Honest Broker
American Strategy Program, Middle East Task Force
The following segment is part of a live debate between the New America Foundation's Daniel Levy and the American Enterprise Institute's David Frum. The debate was hosted by TheEconomist.com and moderated by Xan Smiley.
At the height of the Democratic primary for the 2004 presidential election a then leading contender, the former Vermont governor, Howard Dean, commented that America should be evenhanded in Middle East peacemaking. Mr Dean spent the following days and weeks repenting. The backlash even included a letter from congressional Democratic leadership dressing down the governor. Mr Dean was probably not destined for the White House anyway, but this anecdote is well remembered in Washington.
It seems to suggest that the special US-Israel relationship and the taboos surrounding Israel in US domestic politics preclude the possibility of any contemporary US administration being evenhanded. Not so fast.
I will argue that within the context of that US-Israel special relationship, the United States can still be an honest broker, should play such a role and has done so on several occasions in the past, and that President Obama's America is beginning to occupy that political space.
Mr Obama is a friend of Israel. It is, however, a different type of friendship from the Bush years, more grown-up and grounded in reality, healthier for both parties. One should understand that the honest-broker effort under Mr Obama will be undertaken while maintaining the special relationship, not replacing it. He will, for instance, be especially sensitive to Israel's legitimate security concerns (but not its territorial expansionism).
An appropriate analogy might be a sister-in-law's role during a couple's dispute: there is clearly a closer tie to one side, but that does not preclude a sufficiently effective evenhandedness. Let us say that Mr Obama's America is now being enough of an honest broker.
For an American administration to stake out this ground would not be unprecedented. Aaron David Miller, who advised six secretaries of state on Middle East policy, in his "The Much Too Promised Land" describes the three "bad boys" of Arab-Israeli peacemaking: Kissinger, Carter and Baker. All were tough, and they delivered results. Under Kissinger's guidance, when Israel dragged its feet on Sinai redeployment talks with the Egyptians, President Ford in 1975 announced a "reassessment" of the US-Israel relationship and froze new arms agreements with Israel. President Carter brokered Israeli-Egyptian peace at Camp David that included a full Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai to the 1967 lines and full settlement evacuation. This happened despite the fact that Israel's prime minister Menachem Begin was committed to keeping the Sinai and to personally retiring to the Yamit settlement there. President George H.W. Bush and Secretary Baker imposed loan guarantee penalties on Israeli settlements' expansion in 1991.
And these are not the only examples. President Reagan established diplomatic contacts with the PLO in 1988 against Israel's wishes. More--including on President Clinton--later in our debate.
Mr Obama faces what might, paradoxically, be an improved landscape for brokerage. He inherits the disastrous consequences of Bush 43's Middle East adventures, likely making it easier for him to explain and carry support for a policy shift in the region.
Brokering real progress on Israel-Palestine is now more readily understood as being in the US national interest. An especially compelling case can also now be made on why a two-state solution is urgent for Israel and its future as a democracy, and there are new progressive dynamics in America's Jewish community and in online political organizing that support this trend.
Against this backdrop, Mr Obama is staking out that role of the honest-enough broker. His administration has made public its disagreement with Israel's settlement policy, unequivocally calling for a full freeze. US relations with Syria have been upgraded. The president has made a point of reaching out to the Arab and Muslim worlds, notably in his Cairo speech, and has done so respectfully, eschewing the arrogant and lecturing tone of his predecessor. Obama has conveyed his determination to realize a two-state solution, just last week telling American Jewish leaders that he would be "evenhanded", having honest conversations with and putting pressure on both the Israeli and Arab sides.
The president has, not surprisingly, come under attack from the hawkish right in both the United States and Israel. One Likud minister (Yossi Peled) presented the cabinet with an 11-page document proposing Israeli sanctions on the United States to repel Obama's "hostile" and "appeasement" policies.
One can also ask whether the United States should be an honest broker. Doesn't Israel deserve one friend in the world unequivocally in its camp? I would argue that Israel does need that friendship, but it must be of a responsible kind. Too often Israel's most self-destructive tendencies (entrenching occupation, settlements) have been indulged, perhaps even encouraged in recent years. That is irresponsible friendship, akin to handing a drunken mate the keys to a car.
If Mr Obama's America is not becoming an honest broker, does that mean that it is still, so to speak, too pro-Israel? Or has it become too pro-Arab? Despite the above arguments, the latter case is extremely difficult to sustain. Were Spock to land here and conduct an inventory of Mr Obama's first six months, the only logical Vulcan conclusion would be that the aggregate of policies weighs in Israel's favor. Israel remains the largest recipient of overseas US assistance ($2.775 billion this year despite having a PPP GDP per head of $28,200). America boycotted April's UN Anti-Racism Conference, ostensibly in solidarity with Israel. In opposing settlements, the Obama administration does not embrace international law or punitive measures, and the United States maintains unparalleled military and strategic cooperation with Israel. Mr Obama's America can still credibly be considered to indulge and even facilitate Israel's continued occupation of the Palestinian territories and Golan Heights and, as such, is often severely criticized in the Arab media and beyond.
Surely, though, it would be curmudgeonly not to acknowledge the important points of departure in Mr Obama's approach and the promise his presidency holds out for a Middle East policy sufficiently evenhanded to deliver real breakthroughs. Of course, it is early days and detailed policies, which will be the real test, are still in their infancy. America should also not do this alone; international and regional partners need to be actively engaged. Yet, in an American context, and while maintaining the special relationship, the contours are emerging of a much needed honest broker.











