Before the
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Washington, D.C. 20554

In the matter of
Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-762, and 777-792 MHz
Bands, WT Docket No. 06-150

Implementing a Nationwide, Broadband, Interoperable Public
Safety Network in the 06-229 700 MHz Band, PS Docket No. 06-229

Implementation of the Commercial Spectrum Enhancement Act
and Modernization of the Commission’s Competitive Bidding Rules
and Procedures, WT Docket No. 05-211

Development of Operational, Technical, and Spectrum Requirements
for Meeting Federal, State and Local Public Safety Communications
Requirements Through 2010,  WT Docket No. 96-86

COMMENTS OF

THE AD HOC PUBLIC INTEREST SPECTRUM COALITION

CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA
CONSUMERS UNION
EDUCAUSE
FREE PRESS
MEDIA ACCESS PROJECT
NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION
PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE
U.S. PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP

SUMMARY

The Ad Hoc Public Interest Spectrum Coalition (PISC) applauds the Commission for including issues raised by PISC in the initial comment period.

The United States continues to fall further behind the rest of the world in broadband Internet access – our markets lack the competition necessary to serve consumers with lower prices, faster speeds and universal access. Even as the broadband market has further consolidated – leaving 96% of the market in the hands of two technologies – our policy framework has only served to diminish opportunities for competition. The auction of the 700 MHz spectrum creates a new possibility for competitive broadband provision. It is imperative that we learn the lessons of the wireline market and make the appropriate policy corrections in the launch of the most promising wireless broadband markets.

The Commission simply cannot choose to let current market conditions and participants control the outcome of the upcoming auctions. To date, existing wireless broadband providers do not offer a useful “third pipe” for American consumers. Perhaps most importantly, this market for broadband capable mobile devices is dominated by the same incumbent firms that control the wireline broadband market. These incumbents make clear that they have no intention of offering broadband with the freedom to attach any device and run any application.

To foster real wireless broadband – the fast, ubiquitous, and dynamic third pipe everyone agrees our country desperately needs – PISC recommends that the Commission take the following steps both to ensure that new spectrum is offered on an open and nondiscriminatory basis and to bring in new entrants interested in challenging the current cozy wireless oligopoly and broadband duopoly:

1. Anonymous Bidding: Anonymous bidding prevents bidders from using signaling and blocking techniques during the auction to deter new entrants from participating. Anonymous bidding will both maximize the likelihood of new entrants and better ensure an appropriate return to the public for the use of valuable public licenses.

2. Exclusion of Incumbents or New Entrant Credits: Exclusion of existing incumbents remains the simplest way to create a class of new entrants able to compete with existing providers. Alternatively, a “new entrant credit” can make it possible for new entrants to compete against deep-pocketed incumbent rivals. While this approach does not have the same certainty as a ban on incumbent participation, it does have several positive aspects to recommend it.

3. Band Plan Issues: The Commission should adopt band plans that facilitate creation of national providers to achieve necessary economies of scale, while still protecting the public safety issues raised by supporters of the Band Optimization Plan (BOP). Accordingly, if the Commission adopts the proposed BOP alternative, the Commission should adopt the first additional proposal, FNPRM at ¶ 200, which would maximize the number of REAG licenses in the Upper 700 MHz auction while permitting resolution of the Canadian Border Area issue. If the Commission does not adopt the BOP alternative, it should adopt the first proposal. FNPRM at ¶ 190.

4. Build-Out Requirements: Licensees should be subject to a “use or lose” license condition that will allow residents of unbuilt areas to use unlicensed devices. At the same time, Commission should allow new entrants to demonstrate that failure to meet the service requirements result from genuine difficulties rather than from an intent to warehouse spectrum or leave rural areas unserved.

5. Designated Entities (DEs): The Commission should grant the Council Tree/MMTC Petition for Reconsideration and should set rules limiting the relationships between DEs and large wireless incumbents as proposed in the Further Notice in that proceeding.

6. Two-sided Auction: A two-sided auction violates the plain language of the statute, which requires the Commission to deposit all revenues from spectrum auctions (less certain administrative expenses) into the U.S. Treasury.

7. Open Access: The 700 MHz auctions will not give birth to the much anticipated third pipe if the licenses are auctioned to the very same vertically integrated telephone and cable incumbents that dominate the wireline market. At least 30 MHz of spectrum licenses should be conditioned on the licensees’ obligation to make wholesale service available to any provider. This will guarantee that new entrants have the opportunity to enter the market in competition with incumbent providers.

8. Net Neutrality and Carterfone: All the licensees of the 60 MHz spectrum must be obligated to carry all Internet and voice traffic without privilege, degradation, or preference, and they must permit consumers to use any non-interfering equipment.