To judge by the responses of people whom my assistant and I talked with on the streets of Peshawar this weekend, most Pakistanis will greet the departure of President Pervez Musharraf from office with great satisfaction. Fewer than 10 per cent of those interviewed said he had done a good job even at the start of his rule. The rest said they disliked or even hated Mr Musharraf for two main reasons: he has failed to stop inflation, and “he has taken American money to kill his own people”.

The tragedy of Mr Musharraf is thus that his administration has been des­troyed by factors largely beyond his control – notably the relationship with the US – although some of his decisions may have made them worse. The tragedy of Pakistan is that these factors now apply to all Pakistani governments.

Mr Musharraf has made considerable achievements – providing Pakistan’s best economic management for many years, and contributing to a growth rate that until the present downturn was among the highest in the world. His government was far less corrupt than that of his predecessors, and he himself has never been credibly accused of personal corruption.

Mr Musharraf’s own progressive and tolerant ideals contributed to an opening up of Pakistani cultural life, which had been for so long stifled by the legacy of General Zia’s official Islamisation policy. He introduced a devolution of power to elected local councils that, while flawed, gives the possibility for the growth of democracy in Pakistan’s districts, rather than the appearance of it in its parliament. Lastly, he belatedly went as far as any Pakistani leader can go in seeking a settlement with India.

Of course, Mr Musharraf could never be forgiven by the western media or Pakistani liberals for being a military ruler – although most of those same liberals had welcomed his coup in 1999. His military background may also have accentuated a personal flaw, which was a tendency to make impulsive and risky decisions. Neither his reputation nor his relations with India fully recovered from his responsibility for the militarily brilliant but geo­politically crazy Kargil operation in 1999. His hasty decision last year to dismiss most of the Supreme Court precipitated the events leading to his fall from power.

Sooner or later, the administration would have fallen anyway, for the same reasons that destroy all Pakistani governments. They cannot satisfy the demands of the masses for higher living standards, if only because these are always devoured by population growth. And they cannot satisfy the demand of the political elites for patronage because there is not enough to go round. The state and the military cannot govern without the elites because there is no basis in ideology or society for the creation of a new mass political movement. In the end, elite and mass discontent unite in unstoppable protest.

Nevertheless, bitter public disillusionment with the civilian alternatives meant Mr Musharraf might have lasted longer, had it not been for the attacks of September 11 2001 and the US war on terror, which the overwhelming majority of Pakistanis loathe. Opinion polls show that what has really driven mass hostility to Mr Musharraf here is his subordination to the US, and especially giving even limited military help to the US against the Taliban. Meanwhile, the US media and Congress have attacked Mr Musharraf’s “treachery”.

Even his confrontation with the judges was largely sparked by their investigation of the disappearance of suspected Islamist extremists at the hands of the security forces – and almost every Pakistani with whom I have spoken privately believes many of these were “disappeared” to US custody. Mr Musharraf was caught in an inescapable and tightening vice, between intense US pressure (mixed admittedly with substantial financial help) and the sentiments of his own people.

But anyone who thinks US pressure on Pakistan will now ease has not been paying attention these past 60 years. If Taliban pressure in Afghanistan continues to increase, then so will US pressure on Pakistan to take stronger military action against Taliban support in Pakistan’s tribal areas.

Increasing insurgency by Pakistani Taliban in Pakistan itself means there is a chance of a tougher response from the military and some political parties. Strong public (and military) sympathy for the Afghan “resistance”, however, makes action against the Afghan Taliban a different matter. Moreover, the existence of not only civilian rule but a coalition government means the political parties and the military all have both temptations and opportunities to play pass the parcel with this strategy.

The question therefore is how tight the vice will get in years to come. Pakistan is much stronger than it looks, and is still very far from collapse. But if the US ever increas­es the pressure radically through a ground invasion of Pakistan’s tribal areas, parts of the Pakistani state and army may shatter into sharp and dangerous fragments.