Russia Should Learn to Take Yes for an Answer

How should Russia respond to President Obama's indefinite suspension of US missile defences in Central Europe? Most obviously, by displaying flexibility concerning negotiations on nuclear weapons cuts. Here is an opportunity for both sides to create the impression of successful co-operation while in fact sacrificing very little, since both have far more weapons than they need for an effective deterrence against any conceivable threat.

Much trickier is of course the question of whether Russia should agree to new sanctions against Iran if Tehran rejects international demands concerning its nuclear programme. Unfortunately, the US statement came after the end of the Valdai, but it is clear from statements by President Medvedev, Foreign Minister Lavrov and others that the Russian establishment is divided on the issue.

Russian opponents of sanctions have some weighty arguments on their side. As Andranik Migranyan pointed out in a recent article, Iran is a permanent neighbour of Russia's, whose goodwill is of immense importance to Russia's security. Iran's refusal to assist Islamist extremism and rebellion in Chechnya and elsewhere has been of great help to Russia. In Afghanistan before 9/11, Russia and Iran stood together behind the anti-Taleban resistance.

Finally there may well be spoilers in the Russian establishment who would actually like to see the US become embroiled in war with Iran, since the probable result in the short term would be a steep rise in oil prices, and in the medium term would be Iranian support for the Taleban and a shattering defeat for the US and NATO.

These last arguments however are also among the strongest reasons why Russia should in fact do everything in its power to avoid an attack on Iran. Firstly, repeated experience has shown that a very sharp rise in oil prices is likely to trigger a global recession--which in turn brings prices radically down again.

Secondly, precisely because Russia, unlike America, is doomed to live permanently as a neighbour of the Muslim world, and with large Muslim territories within its borders, it cannot be in Russia's real long-term interests to see a new flare-up of Islamist extremism, even if in the short term this is directed against the US. Finally, while Russia could live quite happily with Iranian possession of nuclear weapons (as indeed could the West, if truth be told) Russia most certainly could not feel safe with the inevitable result, which would be nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Saudi Arabia.

Above all, when it comes to the most serious issue dividing Russia and the West and threatening Russian influence in its neighbourhood, Russia has actually won. When the West was pushing forward against Russia, it made sense for Russia to push back wherever possible; but in the wake of last year's Georgian attack on South Ossetia and the West's failure to save Georgia from Russia's response, NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine is almost certainly dead as a nail. This is made even more probable by America's loss of relative power, and immense commitments elsewhere.

In the wake of the present economic recession and the European Union's internal problems, EU membership for Ukraine is also a dead issue. There is no real need any longer therefore for Russia to fear the expansion of Western influence, or to hold back from supporting the West over Iran in the hope of extracting concessions elsewhere. Or to put it another way, it is becoming time that Russia learned to take "yes" as an answer in its geopolitical dealings with the West, even if the "yes" comes muffled in clouds of traditional anti-Russian language like that of Vice President Biden in Tbilisi.

One reason why Russia should do this is that crises in Russia's neighbourhood do not depend entirely on the will of Moscow and Washington, but can be greatly worsened by ill-will between Moscow and Washington. The way things are going, Ukraine may well face a political implosion in the years to come, including a great increase in ethnic tension within the country. In these circumstances, US hostility to Russia could well help turn this from a local into an international crisis.

The results for Western economies would be severe. For Russia they could well be disastrous. So NATO enlargement aside, American attitudes to Russia do matter to Russia. If Moscow refuses to make any positive response to this latest step of Obama's, it will ensure that future Democratic attitudes to Russia in Washington will be every bit as bad as Republican ones. After all, President Obama by this step is taking a very serious risk in domestic political terms, and the Russian government needs to recognize this and respond accordingly. Or will Russia really feel better off if a Republican like John McCain or Sarah Palin occupies the White House after 2012?