To the myriad foreign challenges Barack Obama will have to confront upon
taking office we may have to add a complex conundrum next door in Latin America. On three fronts that have posed serious
problems for the United
States before, there is a growing and
worrisome democratic challenge in the hemisphere--and no one knows quite how to
handle it.
The first problem is Nicaragua,
where the Sandinista Front rigged and stole municipal elections in such an
egregious fashion Nov. 9 that even the old PRI antics in Mexico pale by
comparison. In the country’s larger cities, like Managua,
the capital, as well as León, Granada
and Masaya, ex-Sandinista opponents and supporters alike were harassed,
intimidated and erased from electoral rolls. Their ballots were discarded, and
they were subsequently forcibly banned from demonstrating against the stolen
vote. Most analysts agree that the opposition at least won in Managua, though it may not have done so
elsewhere. Yet virtually no one in Latin America
said a word. When the Organization of American States’ secretary-general, José
Miguel Insulza, cautiously expressed concern about the situation, he was
violently rebuked by President Daniel Ortega’s spokesperson and diplomats, as
well as by Hugo Chávez’s minions in Venezuela. The rest of the region
remained silent, even though its nations signed, on Sept. 11, 2001, an
Inter-American Democratic Charter drafted to avoid such corrupt election
practices.
In Venezuela,
the recent gubernatorial and municipal ballots also raise concerns. Unlike
previous elections, there was no significant tampering--with the exception of
the state of Barinas, where the opposition is claiming Chávez’s brother, Adán,
was fraudulently declared the winner. But there are other reasons for concern.
The opposition achieved important victories and Chávez accepted his defeats
more or less graciously, also unlike on other occasions. Yet he did so after he
had threatened to send in his “tanks” if the opposition won. He also banned a
number of leaders from running, including 37-year-old Leopoldo López, the most
popular anti-Chávez politician in the country, and vowed to throw several other
rival candidates in jail if they campaigned against him.
Chávez transformed the election into a referendum on his own presidency, and
each time he has encountered electoral or political difficulties in keeping
himself in power and constructing his “21st-century socialism” in Venezuela, he
has returned swinging. This time, he has already insinuated he will appoint
all-powerful deputy governors and deputy mayors to supplant elected opposition
officials, and that he will run for re-election in 2013, despite having lost a
referendum on both counts one year ago. Indeed, there are solid grounds for
thinking that his most recent defeat will lead Chávez in the same direction as
always: radicalization, nationalization of private companies and
authoritarianism. And again, the rest of the region will say nothing.
Regional leaders will remain quiet about Cuba as well--and this may be
Obama’s greatest hemispheric challenge. The nation has been stuck in the mud
since July 2006, when Fidel Castro fell ill, but he has not yet relinquished power
completely to his brother. On Jan. 8, Cuba
will commemorate the 50th anniversary of Castro’s triumphal entry into Havana, and Obama’s Inauguration two weeks later will mark
the date that Castro outlasted his 10th U.S. president. Meantime, the
social and economic difficulties confronting Cuba are growing. As the world
enters a recession, Venezuela
has less money to subsidize the island, and migration from Cuba is rising
once again. There will be growing pressure on Obama to forget Cuba’s record
on human rights and democracy, lift the embargo and normalize relations.
The pressure will come from many quarters, but chiefly from Latin America. A couple of weeks ago, at a high-level
meeting of the so-called Rio Group of Latin American governments in Zacatecas,
Mexico, Cuba was made a member of the group, at the Mexican government’s
request. This ad hoc association, which sprang up from the Contadora Group that
tried unsuccessfully to negotiate a peace agreement in Central
America during the 1980s, was always a club of at least
“tolerable” democracies. In 1989, it suspended Panama because of Manuel Noriega’s
human-rights violations. In 1992, it suspended Peru because of Alberto Fujimori’s
congressional shutdown. Yet Cuba
was invited to join despite the fact that it does not comply with any of the
group’s tenets of representative democracy or respect for human rights.
Latin America, with few exceptions, prefers today to look the other way when
electoral fraud takes place (Nicaragua),
when authoritarian rule threatens (Venezuela)
and when human rights are systematically violated (Cuba). As long as nothing else
occurs, Washington
can also simply look the other way. But if matters get out of control in Nicaragua, in Venezuela,
or in Cuba,
what will Obama do?