Iraq's Iranian Connection

Ayatollah Khomeini and Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi hardly agreed on anything. The two regimes they led--an authoritarian, western-oriented monarchy and an authoritarian, cleric-dominated Islamic Republic--presented dramatic contrasts. Culturally, politically, economically, socially, the two men could not be further apart. On one issue, however, the two men--and two regimes--agreed: Saddam Hussein's Baathist Iraq was a dangerous, unpredictable threat on Iran's border.

The US defeat of Iraq in 2003 thus eliminated a modern strategic rival of Iran (the earlier defeat of the Taliban eliminated another Tehran foe). This historical context is important to remember as Iran jockeys for influence in post-Saddam Iraq. A gift has been bequeathed to the Shi'ite Iranian state: the defeat of an aggressive Baathist, Sunni-dominated historic rival, and the emergence into power of a network of both religious and secular Shi'ite figures, Kurds, and a smattering of Sunnis with close ties to Iran.

The irony is not lost on many western observers. An oft-heard exchange goes: Q: Who won the US war in Iraq? A: Iran did. Former US ambassador to Croatia and advisor to the Iraqi Kurds Peter W. Galbraith puts it bluntly: "The US now has to recognize that [it] overthrew Saddam Hussein to replace him with a pro-Iranian state."

The federalist system of government envisioned in the new Iraqi constitution, with a weak central government and considerable autonomy granted to regions, marks a partial victory for Iran. In the Shi'ite-dominated south and the Kurdish north, both of which benefit with greater autonomy, Iran retains substantive links to local political leaders. On the down side for Iran, there is a concern that it will allow the Kurds enough wiggle room to break away, which could cause a domino effect among Iranian Kurds.

The Islamic Republic's most important ally in Iraq remains the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), which was founded at the behest of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1982 with the aim of leading an Islamic Revolution against Saddam Hussein. The bet paid off, though US forces, not Iraqi Shi'ites, delivered the knock-out blow.

SCIRI, as part of the United Iraqi Alliance slate, swept the board in January's provincial elections. Though its success derived more from the fact that it was thought to have been blessed by Ayatollah Sistani, the revered Iraqi cleric of Iranian origin, it has moved rapidly to take control of the south. SCIRI-linked police officers man the streets, SCIRI mayors sign reconstruction contracts, and SCIRI loyalists man the bureaucracies. Meanwhile, SCIRI's paramilitary wing, the Badr Organization for Development and Reconstruction, is present with some 10,000 men throughout the region.

Iran likely influenced SCIRI's decision to support a federalist structure in Iraq's constitution. The ability to deal directly with a SCIRI-dominated Shi'ite entity in the south rather than a US-influenced central government in Baghdad appeals broadly to Islamic Republic strategists.

Iran's influence does not end with SCIRI. Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jafaari of the Da'wa Shi'ite group visited Iran recently, where he was warmly greeted by, among others, new President Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad. During the visit, Jafaari paid homage to Khomeini by visiting his shrine, and signed deals on infrastructure projects. He also received pledges of Iranian aid to build schools, hospitals, and mosques, which reflects the soft power model that Iran uses in its support of groups like Hizballah.

Iran also has strong ties with Iraqi President Jalal Talabani and Kurdish regional governor Masud Barazani. Talabani recently told the Los Angeles Times that he fondly recalls a battle plan he hatched with Ahmadinezhad to defeat Saddam Hussein. No details were given, but it might have taken place when Ahmadinezhad was a commander of the Revolutionary Guards in the late 1980s and Talabani lived in Tehran as a member of the exiled opposition.

Ayatollah Sistani retains close ties to Iranian officials, though he avowedly says he is not interested in an Islamic Republic. His insistence on early elections, however, in the face of US objections, ensured the current Shi'ite dominance.

Iraq's new constitution will pave the way for that trend to continue because it supports majoritarian politics. In the constitution, there is no bill of rights to protect minorities nor any attempt to craft power-sharing agreements, Lebanese style, based on sectarian affiliation. This plays to Iran's strength. After all, the Shi'ites remain a distinct majority in Iraq. As a result, groups like SCIRI might impose their will on the south and influence Baghdad through a mix of Iranian-style patronage politics and populist electioneering.

Iran faces several challenges: the possibility of Sunni-Shi'ite civil war; widespread Sunni Arab, secular Shi'ite, and some Kurdish suspicion of Iranian actions in Iraq; and potentially more aggressive American finger-pointing on allegations that Iran supports the insurgency. Recent unrest in Iran's Kurdish region might also be partially attributed to inspiration from the neighbors in Iraq.

Iran and its Iraqi allies must also avoid overconfidence and remember the lessons of Iran's revolution: Islamic sloganeering is not enough; the state must deliver economically; and basic human rights should be safeguarded. Otherwise, as in Iran, political opposition and anti-clericalism will rise. SCIRI may be popular now, but it won't last unless it delivers results.