The Wrong Way for Putin to Retain Influence

The key political question in Russia over the past two decades has not been about the relationship between democracy and dictatorship, but between different kinds of oligarchy. The oligarchy that has taken shape under President Vladimir Putin is far more coherent, close-knit and disciplined than Boris Yeltsin’s collection of feuding magnates. It has a common culture and ethic drawn from the common origins of many of its members in the Soviet security services. Its comparative success is due to these factors, as well as good luck with energy prices and good economic management.

Then again, a fully fledged oligarchy does not depend for its survival on one leader; on the contrary, it tends to rotate power among different members of the ruling elite. For better or worse the Russian oligarchy is still far from achieving that degree of solidity.

Mr Putin may be more the chairman of a corporate board than a personal dictator, but he is extremely powerful. Without him, it is felt, not only would the ruling group lose its prestige with the population, but it would be liable to fall into uncontrollable rivalries. Not just Mr Putin himself but most members of the elite are therefore determined that he go on exercising dominant influence after stepping down as president next year.

Hence Mr Putin’s apparent intention to take over the leadership of the pro-government political party, United Russia, and turn it into a real ruling party rather than the present coalition of bosses and celebrities held together by allegiance to the president. This could be accompanied by Mr Putin’s assumption of the prime minister’s office, leading in turn either to the next president quickly stepping down to allow Mr Putin to run for another presidential term according to the constitution, or to the transfer of real power from the presidency to the prime minister’s office.

Given Mr Putin’s youth (he has just turned 55), his great though contested achievements and his immense popularity, it would have been surprising if he had not sought to retain dominant influence. Whether this is the best way to go about things is a different matter. Frankly, if he could not retire, then it might have been better if he had changed the constitution to allow presidents to run for extra terms and submitted the change to a popular referendum.

As it is, all Mr Putin’s possible courses look extremely problematic. Worst of all would be for Mr Putin to become an all-powerful prime minister under a supposedly emasculated presidency. This strategy could lead to a disastrous clash between president and prime minister and the destruction of the entire system.

Even if it succeeded, it would create a system in which power migrates restlessly from one government office to another depending on circumstances. This is no recipe for stability or predictability. By the same token, if a new president wins an election and takes office only to step down again in favour of Mr Putin, that would preserve continuity of power but would reduce the constitution to a pantomime farce.

In terms of the sheer effectiveness of government, the best option might be a strong premiership under Mr Putin together with a strong presidency under someone such as Sergei Ivanov, first deputy prime minister. In theory, this would be a truly formidable combination. In practice, it would require greater mutual trust than exists between most brothers.

Finally, there is the option of Mr Putin limiting himself to the role of leader of United Russia and exercising his power and influence from this platform -- something like Sonia Gandhi’s role in India. The great danger of this would be the risk that it would recreate a de facto one-party state.

On the other hand, Russia’s post-Communist democracy failed in large part precisely because Russian society proved incapable of generating real new political parties. If Mr Putin succeeds in turning United Russia into such a party, then it might eventually -- if unintentionally -- help encourage the emergence of real democratic party politics in Russia, on the basis of a new Russian society created by economic growth. Until that day comes, Russia is unlikely to do better than the present oligarchy and can only hope that it works as efficiently as possible, under a reasonably stable and consensual leadership.