McChrystal's Full-Court Press on Afghanistan Is Improper

Civilian control of the armed forces is one of the most sacrosanct tenets of American democracy. It assures us that military decision-making will be subordinate to the larger strategic perspective of our nation's elected -- and ultimately accountable -- leaders.

But the civil-military balance is at risk of being undermined by the recent leak of Gen. Stanley McChrystal's strategic review on Afghanistan. If, as seems likely, the leak emanated from the military -- and it does follow a regular pattern of leaking on the issue of troop increases for Afghanistan -- it represents a serious breach in civil-military relations.

To be sure, military prodding for a favored course of action is nothing new, and McChrystal is hardly the first military commander to ask for more troops. But the McChrystal review leak is not an isolated incident. Back in July, the Washington Post highlighted National Security Adviser Jim Jones' stern warning to Marine generals about requesting additional forces for the Afghanistan fight. Within days, anonymous leaks to the same paper warned that the U.S. "will lose the war" without significant troop increases. Jones quickly backtracked from his tough words.

Since then, a steady torrent of leaks has intimated that McChrystal would resign if more troops are not forthcoming, that more resources were essential for victory and that there is "significant frustration" in the military with President Obama. McChrystal even took a star turn on "60 Minutes" to push his counterinsurgency message.

McChrystal's review itself followed a similar pattern. The plan offered the President no tactical recommendations outside of the military's favored course, a robust and prolonged counterinsurgency effort and warned of dire consequences without the introduction of more troops to the conflict.

This is not to say that the course recommended by McChrystal is the wrong one. But by leaking the report, it has put President Obama in a difficult and uncomfortable position. The commander-in-chief can either double down the U.S. commitment in Afghanistan, or he can reduce the military footprint there and risk political charges that he is disregarding the wishes of his own field commander. At the very least, if he makes this choice he will be seen as publicly disagreeing with his top general.

These are precisely the types of disagreements that should be aired behind closed doors and not in the public arena.

The political implications of such leaking make it that much harder for the President to engage in the sort of deliberate national security decision-making that is required of the commander in chief. Worst of all, it has placed the President in the unusual public position of appearing subordinate to the wishes of his commanding general -- Obama's political rivals have even argued that to deny McChrystal's request is to "concede defeat." This practically turns the civil-military balance on its head.

No matter what course Obama adopts on Afghanistan, of perhaps greater concern should be assertive members of the military placing inappropriate political pressure on the President to accede to their wishes.

Over the past two decades, the U.S. military has taken on added prominence, power and responsibility in American society. But as this recent incident demonstrates, there is a certain danger in politicizing an institution that is constitutionally mandated to be above politics.

Obama is the only person charged with weighing the various national security implications of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan -- not just from a military perspective, but also from a political and national interest viewpoint. He must be allowed to make the decision without worrying about his military commanders airing their opinions in public and pushing them toward their preferred military course.