The Nazis occupied and subjugated most of Europe and instigated a global conflict that killed tens
of millions. And when the U.S.
fought the Nazis she spent 40% of her GDP to do so and fielded millions of
soldiers. Communist regimes killed 100 million people in wars, prison camps,
enforced famines and pogroms. And had the Cold War ended with a bang instead of
a whimper much of the human race would have vanished. By contrast, al Qaeda
might one day launch another attack on the United
States, but its capacity to do so is very diminished
today, and the group will never pose an existential threat to the United States.
the Bush administration inflated the very real threat that al Qaeda and its
allies pose, many Europeans have underestimated that threat. European
politicians, who have lived through the bombing campaigns of various
nationalist and leftist terror groups for decades, have often said that al Qaeda
is just another criminal/terrorist group that can be dealt with by police
action and law enforcement alone. This is not the case. A typical European
terrorist organization like the Irish Republican Army would call in warnings
before its attacks and its single largest massacre killed 29 people. By
contrast, al Qaeda has declared war on the United States repeatedly as it did
for the first time to a Western audience with Osama bin Laden's 1997 interview
with CNN. Following that declaration of war the terror group attacked American
Embassies, a US war ship, the Pentagon and the financial heart of the United
States, killing thousands of civilians without warning; acts of war by any
standard. Al Qaeda is obviously at war with United States and so to respond by
simply recasting the GWOT as the GPAT, the Global Police Action against
Terrorists, would be foolish and dangerous.
then is the war that the US is engaged
in? The United States
is clearly at "War against al Qaeda and its Allies." And instead of the Bush
formulation of "Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists" the
American policy in this war should be, "Anyone who is against the terrorists is
with us." After all it is only al Qaeda and its several affiliates in countries
like Iraq, Lebanon and Algeria
and allied groups such the Taliban that kill U.S. soldiers and civilians and
attack American interests around the globe. Everyone else in the world is a
potential or actual ally in the fight against al Qaeda and its affiliates
because those organizations threaten almost every category of institution,
government and ethnic grouping.
what extent then is the Taliban in both Afghanistan
allied with al Qaeda? If the Taliban
isn't allied with al Qaeda then it is part of the solution, and if it is an al
Qaeda ally then it is part of the problem.
was a fair amount of tension between Osama bin Laden and many leaders of the
Taliban pre-9/11 but we need to be clear that the Taliban-never a monolithic
movement-is much closer to al Qaeda today than it was eight years ago. Yes,
there are local groups of the Taliban operating for purely local reasons but
the upper levels of the Taliban on both sides of the Afghan/Pakistan border
have morphed together ideologically and tactically with al Qaeda. Some examples
Mehsud, the leader of the Pakistani Taliban, sent suicide attackers to Spain in
January 2008, is at war with the Pakistani state and sees himself as part of
the global jihad.
Haqqani family, arguably the most important component of the insurgency on the
both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border, has ties with al Qaeda that date back
to the 1980s.
Dadullah, a key Afghan Taliban commander gave interviews to Al Jazeera in 2006
before he was killed, in which he made some illuminating observations about the
Taliban's links to al Qaeda. Dadullah said, "We have close ties. Our
cooperation is ideal," adding that Osama bin Laden is issuing orders to
the Taliban. Dadullah also noted that "we have 'give and take' relations
with the mujahideen in Iraq."
Hekmatyar, a commander allied to the Taliban, has been close to al Qaeda since
at least 1989.
use of suicide attacks, improvised explosive devices and the beheadings of
hostages, all techniques that al Qaeda perfected in Iraq,
are methods that the Taliban has increasingly adopted in Afghanistan and
have grown exponentially there since 2005.
