For half a century, the United States
has pursued a policy of isolating Cuba in the vain hope that doing so
would lead to the downfall of the island's Communist regime. Today that policy
is one of the last great historical anachronisms of the Cold War, outliving the
Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union, despite the
fact that it has never accomplished what it was supposed to do. Political
realists such as Henry Kissinger have argued for years that the policy
undercuts U.S. diplomatic
efforts on a host of fronts because it is so widely disliked by other
countries, especially in the Western Hemisphere.
(It is one of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez's most successful talking
points.) Human rights groups like Amnesty International have long pointed out
that the embargo is an obstacle to improving human rights conditions, not an
aid. Meanwhile, greater trade with the United
States has led to better lives and greater--if not
necessarily complete--freedoms for the citizens of other countries with
Communist governments, such as China
and Vietnam.
And yet, thanks to intransigent conservative ideology and the outsized
electoral influence of Florida's
Cuban American voters, the policy of near-complete isolation has endured.
For the last several months, however, the Obama
administration has moved slowly, step by incremental step, away from the
policy. In March, the president signed a budget bill easing Bush-era
restrictions on how often Cuban Americans can visit the island and how much
remittance money they can send to relatives there. In April, he eliminated such
restrictions altogether, and also gave U.S. telecom firms permission to pursue
licensing deals with Cuba to expand cell phone, broadband, and other
communications services. Then, in May, his administration offered to resume
direct mail service to the island for the first time in decades, and to begin
negotiations on issues involving migration--offers the Cuban government readily
accepted. Finally, in June, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton brokered a deal
to allow Cuba
to rejoin the Organization of American States if it meets key benchmarks of
democratic reform. (Cuba
was not so quick to take up that offer.) Meanwhile, the White House has been
watching with interest efforts on Capitol Hill to repeal the law that bans
American tourists from visiting the island--efforts that stand a surprisingly
decent chance of garnering majority support in both the House and Senate by
this fall.
The next logical step--and by far the biggest and
most controversial--would be to end the United
States's forty-seven-year-old trade embargo on Cuba.
When he was a state senator, Obama called for doing exactly that. But he
backtracked four years later, as presidential candidates inevitably do. In a
speech in Miami to the Cuban American National Foundation, a bastion of support
for the existing policy, Obama promised to end the restrictions on Cuban
American travel and remittances to Cuba but said, "as president I'm not
going to [end] the embargo; it's an important inducement for change." This
is more or less his position today.
But the president and his senior advisers also
understand a key political fact: on November 6, 2008, Obama won Florida with only 35
percent of the Cuban American vote. In fact, he is the first U.S. president
since the Cuban Revolution who is not beholden to that voting bloc for his
victory in the state. In other words, he is the first president to have the
political running room to lift the embargo.
And here's the most interesting part: he doesn't
necessarily need Congress's support to do it. Under the right conditions, he
can lift the embargo unilaterally. Those conditions are dictated by, of all
things, the weather.
***
By dint of its location, Cuba
is a nearly perennial target of tropical storms. Last year saw Cuba absorb
four direct hits by hurricane-force storms, wiping out a third of the island's
agricultural production, damaging or destroying a third of its housing,
devastating its electrical grid, and eliminating 20 percent of its GDP. It was,
many experts say, the worst storm season ever.
In the wake of that disaster, the Cuban government
was somehow able to patch together enough international credit to avert mass
starvation. It did so only by importing enough food to increase its monthly
ration from 50 percent of the nation's calories to 75 percent. Indeed, reports
from the island suggest that Havana
had to choose between importing food and importing building materials: much, if
not most, of the housing that was damaged in the 2008 storms has yet to be
rebuilt. And with tourism down, nickel prices down, and last year's tobacco
crop flattened--and with Venezuela,
Cuba's most important
regional ally and budget subsidizer, reeling from the drop in oil prices--Havana's sources of cash
are not keeping up with its mounting debt.
This year the National Hurricane
Center predicts fourteen
named storms and up to seven major hurricanes in the Atlantic basin. In its
present weakened condition, just a single direct hit by a major hurricane could
overwhelm the Cuban government's ability to meet the basic needs of its people.
A storm like last year's Hurricane Ike--which came ashore as a Category 3 storm
and chewed up the length of the island from east to west--could be
catastrophic.
If Cuba
were any other country, the United
States would efficiently arrange assistance
through the U.S. Agency for International Development. However, as the Bush
administration learned last September, Cuba
will not accept direct humanitarian assistance from the United States.
The Cubans' rationale, one has to admit, has a certain logic: if a man is being
choked, does it make sense for him to accept a glass of water from the person
who's choking him?
That's where things get interesting. If, by
extraordinarily bad luck, Cuba
does get severely battered, the government may not be able to deliver enough
food, reconstruction aid, and, frankly, coercion to prevent the people from
voting with their boats. Before long, we could see a wave of seagoing humanity
motoring, paddling, and floating the ninety miles to the coast of South Florida. After
all, it's happened before, twice--once in 1980, and again in 1994.
If a major storm hits, President Obama will face a
choice. Like George Bush, he could offer assistance. Like Bill Clinton, he
could wait for the Cuban people to take to the sea and then order the Navy and
Coast Guard to scoop up rafters and try to send them back. Or he could use the
crisis to forge a bold new policy.
***
Here's how. In a little-known corner of the United States Code, the 1961
Foreign Assistance Act, Congress gave the president extraordinary authority in
times of humanitarian disaster: "[N]otwithstanding any other provision of
this chapter or any other Act, the President is authorized to furnish
assistance to any foreign country, international organization, or private
voluntary organization, on such terms and conditions as he may determine, for
international disaster relief and rehabilitation."
"Notwithstanding ... any other Act" means
the president is not constrained by any other law passed by Congress as he
responds to a disaster. And that gives the president the opportunity to convert
a perfect storm into a strategic watershed: instead of offering the Cuban
government direct assistance, which it will only reject, he could lift the
embargo itself.
Structured properly--say, for a term of 180 days,
during which the Cuban government and people could purchase nonmilitary items
on the American market for cash or credit--the Obama administration could avert
a humanitarian nightmare, win the goodwill of the Cuban people, provide
significant economic stimulus to the southeastern United States, tie Hugo
Chávez in knots, and make it possible for Congress to repeal the embargo at the
end of the 180 days, when it is clear that America's national interests are
best served by a policy of confident and generous strategic patience.
The president's chief of staff, Rahm Emmanuel, is
famous for saying that one should never let a good crisis go to waste. One
hopes that it would not take a significant uptick in human suffering to force a
change in an antiquated piece of U.S. policy--but if it does, this
might just be how it happens.