The release last week of a European Commission report highly critical of Bulgaria's and Romania's progress in their efforts against corruption serves as a useful reminder that both Brussels and Ankara should exercise patience while negotiating Turkey's European Union bid. The Bulgarian and Romanian cases demonstrate that both Europe and its potential members are best served by an exhaustive, deliberate accession process.

Negotiations between Turkey and the EU have slowed recently due to increasing doubts in both Turkey and Europe about the wisdom of further expansion. Already suffering from "enlargement fatigue," Europe has seen the economic crisis highlight its internal divisions, strengthen nationalist sentiment within member countries, and raise questions about Brussels' ability to make effective policy. The decision last month to indefinitely postpone accession negotiations with Croatia is just the latest indication of Europe's mood. Meanwhile, many Turks have grown impatient with the accession process and are asking themselves whether they really need Europe.

But while both sides' concerns are understandable, they are shortsighted.

Full membership negotiations between Turkey and the EU began in 2005, but talks have since stalled due to the slow pace of Turkey's reform program and popular opposition to Turkey's bid within Europe. In a broad array of areas -- including judicial reform, civil-military relations, human rights, and press freedoms -- Turkey falls far short of EU standards and has made little progress for several years. The Constitutional Court's near-ban of the ruling, moderately Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP) last summer for "engaging in anti-secular activities" signaled a low point in European perceptions of Turkey's democratic institutions.

Meanwhile, popular support for accession is waning in both Turkey and Europe. Turks are frustrated that Brussels has opened negotiations in just 11 of the 35 policy areas that must be completed before Turkey can join. What's more, they felt insulted by statements from French President Nicolas Sarkozy and German President Angela Merkel that Turkey will never become part of Europe and will have to settle for an ill-defined, unprecedented "privileged partnership" with the union.

At the same time, Europeans are growing impatient with Turkey's halting reform efforts. They question the wisdom of extending Europe's borders to the heart of the Middle East, and worry about the financial costs associated with incorporating a country as large and relatively poor as Turkey.

Ankara is currently enjoying a moment of self-satisfaction. Its economy has fared well in recent years, and it maintains friendly relations with nearly all of its feuding neighbors. Turkey's potential as an energy hub, its role as a diplomatic interlocutor between its neighbors and the West, and President Barack Obama's high-profile visit in April have further highlighted Turkey's emergence as a significant regional power.

But these positive developments have led to an inflated sense of confidence in Ankara. Turkey lives in a dangerous neighborhood in which it has no natural allies. And the deep mistrust between the government and the military, as well as the fact that Turkey's economy contracted 13.8 percent in the first quarter, reveal that both Turkey's political and economic systems rest on shaky foundations. In 10 or 20 years, those foundations are likely to be much sturdier should Turkey remain committed to the accession process. And Ankara is likely to find itself in a stronger international position if it enjoys the security and stability that Europe provides.

Things may look different from Europe's perspective in a decade or two as well. Europe's population is declining, and economic growth among the developed, Western European states is likely to be low. Turkey will be in a position to provide the labor that Europe needs, while serving as a destination for investment and an engine for economic growth.

But the benefits that Turkey offers Europe go beyond economics. Turkey's army -- the second-largest in NATO -- could play an increasingly significant role as the United States gradually pulls back from its overseas security commitments, at the same time that European governments struggle to modernize their militaries while providing for aging populations. Incorporating a Muslim country may also help Europe to integrate its large and growing Muslim minority.

Most importantly, Europe will have to engage with Turkey as a large, influential country on its borders whether or not it becomes part of Europe. The accession process offers Europe the opportunity to ensure that its southern neighbor is as stable, prosperous, and friendly as possible.

So the challenge for Ankara, Brussels and European capitals is to get Turkey to a place where it is prepared to join the Union, even if continuing the accession negotiations until Turkey is actually ready is a difficult diplomatic and political dance.

The Turkish government must remain committed to the reform process and make a sustained effort to explain to its constituency why membership is so important -- and that the process will take some time. The common goal of EU membership is a strong external incentive that can bind together the various elements within an increasingly divided Turkish society. Meanwhile, European leaders should leave the door open to membership, while firmly demanding that all criteria be met, even if it takes many years. Both Europe and Turkey stand to benefit over the long term if they can sustain the political will to exercise strategic patience in their negotiations.