Qaeda was founded in Pakistan
two decades ago and bin Laden has been fighting alongside Afghan mujahideen
groups since the mid-1980s. Al Qaeda Central on the Afghan/Pakistan border is
much less of a foreign' group with far deeper and older roots in the region
than Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) ever was in Iraq.
could go on listing examples of the Taliban's ideological and tactical
collaboration with al Qaeda, but the larger point is that separating al Qaeda
and the Taliban is not going to be as relatively simple as splintering Iraqi
insurgent groups from AQI.
of course, the US
should be splintering, buying off and co-opting as many elements of the Taliban
as possible, we also need to be realistic about how much closer Al Qaeda and
the Taliban have grown together in recent years.
is why the formulation that the United States
is "At War with al Qaeda and its Allies" is a useful way to frame American
policy in Afghanistan (and Pakistan and
elsewhere). If militant groups are willing to reject al Qaeda, recognize the
legitimacy of their government, end their attacks on international forces and
stop training terrorists for missions overseas then they there are no longer
allies of al Qaeda and therefore the United States is not at war with them.
however, al Qaeda's allies will not takes those steps then they are enemies of
the United States.
Today in the Pakistan/Afghanistan region, the Pakistani Taliban, the senior
leadership of the Afghan Taliban, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezbi-Islami, the
Haqqani network, the Islamic Jihad Union, elements of Lashkar-e-Taiba and
Jaish-e-Mohamed are all allies of al Qaeda who should be considered enemies of
the United States unless they take the four steps necessary to prove otherwise
which, to repeat, are, reject al Qaeda, recognize the legitimacy of the
government, end attacks on international forces and stop training terrorists
for overseas missions.
Who are the United States
and it allies fighting in Afghanistan?
When President Bush left
office the Taliban were stronger than at any point since they had lost Kabul seven years
earlier. The Taliban, which in 2002 had
barely been more than a nuisance, now control large sections of Afghanistan's most important road, the 300-mile Kabul to Kandahar
highway. And the south of the country is not only the source of the vast
majority of the world's heroin, but it is also quite dangerous for those the
Taliban deems an enemy, which, in practice, means pretty much anyone who isn't
part of their movement. By mid-2008 more Americans soldiers were dying in Afghanistan every month than in Iraq. In
early 2009 a US official involved in Afghan policy put the number of Taliban
fighters somewhere between 12, 000 to 18,000. Whatever the exact number the
Taliban today is obviously a larger force than they were in 2006 when US intelligence officials in Afghanistan
estimated that they numbered at most
Between the rising
Taliban insurgency, the epidemic of attacks by suicide bombers and spiraling
criminal activity fueled by the drug trade, by the time President Obama took
office Afghanistan looked
something like Iraq
in the summer of 2003, when the descent into violent conflict began. As a
former senior Afghan Cabinet member explained, "If international forces
leave, the Taliban will take over in one hour."
When the Taliban ruled Afghanistan
they were a provincial bunch; their leader, Mullah Omar, rarely visited Kabul in the five years
that he ran the country and he made a point of avoiding meeting with
non-Muslims and most journalists.
But this is not your father's Taliban. Where once the Taliban had
banned television, now they boast an active video propaganda operation named Ummat, which posts regular updates to
the Web. They court the press and Taliban spokesmen are now available at
any time of the day or night to discuss the latest developments. The Taliban had banned poppy growing in 2000; now they
kill government forces eradicating poppy fields, and they profit handsomely
from the opium trade. The Taliban also offer something that you might find
strange, which is rough and ready justice. The Afghan judicial system remains a
joke, and so farmers and their families--the vast majority of the population--
looking to settle disputes about land, water and grazing rights can find a
swift resolution of these problems in a Taliban court. As their influence
extends, the Taliban has even set up their own parallel government, and
appointed judges and officials in some areas.
rhetoric is now filled with references to Iraq
in a manner that mirrors bin Laden's public statements. They have also adopted
the playbook of the Iraqi insurgency wholesale, embracing suicide bombers and
IED attacks on US and NATO convoys. The Taliban only began deploying suicide
attackers in large numbers after the success of such operations in Iraq had become
obvious to all. For the first years after the fall of the Taliban suicide
attacks were virtually unknown in Afghanistan, jumping to 17 in 2005
and 123 a year later. Just as suicide bombings in Iraq had had an enormous
strategic impact-from pushing the United Nations out of the country to helping
spark a civil war-such attacks also have made much of southern Afghanistan a
no-go area for both foreigners and for any reconstruction efforts.
time President Bush left office there were 31,000 American soldiers in Afghanistan,
the most that had deployed there since the fall of the Taliban. Afghanistan
is a country ideally suited to guerrilla warfare with its high mountain ranges
and a land mass that is a third larger than Iraq's, while its population is
some four million or so greater. Yet, by early 2009, there were four times more
soldiers and policemen in Iraq
than there were in Afghanistan.
