Overselling a Nuclear Deal

There are sensible and foolish arguments against the U.S.-Indian nuclear deal. The foolish ones are those based on a theological approach to nuclear nonproliferation. The serious ones relate to the nature of the new U.S.-Indian "strategic partnership," and to wider U.S. strategies in the region.

The argument that India must not be rewarded for developing nuclear weapons is a foolish one. In the real world, there is no more chance of India giving up its nuclear deterrent than there is of America, Russia or China giving up theirs. There are strong arguments, therefore, for the U.S. to help India develop its nuclear industries and weapons in as responsible and safe as fashion as possible.

By contrast, trying to punish New Delhi indefinitely simply means spoiling the U.S.-Indian relationship to no good purpose -- because sooner or later other "legitimate" nuclear powers like France and Russia are bound to start selling India nuclear fuel and technology.

As to the U.S.-Indian deal encouraging Iran and North Korea, their nuclear decisions were made long ago, and their future decisions will flow from separate domestic and strategic calculations. Future South Korean and Japanese decisions will likewise result from the behavior of North Korea and China, not from that of India.

All the same, there are deeply troubling aspects to this deal. Too much of the American motivation for it stems from misconceived obsessions with "balancing" against China and isolating Iran. Even more dangerously, the deal reflects a profound U.S. indifference to the security concerns of Pakistan, and the long-term effects of India's nuclear program on Pakistani behavior.

American attempts to turn India into a U.S. ally against both China and parts of the Muslim world misunderstand the nature of India's vital interests, and Indian determination to defend those interests. Rather than leading to a stable and close long-term American relationship with India, these U.S. attempts may well collapse in a welter of unfulfilled hopes and mutual recriminations. Thus the United States should not expect automatic Indian support for its efforts to isolate Iran. India desperately needs access to Iranian energy, has close, multifaceted ties with Iran and won't sacrifice either to please America.

The U.S.-Indian relationship could also go sour economically. While some Americans are enthralled by India's large market, others fear Indian competition just as much as they fear that of China, and see Indian call centers manned by Indians as the first harbinger of a potentially disastrous threat to key U.S. service industries. Should the United States experience a severe economic downturn, there will be demands for severe protectionism directed at India as well as China.

As for using India as a strategic balance against China, this tends to ignore a little geographical feature called the Himalayas. The truth is that India and China point in very different directions, and given minimally sensible diplomacy, do not threaten each other. That is especially true since the Chinese-Pakistani relationship has cooled because of Chinese fears of Islamist extremism.

So India does not really have much to gain by joining an American-sponsored strategy of containing China, and in any case, being seen as a subordinate U.S. ally would be deeply humiliating for many Indians. Instead, the dominant view in New Delhi at present is that rather than choosing sides prematurely, India will gain leverage with both Beijing and Washington by eschewing an alliance with either.

Pakistan developed its own nuclear deterrent as a response to India's, and if India develops its nuclear arsenal further, then Islamabad will see itself as having no choice but to respond. In the past, it was the desperate need to compete with India with far fewer resources that led Pakistan into dangerous nuclear smuggling. It is a truly vital U.S. security interest to prevent this happening again in future.

Here, the U.S.-Indian deal really does send a dangerous signal -- unless it is accompanied by a similar U.S. deal with Pakistan, which is politically almost unthinkable given Pakistan's record and attitudes to Pakistan in the U.S. Congress. An American refusal, however, will humiliate the Pakistani government, damage yet another vital U.S. alliance, and strengthen extremist forces in Pakistani society.

When it comes to debate the U.S.-Indian deal, therefore, the U.S. Congress should insist that it be embedded in a wider American strategy toward South Asia, involving much stronger U.S. moves to help solve the Indian-Pakistani dispute over Kashmir, and American assistance to both India and Pakistan for nuclear security, command and control and confidence-building measures. Congress should also use this opportunity to think seriously about U.S. strategies in the rest of Asia.

The U.S.-Indian nuclear deal won't make the sky fall, but its benefits are being oversold and its potential dangers overlooked.