The Western Hemisphere has received less attention and far fewer security assistance resources from Washington since 9/11 than major "fronts" such as the Middle East and South Asia.The one major exception to this pattern is Colombia.

As a partner of the United States in the "war on drugs," Colombia has been one of the largest recipients of subsidized U.S. arms transfers for well over a decade. According to an analysis conducted by the Center on International Policy in Washington,D.C., Colombia received $2.8 billion in military and police assistance from 2002 to 2006.[98] The Colombian government is slated to receive an additional $1.9 billion between2007 and 2009 (see table 19), for a total of $5.3 billion from the beginning of the Bush administration. Aside from Iraq and Afghanistan, where the United States currently has troops on the ground, Colombia ranks third among U.S. military aid recipients worldwide, after Israel and Egypt. Whether all of this assistance can make a difference in a country plagued by along standing, multi-sided civil war, serious human rights abuses, and widespread violence against civilians is another matter.

Table 19
Major U.S. Security Assistance Programs to Colombia
FY 2002 through FY 2009 (dollars in thousands)

Sources: U.S.Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY 2004 through FY 2009 editions; and Center for International Policy, U.S. Aid to Colombia, All Programs, http://justf.org/Country?country=Colombia.
^aFY 2008 figures are estimates.
^bFY 2009 figures are as proposed in the administration's budget.

Although the State Department’s most recent country report on human rights for Colombia asserts that the human rights situation "continued to improve," it also acknowledges that a litany of abuses remain:

The following societal problems and governmental human rights abuses were reported during the year: unlawful and extrajudicial killings; forced disappearances; insubordinate military collaboration with new illegal groups and paramilitaries who refused to demobilize; torture and mistreatment of detainees; overcrowded and insecure prisons; arbitrary arrest; high number of pretrial detainees, some of whom were held with convicted prisoners; impunity; an inefficient judiciary subject to intimidation; harassment and intimidation of journalists; unhygienic conditions at settlements for displaced persons, with limited access to health care,education, or employment; corruption; harassment of human rights groups; violence against women, including rape; child abuse and child prostitution; trafficking in women and children for the purpose of sexual exploitation; societal discrimination against women, indigenous persons, and minorities; and illegal child labor.[99]

Human Rights Watch summed up the security situation in Colombia in 2007:

Colombia remains mired in a decades-long internal armed conflict, which continues to result in widespread abuses by irregular armed groups, including both guerrillas and paramilitaries, as well as by the Colombian armed forces. Civilians suffer the brunt of the conflict, as every year thousands become displaced by the violence, losing their homes and livelihoods. Forced disappearances, extrajudicial executions, targeted assassinations, threats and kidnapping remain commonplace. The vast majority of abuses remain unaddressed.[100]

Human Rights Watch analysts also noted that much of the armed activity carried out by guerrillas and paramilitary groups in Colombia is funded by drug-related activities, and that "paramilitaries have also become increasingly involved in large-scale corruption schemes, infiltrating national governmental institutions, controlling local politicians, and diverting funds from state agencies."[101]

A more recent assessment by the International Crisis Group asserts that Colombian president Alvaro Uribe’s stepped-up military activities against the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionario de Colombia, or Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) are "beginning to produce tangible results" after six years of intense fighting.[102] The ICG assessment suggests that in addition to killing important rebel leaders--including second-in-command Raul Reyes--the Colombian government’s offensive has also weakened the FARC organizationally, making it harder for it to raise revenues or carry out coordinated activities. The government’s efforts are backed up by strong public opposition to the FARC, as evidenced by a 4 million person march against the organization in February. The FARC’s engagement in everything from kidnapping to the use of antipersonnel land mines has delegitimized it in the eyes of the vast majority of Colombians.

Even given what it sees as progress on the security front, however, ICG suggests that "the Uribe administration should not put all of its eggs in the military basket," that it should instead develop a strategy for alleviating rural poverty and creating alternative revenue sources for farmers now making a living by growing coca.[103] This approach would require a substantial redirection of U.S.aid to Colombia. According to a November 2006 analysis by Adam Isacson of the Center for International Policy, 80 percent of U.S. assistance to Colombia since 2000 "has gone to Colombian security forces for weapons, helicopters, planes, boats, combat equipment, training, advice, intelligence, and the spraying of herbicides over 2 million acres of Colombian territory."[104] Only one out of every five dollars of U.S. aid has gone for nonmilitary purposes such as judicial reform, human rights, and rural development.[105]

Violence against trade unionists is a particularly acute problem in Colombia, with over 2,500 killed over the past two decades. One Columbian labor rights group estimates that 72 were killed in 2006, the most recent year for which full statistics are available.[106] The prevalence of violence against trade union members has become a political sticking point in efforts to gather congressional support for a U.S.-Colombia free trade agreement, which is a major goal of both the Bush and Uribe administrations.

U.S. arms transfers and military assistance to Colombia deserve greater scrutiny, with the aim of allocating transfers based on progress on the wide range of human rights concerns noted above. According to Human Rights Watch, only 25 percent of U.S.military assistance to Colombia is "formally subject to human rights conditions."[107] In addition, consideration should be given to shifting the composition of U.S. assistance to Colombia to put more emphasis on social and economic development, and less emphasis on expanding the Colombian government’s military capabilities.