560,000 members of the Iraqi security services and some 130,000 American
soldiers were in Iraq, while
had only 140,000 local soldiers and police and around 60,000 US and NATO
troops. Classical counterinsurgency doctrine suggests that security forces need
to be at a ratio of 25 per thousand of population to secure a country. Given
its more than 30 million citizens, Afghanistan needs as many as
600,000 policemen and soldiers, yet by 2009 there were only a third of that
The relatively low number of
soldiers means that American and NATO forces can clear the Taliban out of areas
but can't hold many of those cleared areas and then rebuild them, the critical
sequence in any successful counterinsurgency. One western diplomat in Kabul in 2008 described
military operations in the south of the country as much like "mowing the lawn"
every year. NATO forces went in and cleared out Taliban sanctuaries there and
then had to go back and do it all over again in the same place the following
In addition to the small numbers
of boots on the ground necessary to secure the country, Afghanistan's
ballooning drug trade also helped to expand the Taliban's ranks. It is no
coincidence that opium and heroin production, which by 2009 was equivalent to
one-third of Afghanistan's
licit economy--spiked at the same time that the Taliban staged a comeback. Afghanistan is
the source of an astonishing 92 percent of the world's heroin supply.
The drug trade not only helped fund the Taliban it also
pervasive corruption. By 2008, according to the watchdog group, Transparency
was rated one of the most corrupt countries on the planet, alongside such
completely failed states as Somalia.
are the networks in Pakistan
that support the Afghan insurgency?
A key to the resurgence of the Taliban can be
summarized in one word: Pakistan.
The Quetta shura' headed by Mullah Omar is
located in the Pakistani province of Baluchistan and the Peshawar Shura' is based in the
capital of Pakistan's North West Frontier Province.
In addition, Hekmatyar operates in the Pakistani tribal areas of Dir and Bajur;
the Haqqani network is based in Waziristan, and al Qaeda has a presence in Waziristan, Bajaur and Chitral. The headquarters of the
Taliban and its key allies are, in short, in Pakistan.
The Taliban has deep roots in Pakistan. Many
members of the movement of religious warriors grew up in refugee camps there.
Not only that, but the Taliban, an almost entirely Pashtun organization, draws
strength from the fact that, at some 40 million, the Pashtuns are one of the largest ethnic groupings in the
world without their own state, and they straddle both sides of the
Afghan-Pakistan border, a line that was drawn by the British in 1893, that, in
any event, many Pashtuns don't recognize. Indeed, there are almost twice as
many Pashtuns in Pakistan as
there are in Afghanistan.
The Pakistani government
routinely denies that it provides a haven for the Taliban leadership. An
explanation for the seeming dichotomy between the fact that U.S. military and intelligence officials
universally hold the view that the Taliban is headquartered in Pakistan and
the government denial of this, is that the Pakistani government has never
completely controlled its own territory. And when civilians are at the helm,
nor does it even control its own military. ISI, the Pakistani military
intelligence agency, at some levels has continued to tolerate and/or maintain
links with Taliban leaders throughout the war on terror'.
How did this happen? In part,
because Pakistan's generals
supplemented their decades-old policy of supporting Kashmir jihadi groups with
a doctrine they termed "strategic depth," which meant they wanted to ensure
that they had a pliant, pro-Pakistani Afghan state on their western border in
the event that India
attacked over their eastern border. In practice, the doctrine of strategic
depth led Pakistan to
support militant Pashtun Islamists in Afghanistan like Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar and later the Taliban, who the Pakistani government believed were
most closely aligned with their own anti-Indian policies. Both the Kashmiri
jihadi groups and the Taliban would evolve Frankenstein-like into groups that
the Pakistani state could eventually no longer control, and would start to
The general backwardness of Pakistan's
tribal regions, where many of the militants are located, can be gauged by the
female literacy rate, which is only 3%. And an indicator of the ferocity of the
tribes are the compounds in which they live, generally mud or concrete
fortresses studded with gun ports ideal for fighting off raiding parties.
