The British Empire's Lessons for Its U.S. Brother

In contemplating a future world in which U.S. power is used more effectively, but in more limited ways -- indeed, more effectively because of these limits -- Americans can draw upon the example of British strategy in the century before 1914, when its global power was at its zenith.

This experience has been used by writers such as Niall Ferguson and Max Boot as an example for the exercise of American global power today and in the future.

Such recommendations too often ignore the fact that British power, even at its height, was in certain key respects limited. And it is often forgotten that, at the start of the 20th century, Britain conducted a deliberate strategic withdrawal from several regions in order to concentrate on what London regarded -- rightly -- as its most dangerous enemies.

British Rule

Britain’s directly ruled empire was also not the heart of its economic supremacy. More important was Britain’s indirect influence over large parts of the globe, and above all its domination of the world economy through its lead in industry, technology, trade and finance.

Britain’s 19th-century strategy was an economical one -- intelligently tailored to the British Empire’s real strengths and weaknesses. London did not seek to acquire global dominance of the kind now being dreamed of by U.S. neoconservatives and liberal hawks.

Super Powers

It always recognized that Britain had to coexist in the world with a number of other great powers, each with its own sphere of legitimate interest, which it would be reckless folly to meddle with.

During the 1890s, Britain’s economic predominance disappeared in the face of the dramatic growth of the American and German -- and to a lesser extent, Russian and Japanese -- economies.

In part for inexorable geographic and economic reasons, and in part for domestic political ones, the British government failed to check this relative economic decline -- just as it may not be possible for any U.S. administration to do much about the relative economic rise of China.

Sharp Strategy

What they could -- and did -- do in the British case was to take a cool, level-headed look at the strategic implications of these developments, and adopt radically new strategies to deal with them.

British policymakers identified the threats to Britain’s truly vital interests and prioritized accordingly -- recognizing that to try to remain predominant everywhere would mean risking defeat everywhere.

Tough Decision

They ceded predominance in Latin America to the Americans, and Britain signed an alliance with Japan that essentially recognized that country as the predominant power in the Far East.

A few years later, in 1907, as the menace of Wilhelmine Germany grew, Britain signed a treaty with its old rival Russia that guaranteed British rights in southern Persia -- but surrendered predominant influence over the country to St. Petersburg.

None of this was easy for a British official class that had been used to dominating all these regions for generations, and expected to be ferociously criticized for these withdrawals by sections of British opinion.

Smart Move

This strategy of limited strategic retreat took not just intelligence but great moral courage.

Without this willingness to conduct painful compromises and tactical retreats in the 20 years before 1914, Britain would undoubtedly have been defeated in the First World War.

Unlimited Ego

The very idea of reducing America’s presence in any area of the world is anathema to most members of the U.S. foreign policy establishment. As President Eisenhower warned, their own narrow interests as a ruling elite are completely against this. They have also convinced themselves that it isn’t necessary.

Amazingly, even after the savage lesson of Iraq, one can still frequently hear in Washington, from representatives of both parties, the line that “U.S. power in the world is practically unlimited.”

Of course, in certain narrow military fields, such as naval and air supremacy, and the ability to deploy precision-guided munitions against identifiable objects, this is true -- just as it was true that for most of the 19th century, the Royal Navy could destroy at will most of the other navies in the world.

Futile Figures

The figures are well known. The United States spends as much on its military as the rest of the world put together. It has the only large aircraft carriers in the world, and the only forces widely equipped with precision-guided missiles and bombs.

True -- but also frequently irrelevant. The British could knock over any army outside Europe and North America -- but they could not generate the forces to occupy and rule a vast civilization like China.

Losing Battle

Likewise, the United States today can knock over any army and regime with relative ease -- but it cannot occupy and change societies such as Iran, Pakistan or even little Iraq.

In the entire century from 1815 to 1914, the British only launched one significant military operation on the European continent. That was the Crimean War -- and even that was on the farthest periphery of the continent, and was only possible because the French and the Turks provided the bulk of the ground forces.

The reasons for Britain’s particular weaknesses during the 19th century were basically the same as those for America of today.

Calculated Courage

Above all, both the British and the American populations have been deeply hostile to the conscription necessary to create armies large enough to fight prolonged wars with major powers and establish armies of occupation. And they were opposed to the taxes necessary to pay for huge armies and endless wars.

Britain therefore conquered and ruled its empire through a mixture of professional troops and local native auxiliaries and mercenaries. In consequence, it deliberately restricted its ambitions to weak Asian and African polities that could be conquered with relative ease.

Unclear Future

The difference to the United States is that today the demilitarization of society has gone so far that it is difficult to raise even volunteer troops for long and bloody overseas wars. Volunteer armies are also much more expensive than conscript ones.

In the case of both Britain and the United States, the resulting fiscal strain has been made worse by the fact that -- as global, not regional, powers -- they have also had to maintain immensely expensive navies (and in the U.S. case, an air force) and the high-tech industries to build them.

Like the United States now, Britain then was by far the richest power on earth -- but that did not mean that its resources were infinite.

This article is adapted from "Ethical Realism: A Vision For America's Role In the World" by Anatol Lieven and John Hulsman.