The Next American President And South Asia

Is America’s policy toward South Asia likely to change during the next U.S. administration? Whether the Republican John McCain or the Democratic contender, be that contender Barack Obama or Hillary Clinton, wins the White House in November, U.S. policy toward South Asia is more likely to be shaped by the continuation of present trends than by radical new departures.

Unlike Europe, East Asia and the Middle East, South Asia has never been treated as a region of vital interest to the U.S. During the Cold War, Washington’s South Asia policy was shaped by, and subordinated to, its global Cold War strategy. India, without being a member of the Soviet bloc, was loosely aligned with Moscow, so the U.S. tended to take the side of Pakistan. The U.S. alliance with Pakistan deepened following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which provoked a coalition of the U.S., Pakistan and China to support the anti-Soviet resistance.

The end of the Cold War changed the regional and global equation. But the subordination of America’s policy toward South Asia to its policies toward other regions of greater interest to the U.S. remained intact. To be specific, U.S. policy toward South Asia is shaped by American strategy in East Asia and the Middle East.

East Asia -- and India

In East Asia, the U.S. is concerned about the implications for the regional and global balance of power of the long-term rise of Chinese military power. This creates a somewhat paradoxical situation, because while the Pentagon tends to view China as a potential great power threat -- a “peer competitor” in the jargon of U.S. national security experts -- American corporate and financial elites are deeply invested in the rapidly growing Chinese economy, which is a source of capital to fund America’s deficits and of cheap goods for America’s consumers.

Despite the intertwining of the Chinese and American economies, a low-level security rivalry between China and the U.S. has been underway for some time. Recently the U.S., using the excuse of testing its missile defense system, shot down one of its satellites, in way of reply to China’s own shooting down of one of its satellites in January 2007, an action that was widely perceived as a signal to the U.S. that China could retaliate against the U.S. military, which would be heavily dependent on orbital assets like spy satellites and communications satellites, in the event of a Sino-American conflict -- over Taiwan, for example.

In addition, China is building up its submarine fleet, which is viewed as a threat to U.S. naval dominance of the Pacific and possibly the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. Chinese hackers, thought to be backed by the Chinese government, have broken into computers in the U.S. and some of America’s allies. Chinese political and military support for regimes in resource-rich countries in Africa has prompted new U.S. military attention to that continent. Most troubling of all, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which unites China and Russia with several Central Asian states, has evolved into what looks more and more like a Sino-Russian military alliance, with joint military exercises clearly designed to intimidate the U.S.

To balance Chinese power, the U.S. has encouraged its allies Japan and South Korea to play a more active military role together with the U.S. In effect, the plan is to turn the alliance of the U.S., Japan and South Korea into a de facto anti-Chinese alliance. With the same goal in mind, the neoconservatives of the Bush administration have openly discussed bringing India into a U.S.-Japanese-South Korean-Indian “alliance of democracies” that could contain China. In addition to U.S. interest in India as a potential military counterweight to China, rapidly growing U.S.-Indian trade and a burgeoning Indian diaspora in the U.S. are creating Indian-American ties that are much closer and warmer than ever before.

West Asia -- and Pakistan

But the U.S. tilt toward India, as part of America’s strategy of hedging against the rise of Chinese power, does not mean that the U.S. is tilting away from Pakistan. On the contrary, the U.S. is deeply concerned about the future of Pakistan, because of another region vital to the U.S. -- the Middle East. With Osama bin laden thought to be hiding in the tribal areas, Pakistan, rather than Afghanistan or Iraq, has become the center of the global U.S. campaign against al-Qaeda. And Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons adds to American fears that Pakistan might disintegrate or fall under the control of an anti-American regime. The assassination of Benazir Bhutto underlined the potential for anarchy in Pakistan.

American policy toward South Asia, then, is shaped by U.S. policy toward two other regions of more importance to the U.S.: East Asia and the Middle East. In order to counter the rise of China in East Asia, the U.S. is deepening its ties with India. At the same time, in order to defeat al-Qaeda, the U.S. has a vital interest in the fate of Pakistan, India’s traditional rival. The other South Asian countries, such as Bangladesh or Sri Lanka, are marginal to US interests in either region. Whether a Republican or a Democrat wins the White House in November 2008, these strategic realities are unlikely to change.