Larger compounds are defended by artillery. In Pashtu the words for "cousin"
and "enemy" are the same, which is indicative of the endemic low-level warfare
that is the way of life in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA),
where all males are armed and the blood feud is a multi-generational pursuit
that the tribesmen seem to genuinely enjoy.
It was in this remote, ungovernable
region that al Qaeda rebuilt its operations from 2003 forward. An American intelligence official stationed in Pakistan
said that by 2008 there were more than 2,000 foreign fighters in the region,
while a US intelligence official who tracks al Qaeda put the number
somewhat lower, saying the foreign militants in the FATA consisted of around
100 to 150 members of the core of al Qaeda who had sworn bayat, a religiously-binding oath of personal allegiance to bin
Laden; a couple of hundred more free agent' foreigners, mostly Arabs and
Uzbeks, living there who were "all but in name al Qaeda personnel", and
thousands of militant Pashtun tribal members, into whose families some of the
foreigners had intermarried.
militants' training camps are relatively modest in size. "People want to
see barracks. [In fact,] the camps use dry riverbeds for shooting and are
housed in compounds for 20 people, where they are taught calisthenics and
bomb-making," a senior American military intelligence official explained.
The existence of these camps boded well for Al Qaeda, since terrorist plots
have a much higher chance of success if some of the cell's members have
received personal training in bomb-making and terrorist tradecraft rather than
merely reading about such matters on the Internet, as many freelance terrorists
To root out
those militants the Pakistanis first tried the hammer approach in the FATA in
2004 with a number of military operations that were essentially defeats for the
Pakistani army, which is geared for land wars with India, rather than effective
counterinsurgency campaigns. The failed military operations were followed by
appeasement in the form of "peace" agreements with the militants in 2005 and
2006, which were really admissions of military failure and led the Taliban and
its al Qaeda allies to establish even greater sway in the FATA.
Today the militants wholly control
all seven of the tribal agencies in the FATA and their writ extends into the
"settled" areas of the North West Frontier Province,
almost up to the gates of Peshawar,
the provincial capital. They also control Swat, whose verdant valleys and
towering mountains had once been one of Pakistan's premier tourist
destinations, and is now firmly in the grip of the Pakistani Taliban. The
Taliban conduct their own kangaroo courts publicly hanging men for infractions
such as drinking, and shooting burqa-clad women for supposed promiscuity.
handed more than $11 billion to the Pakistani military after September 11 for
its help in the war on terror'. Yet the Taliban and al Qaeda remained
headquartered in Pakistan
throughout the Bush administration's two terms. By July 2007 the sixteen
American intelligence agencies that collectively make up the US intelligence
community all signed off on a National Intelligence Estimate that concluded
that al Qaeda was not on the wane but was rather resurging, and further warned
that the terror group "has protected or regenerated key elements of Homeland
attack capability, including a safe haven in Pakistan's Federally Administered
Tribal Areas (FATA), operational lieutenants, and its top leadership."
By early 2008 the Bush
administration had tired of the Pakistani government's unwillingness or
inability to take out the militants in the FATA and greatly expanded the number
of strikes from Predator drones armed with missiles targeting militants in the
tribal regions. In 2007 there were three Predator strikes in the tribal areas,
while in 2008 there were 34. Several of those
strikes killed al Qaeda leaders such as Usama al Kini, the mastermind of the
2008 bombing of the Marriott hotel in Islamabad; Abu Khabab al Masri, who had
overseen al Qaeda's investigations into chemical and biological agents, and Abu
Laith al Libi, the number three man in the al Qaeda hierarchy (perhaps the most
dangerous job in the world given the half dozen or so men who have occupied
that position who have subsequently been captured or killed). Under President
Obama the missile strike program has actually accelerated, with five strikes
already since he took office.
