How does Cochrane reconcile robust competition with health security? In addition to medical insurance, he proposes that individuals and families purchase health-status insurance. In the event that one develops a chronic illness, the health-status insurance policy would pay for the lifetime increase in medical insurance costs.
Last week, at a White House forum on reforming health care,
President Obama issued a challenge to advocates of less government
control of the medical marketplace.
"If there is a way of getting this done [i.e., reforming health
care] where we're driving down costs and people are getting health
insurance at an affordable rate and have choice of doctor, have
flexibility in terms of their plans, and we could do that entirely
through the market, I'd be happy to do it that way."
More to the point, Obama added that he'd be just as happy to pursue
an approach that involved more government control as well, and that
seems to be the tack he's taking. During the 2008 presidential
campaign, Obama promised a sweeping overhaul of the health care system
that would leave the system of employer-provided group insurance intact
while creating a new National Health Insurance Exchange that would
offer the benefits of group insurance to those who don't have access to
it. The Exchange would give people access to a choice between various
private plans and a new public insurance plan modeled on Medicare, and
insurers would be forbidden from charging on the basis of pre-existing
conditions of health status.
Congressional Republicans have criticized Obama's approach, and
they've been particularly hostile to the idea of a new public insurance
plan. They argue that Obama's reforms will eventually lead to a
nationalized health care system. But as of yet they've failed to offer
an alternative that meets Obama's criteria for a successful health care
reform.
Enter John Cochrane, an economist at the University of Chicago Booth
School of Business. Professor Cochrane has long advocated a proposal he
calls "health-status insurance," an approach that could guarantee
long-term health security while also freeing medical insurers to
compete for customers.
To most health care reformers, this sounds like a contradiction in
terms. Our health care system has a strong built-in bias towards
employer-provided group insurance. The appeal of group insurance is
that it allows healthy customers to cross-subsidize unhealthy
customers.
The great fear that has motivated reformers for decades is that
insurers will compete for healthy customers by offering them
inexpensive plans, in the process unraveling the delicate web of
cross-subsidies and leaving unhealthy customers to pay ever-higher
premiums. This is called "adverse selection." And so most reform
proposals promise to further restrict competition between medical
insurers by, for example, mandating that all insurance plans charge the
same rates to all subscribers. This approach, called community rating,
has an intuitive appeal. Why should a family be punished because it has
a child with leukemia? Why should a small business face punishing
health care costs because one of its employees suffers from diabetes?
It is easy to see why businesses large and small are increasingly
agitating for a health care reform that will ease these burdens.
Obama's call for a National Health Insurance Exchange is rooted in
these concerns. By gathering everyone up in ever-larger pools, you
preserve the web of cross-subsidies and insulate the unhealthy and the
unfortunate.
As Professor Cochrane argues, however, this "forced-pooling" has a
serious downside. As in any industry, reduced competition leads to
higher costs, lower-quality service and less innovation. To "solve"
these problems, we instinctively impose more regulations--yet these
regulations further reduce competition, and the cycle begins anew. The
inevitable end result, as Obama's critics suggest, is a single
government-run insurance pool covered by a single government-run
insurer, or perhaps a public plan plus a handful of private plans that
essentially behave like regulated utilities.
So how does Cochrane reconcile robust competition with health
security? In addition to medical insurance, he proposes that
individuals and families purchase health-status insurance. In the event
that one develops a chronic illness, the health-status insurance policy
would pay for the lifetime increase in medical insurance costs. Medical
insurers would be free to adjust premiums upwards, but the consumer
would be insulated from the economic shock. For those who already
suffer from chronic conditions or other expensive ailments, the
government could step in and deposit money in a health-status insurance
account to cover the higher costs.
The Cochrane plan doesn't solve all of America's health care
maladies by any means, but it does create a competitive insurance
marketplace while protecting people from the economic effects of
unanticipated health problems. Tackling the problem of the uninsured
actually becomes much easier in a world with health-status insurance,
as it will make medical insurance more affordable for everyone.
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