In a recent Friday afternoon announcement, the Clinton administration granted temporary import relief to two components of the U.S. steel industry.

These decisions make temporary import relief, provided under a U.S. trade statute known as Section 201, a more credible option. Shortcomings in the announcements, however, demonstrate the continuing need for Congress to update Section 201.

The two decisions provide a measure of relief to two beleaguered segments of the U.S. steel industry still riding out the impact of the steel-import crisis.

U.S. line-pipe producers, a relatively small industry segment, should be quite satisfied with their 201 relief, which provided meaningful tariff increases for three years.

American wire-rod producers, however, have considerable reason to complain. The administration decision was long overdue -- four months past the statutory deadline for an announcement. And after their long wait, steel wire-rod producers were granted a tepid remedy; they were granted tariff relief only if imports go to a very high level.

In fairness to the Clinton administration, the steel wire-rod issue was seen by observers -- including the International Trade Commission -- as a closer case than the line-pipe situation. Still, it is impossible to use this as a rationale for simply ignoring the time limits set in the law.

These two cases are the first relief for major manufacturing industries under Section 201 in a decade and a half. They should help restore Section 201 as a meaningful option for U.S. industries facing serious import competition. Unfortunately, the administration's delay in the wire-rod case has, at the same time, damaged the credibility of the statute.

This is a real blow to U.S. trade policy because Section 201 can and should play an important role in U.S. trade policy. Section 201 has many virtues.

First, although the minor complaints of trading partners on the topic can obscure this fact, Section 201 is entirely consistent with the World Trade Organization.

Since the creation of the world trading system, the need for countries to impose temporary restraints on imports has been explicitly recognized in the WTO's Safeguard Clause. Section 201 implements that clause in U.S. law.

Further, despite the dire predictions of some, the temporary breathing space provided by Section 201 has allowed troubled U.S. industries to re-tool and emerge as competitive industries.

Although not the only example, Harley Davidson Motorcycle Co. is the example most frequently cited to prove this point.

During the Reagan administration, Harley was granted temporary import relief from Japanese competition. Harley used this respite wisely and was actually able to request that the import relief be lifted early. Today, it continues as a leader in the motorcycle industry.

By allowing companies like Harley the time they need to get their houses in order, Section 201 spares the economy the needless costs of unemployment and disinvestments in an industry that still has the potential to regain competitiveness with minimal and temporary impact on consumers.

Finally, Section 201 can play a vital role as a political safety valve. The recent steel import crisis provides an excellent case in point.

Starting in 1998, the dramatic surge in steel imports sparked cries for dramatic action to preserve the U.S. industry. This spurred Congress to move to enact quotas on steel imports.

These quotas passed the House of Representatives and may well have become law if Section 201 and other U.S. trade laws did not provide a credible, WTO-consistent alternative.

This is an example of how trade laws, like Section 201, provide a political safety valve. Without them, shocks like the steel import crisis could well destroy U.S. support for international trade agreements.

Unfortunately, Section 201 is in need of repair by Congress. Two issues stand out.

First, the standard under U.S. law for triggering action under Section 201 is higher than the WTO requires. Congress would be well advised to simply mirror the WTO standard for relief.

Second, the president's long delay in the steel wire-rod case demonstrates the need for limits on presidential discretion, of which there now essentially are none. Simply requiring that the relief recommendations of the ITC be enacted if the president does not act by the statutory deadline would be one important limitation.

Often, trade issues seem mired in an endless debate between "free traders" and "protectionists." Section 201, however, should be an exception to this grim outlook.

Improving Section 201 should be an issue on which these two opposing groups find common ground. Hopefully, they will do so before the next trade crisis.