The missile strike program is,
however, deeply unpopular among Pakistanis who see it as an infringement on
their sovereignty. A poll released in June 2008 found that 52% of them blamed
the United States
for the violence in their country, while only 8% blamed al Qaeda! American
officials have to weigh the risks from allowing al Qaeda operatives continuing
to build up their network in the FATA---where they had been training Europeans
for attacks in the West---against the possibility that strikes that kill
civilians are a recruitment tool for the Taliban and might destabilize the
Despite American criticisms that
the Pakistanis could do more to fight the Taliban and al Qaeda, Pakistan's
officer class feels strongly that their country is doing as much as it can to
combat the militants, citing as evidence the 1,347 of their soldiers who had
died fighting the militants between 2001 and 2008 (a number that outweighs the
1,065 NATO and US forces who died in the same period fighting the Taliban
across the border in Afghanistan.)
is no doubt that elements of the Pakistani army had done much to combat the
militants, lingering suspicions remains about the military intelligence agency
ISI, which had been instrumental in the rise of the Taliban and a number of the
Kashmiri militant groups. The most dramatic evidence for the continued links that
some in ISI maintained with terrorists was the suicide bombing of the Indian
embassy in Kabul in July 7, 2008, which killed more than 50, the single worst
attack in the capital since the fall of the Taliban seven years earlier. Both
the US and Afghan governments said the bombing was aided by elements of the
ISI, an assertion they based on intercepted phone calls between the plotters
and phone numbers in Pakistan.
The new civilian government
installed following the February 2008 election tried to bring ISI under its
control. Just before Prime Minister Gilani traveled to Washington in July 2008 his government
announced that the ISI would hence forward report to the Ministry of Interior.
Within a few hours of that announcement the Army countermanded the order, which
showed who is wearing the trousers in the military-civilian relationship.
between army and the civilian government could also be seen in the aftermath of
the Mumbai attacks in late November 2008, which were carried out by militants from
Gilani said he would send the ISI chief to India
to help with the investigation, a request that the military agency simply
ignored, making it clear that Pakistan
had effectively two governments: a weak democratically elected one and a strong
unelected body that controls almost all decisions related to Pakistan's
national security and foreign policy.
Mumbai attacks also underlined how little things had really changed inside Pakistan's
jihadi culture since 9/11. The group that carried out the attacks,
Lashkar-e-Taiba, (LeT) had been officially banned in January 2002, but that did
not prevent it from organizing the 60-hour attack on Mumbai, much of it carried
live by news channels around the world, a series of assaults that was often
described as India's 9/11.' The Mumbai attack underlined the fact that Pakistan had lost control of its jihadists who
sought to undermine the creeping rapprochement between India and Pakistan
over the Kashmir issue.
What is worrying as Pakistan heads
in to 2009 is its economy is in free-fall, a plunge that preceded the global
financial crisis. And the high Pakistani fertility rate puts it on track to
become the fifth largest country in the world by 2015 with a population of
almost 200 million. The combination of a sharply rising population with not
enough jobs will likely play into the hands of the militants who often recruit
young men with time on their hands. Unless Pakistan changes that equation the
plague of the Taliban, al Qaeda and the Kashmiri militant groups will only grow
3. Why should the US sustain it commitments
in Afghanistan, after all it is now more than seven years after 9/11 and al
Qaeda is no longer headquartered there, but in Pakistan?
The most cursory knowledge of
Afghan history suggests that the absence of a government in Kabul without the robust backing of the United States
will be a prelude to the Taliban returning to power. Following the expulsion of
the Soviets, the George H.W. Bush administration closed the American Embassy in
Kabul in 1989 and for more than a decade
US policy makers paid virtually no
attention to Afghans. As the country was battered by multiple civil wars, the
Taliban and later al Qaeda took good advantage of the resulting vacuum. On 9/11
the United States learned a
deadly and expensive lesson about how mistaken it was to stand on the side lines
as Afghanistan sank into chaos.
