A measure of western hostility to Russia is justified, given both the nature of Russian external policies and the crude, clumsy way in which they are often executed. Unfortunately, this hostility can take on an irrational and hysterical tone absent from western attitudes to China, for example.

In recent years one reason for this particular western attitude has been growing dislike of the semi-authoritarian character of the Putin administration. A good deal of hypocrisy is involved here. The west made no such criticisms of the undemocratic behaviour of the Yeltsin administration and its oligarch backers; and while western observers back pro-western liberal groups in Russia as "democrats," these are in fact supported by a small fraction of the electorate. This is above all because when in power, many of these liberals and their business allies both employed authoritarian measures and displayed open contempt for the interests, culture and even physical survival of the great majority of Russians.

By contrast, all reputable opinion polls still show Vladimir Putin enjoys the support of a large majority of Russians. This too is understandable, given the way in which the economy has grown and living standards improved under his presidency. And if much of this progress can be attributed to high oil prices, it is also true that greatly improved revenue-raising capability means that at last the Russian state can once again divert a reasonable proportion of these profits into improving state wages and services. To achieve this, it was necessary to restore state power and radically reduce that of the oligarchs; and it is dishonest to suggest that given Russian realities, the process of cutting down the Yeltsin-era elites could ever have been pretty.

In certain other countries, a semi-authoritarian approach to state-led capitalist development has worked extremely well. This is true of China today, and of South Korea and Taiwan over the past two generations. Mr Putin seems to be trying to create a Russian state led by an administrative-security-economic elite roughly along such east Asian lines, and with certain analogies to that of military-dominated Turkey, or even aspects of the French system. As with France's current attempt to create a national energy champion through the merger of the state-owned Gaz de France and Suez, Mr Putin's strategy includes the creation of great semi-state corporations. These are supposed to be strong enough to compete with the international leaders in their fields and to strengthen Russia's international economic clout.

The new Russian elite of Mr Putin's conception is supposed to be dynamic and capable of competing in the free market, but also to be deeply patriotic: it should be committed to the interests of the state and deferential to the wishes of the state, especially in foreign affairs. The elite will move freely between the state and market sectors, and in the process will be handsomely rewarded; but it will keep its money within Russia, not spend it on British football clubs or French chateaux. Its members will never lobby for foreign support against their own government. In society as a whole, there will be open public debate on a range of issues, but on others it will be strictly limited. Similarly, elements of democracy will remain but be heavily managed. This will not be a personal or dynastic dictatorship such as Azerbaijan but a collective regime of this elite, with leading members succeeding each other and rotating in power. If proved correct, the rumour that Mr Putin, after stepping down as president in 2008, will take over Gazprom or another great corporation would be very significant in this regard.

But for every historical case where such attempts have worked, there have been two or three where this approach only leads to a new form of economically retrograde kleptocracy, in which the state elites, far from developing the economy, wreck it through a mixture of incompetence and looting.

Compared with other cases where this approach has succeeded, do the Russian state elites of Mr Putin's vision have enough power over the economy to push through necessary reforms or are they in fact mostly still ruling indirectly through local oligarchies? Are they sufficiently honest to administer great corporations and manage state patronage while keeping their own greed within reasonable bounds? Are they modern and well-educated enough to imitate the east Asians and manage successfully both great corporations and the economy as a whole?

To ask these questions is not to say they have yet been conclusively answered in the negative. There are reasons for pessimism but also for guarded optimism. And before condemning Mr Putin's vision out of hand, we should also acknowledge that there was no doubt where Russia under Boris Yeltsin was headed: towards a permanently ruinous Filipino-style pseudo-democracy ruled by brutal and exploitative oligarchical clans. Mr Putin may well fail, but it would be hard to argue seriously that the model he is trying to follow is worse than the Filipino one.