At first glance, the new national defense strategy released by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recently looks like a new start, with much talk of working with allies and -- heaven forbid -- even other US government agencies.

Gates comes across as the "anti-Rumsfeld," replacing his predecessor's bluster with quiet diplomacy, and an overreliance on military force with a more pragmatic, balanced approach to security. The new strategy document reflects these differences.

This is not the first time that Gates has embraced the themes set out in the new strategy document. In a speech this year at Kansas State University, he called for substantial increases in spending for the State Department, pointing out that there are fewer professional diplomats in the Foreign Service than there are personnel on an average aircraft carrier task force (of which the United States has 12).

But lest his audience think he had truly gone wobbly, Gates also stressed that he did not want these new funds to come at the expense of growing Pentagon budgets.

The defense secretary seems to want to have it both ways - to prepare for conventional and irregular warfare; to get civilian help on tasks like reconstruction, development, and governance while institutionalizing the Pentagon's own capabilities in these areas; to have a strategic dialogue with China while maintaining US dominance; and to seek stronger alliances while opposing anything that would limit US "freedom of action" -- even though real alliance-building generally requires limiting one's freedom of action.

It all seems to boil down to seeking a kinder, gentler form of global dominance. This may be a more intelligent strategy for preserving US global preeminence than Donald Rumsfeld's, but one that ignores a central reality: the United States is losing the economic, political, and cultural underpinnings of its post-World War II dominance. With chronic trade and budget deficits, a weak dollar, and an inability to rally adequate international support for its objectives in Iraq and Afghanistan, Washington's ability to win friends and intimidate adversaries has declined substantially.

Even given these flaws, there are a few interesting strands in the Gates document. It talks about the military not being the primary tool for keeping weapons of mass destruction from terrorists, or for thwarting cyber-attacks. But even here, the Gates document argues for military capabilities if civilian strategies don't pan out.

Gates also talks about looking forward to the day when terrorism is just a "nuisance" that can be handled by law enforcement. This is dangerously close to the position that got John F. Kerry in trouble in the 2004 election campaign. Finally, the document suggests the need to address the "root causes" of terrorism, an approach that was anathema under Rumsfeld's leadership.

What hasn't changed in the Gates strategy is the expansive definition of US interests, including "protecting" free trade and the flow of resources to the United States and its allies. Without a change in the definition of US interests, major change in US defense policy is unlikely.

The biggest obstacle to implementing the new Pentagon strategy is money. With two wars already underway and serious economic problems domestically, the military budget could level off or even fall relative to inflation. If so, there would need to be cuts in longer-term programs. Either that, or the United States would have to shut down one or both of the current wars.

So, like it or not, the next administration will be forced to make choices -- between military spending and diplomacy; between expensive Cold War weapons and provisions for troops involved in current conflicts; and between a military strategy of "global reach" and finding the resources to address pressing domestic needs. In this area at least, a little budget discipline could go along way toward the crafting of better -- and more realistic -- approaches to defending the United States and its global interests.