9/11 was planned in Afghanistan and al Qaeda was
headquartered there until the fall of the Taliban. Preventing
Afghanistan from reverting
back into a failed state dominated by the Taliban in which al Qaeda would again
freely operate is a critical national security interest of the United
States and its allies.
Some will no doubt advise
President Obama that increased American engagement in Afghanistan and Pakistan will be
too costly and dangerous. His best response will be that on September 11, 2001,
we learned that we neglect Afghanistan and Pakistan at our peril.
Annex: Policy proposals that the committee
members might consider.
Press for better information about trends in Afghanistan
must press for more information to be made public about Afghanistan from the US
military, State Department and other US agencies. While the minutest
trends in Iraq are a matter
of public record, similar information is either not collected and/or not
publicly disseminated about Afghanistan.
If we don't know were we are coming from it's hard to know the direction we are
The U.S. must decouple the Taliban from the drug trade, which has been one of
the principal motors of their resurgence.
First, do no harm' is a sensible injunction in
combating any insurgency, but the United States
adopted a boneheaded counter-narcotics strategy in Afghanistan. Every year American
taxpayers paid more for that anti-narcotics policy than Afghan farmers make
from the gate price of their opium crops. Meanwhile, with almost every new
growing season Afghanistan
has produced ever-larger amounts of opium and its byproduct heroin. A more
failed policy it was hard to imagine, yet the U.S. gamely pressed on with its
main policy prescription, which was the eradication of poppy fields.
administration's counter-narcotics policy placed eradication at its center,
even though it was met with growing Afghan skepticism and, in some cases,
violence, and coincided with a general decline in public support for the U.S. and NATO mission in Afghanistan.
Why was the policy so unpopular? Afghanistan is one of the poorest
countries in the world and so many rural Afghans have very few options to make
money other than to engage in poppy growing. Abruptly ending the poppy/opium
trade was not an option as that would have put two million people out of work
and impoverish millions more as the only really functional part of the economy
was poppy and opium production. You simply can not
eviscerate the livelihoods of the millions of Afghans who grow poppies and not
expect a backlash.
The eradication approach has only
created more enemies for the coalition as the farmers who had their crops
destroyed are generally the poorer ones who couldn't pay the bribes to have
their fields left alone. Needless to say those farmers prove easy recruits to
the Taliban cause. The U.S. government, in short, is
deeply committed to an unsuccessful drug policy that helps its enemies. The
Taliban derives not only substantial financial benefits from the opium trade,
but also political benefits from its supportive stance on poppy growing,
masterfully exploiting situations in which U.S.-sponsored eradication forces
are pitted against poor farmers.
As General David Barno, the US
military commander in Afghanistan from 2003-2005, has wisely pointed out, the measure
of a successful counter-narcotics policy should not be hectares of poppy
destroyed every year, but hectares of other crops that are planted.
United States should send
more agricultural advisers to Afghanistan,
an overwhelmingly agricultural country, and provide them with incentives such
as fast-track promotions for working in Afghanistan.
-The United States and other NATO
countries should open their markets to Afghan farm products and handicrafts.
international community should help Kabul set up an agency, modeled on the
Canadian Wheat Board, that would purchase crops from farmers at consistent
prices, and market and distribute them internationally.
end the culture of impunity that Afghan drug kingpins currently enjoy, the U.S.
Drug Enforcement Administration should make public the list of the country's
top drug suspects, including government officials, a practice that would likely
see results in Afghanistan's
shame-based culture. It appears that the list has so far not been published
because it would embarrass certain officials in the Karzai government.
Publication is long overdue.
system is still too weak to handle major drug cases, Washington
and Kabul should sign an extradition treaty
allowing Afghan drug kingpins to be tried in the United States, as has happened in
the past with Colombian drug lords.
-The United States should also
endorse a pilot demonstration project to harness poppy cultivation for the
production of legal medicinal opiates such as morphine for sale to countries
like Brazil that are in short supply of cheap pain drugs. While there
are some legitimate criticisms of this idea-principally that it would be
difficult to make sure that Afghan opium was only going into the legitimate
market-one low-risk approach would be to allow the legalized opiate trade to
debut as a pilot project on a small scale in a province with reasonable
security. Farmers engaged in legalized poppy growing would enjoy financial
incentives that could be revoked, and they would face criminal penalties if
they tried to divert their product to the illicit market. Congress could amend
the law that requires U.S.
opiate manufacturers to purchase at least 80 percent of their opiates from India and Turkey
(affording them a guaranteed market) to include Afghanistan. This preferential
trade agreement, which was designed to serve U.S.
political and strategic interests, should be recalibrated to fit our
present-day strategic interests in Afghanistan, where vital national
security interests are at stake.
for security-led reconstruction.
should focus on completing two high-profile projects that will have real
benefits for the Afghan people. The first is to secure the important Kandahar-to-Kabul road,
which was opened as a blacktop freeway with much hoopla in 2003, but which is
now a suicidal route for anyone driving it without a security detail. This
would have broad economic benefits to the country and would send the same kind
of signal that securing Route Irish between Baghdad city and Baghdad airport
did two years ago, which is that the coalition can bring security to key roads.
The second is to finish the work on the Kajaki Dam in southern Afghanistan,
which will provide electricity to some 2 million Afghans, most of whom live
deep in Taliban country.
American aid should be tied, in
part, to an Afghan public employment program similar to the Works Progress
Administration program that President Roosevelt instituted during the Great
has a chronic 40 percent official unemployment rate. It also has a desperate
need for new roads and dams, and must repair the agricultural aqueducts
destroyed by years of war. Meanwhile, Kabul
and other major Afghan cities are awash in debris and trash. Cleaning up that
rubbish would have a salutary effect on the residents of those cities. Much of
the labor required to fix Afghanistan's
problems does not require great skill, and millions of Afghans could be set to
work rebuilding and cleaning up their country. It is puzzling that the manual
labor for major Afghan projects such as the Kabul-to-Jalalabad road has been performed by
Chinese workers. This practice must end and contracts for such projects must
specify that Afghans are hired for those jobs that they can perform.
Much of the terrorism in the region emanates from Pakistan. What can be done about
mapping of the social networks of terrorists in Afghanistan
should include the identification of the clerical mentors of suicide bombers,
as it seems likely that only a relatively small number have persuaded their
followers of the religious necessity of martyrdom. Armed with such
intelligence, the United States
and NATO could ask Pakistan,
where most of the suicide attackers originate, to rein in especially egregious
together with the Pakistani and Afghan governments, should also target the
production and distribution networks of As-Sahab,
al Qaeda's video/audio production arm, as well as the Taliban's analogous Ummat propaganda division. Given the
close connections between these networks and al Qaeda and the Taliban, such an
effort would also provide important clues to the whereabouts of terrorist
president should take every opportunity to make it clear that America's commitment to Afghanistan is
not just until the next election cycle, but for years to come. The American
public, which understands that Afghanistan's
reversion into a failed state would be a prelude to al Qaeda regaining a safe
haven in the country, will support this approach. Elements of the Pakistan national security apparatus are not
prepared to eliminate militant groups on their territory because they are a
means of asserting de facto control over Afghanistan should the Americans
withdraw. Only an unambiguous declaration of long-term U.S. commitment will convince Pakistan's
government to end its passive tolerance for the militant groups headquartered
on the country's western border.
help tamp down the insurgency in FATA and other areas of the NWFP, America should
help the Pakistanis build up their counterinsurgency capabilities. The
Pakistani army is built for a land war with India, not for fighting terrorists
and insurgents. Pakistani officers should be encouraged to attend
counterinsurgency courses at American war colleges, and the United States should support such courses at Pakistan's National Defense
University. None of this
would cost a lot of U.S. dollars and would yield potentially large results, as
the new U.S.
counterinsurgency strategy has done in Iraq.
amounts of discrete U.S.
aid in support of deradicalization programs for jailed Pakistani militants
could also yield large returns. Such programs have had some success in Saudi Arabia, Indonesia,
and Singapore, but have not
been tried in Pakistan.
Pakistani officials would benefit from learning about best practices in
countries that have already spent years in building up their own