With Ethiopian troops deep inside western
Eritrea, it would appear that Ethiopia had scored a decisive
victory in the Horn of Africa. But the chances are small that
the Ethiopian army will conquer Eritrea, or even consolidate
its hold over much of the country, where food and water are
scarce.
The conflict is often portrayed as another example of Africa's
hopelessness, but this is not even an African war per se. The
combatants are Semites whose languages bear similarity to Hebrew
and Arabic. Indeed, it is useful to see the Horn of Africa as
a fragment of the Middle East dislodged from Eurasia, where
the style of warfare, with tens of thousands of casualties,
is more reminiscent of, for example, the Iran-Iraq war of the
1980's, than of any African conflicts of the past decade. The
Horn is likely to fade from the news as the war drags on, but
the dispute is intractable.
And given the pattern of this 40-year-long conflict, it is
possible that the Eritreans will resort to what, arguably, they
are more accomplished at than any other people in the world:
guerrilla warfare.
In the 1980's, I saw Eritrean guerrillas build trench warrens
lined with slate and sandbags, convert cluster bomb parts into
flywheels for trucks, use the tips of spent tank shells for
rain gauges in their desert agricultural stations, make wash
basins out of exploded MIG shells, and store blood in refrigerators
powered by wind and solar energy. In a mountainside hut, I saw
amputees operate an Italian-made machine that produced 10,000
sanitary napkins per hour for women guerrilla fighters at the
front.
Decades of conflict in their sun-blistered moonscape of a country
have raised Eritreans' resourcefulness to levels rarely seen
elsewhere. While I watched guerrillas produce chloroquin tablets
to fight malaria, the pharmacist in charge told me that he planned
to start producing materials from which chloroquin is composed,
"since we can't depend on anyone." Even with satellite photographs,
in the 1980's it was difficult for Western intelligence agencies
to estimate Eritrean battle loses because of the Eritreans'
ability to get their dead and wounded off the field more quickly
than all but the most sophisticated armies.
War has engendered a monastic approach to existence in Eritrea,
where people have raised deprivation and absolute self-reliance
to the status of religion, even as both Orthodox Christianity
and Islam have been de-emphasized. In Eritrea, a nation of 4
million people fighting one of 61.7 million, a situation of
permanent siege has led to the breakdown not only of religious
barriers, but of sexual ones, too. In a society where clitoridectomy
used to be common, the culture of war has liberated women. A
third of Eritrean soldiers are female, and in the 1980's they
accounted for 30 percent of the casualties.
Eritrea's evolved sense of equality is a paradoxical byproduct
of Italian colonialism. Whatever its faults, Italian occupation
was seen by Eritreans as preferable to feudalistic domination
by Ethiopia. Italy had occupied Eritrea by 1899, envisioning
it as a staging post for a future invasion of Ethiopia. So the
Italians built a rail and road network that, by uniting the
territory, facilitated the growth of Eritrean national consciousness,
spanning sectarian lines. When Mussolini invaded Ethiopia in
1935, Eritreans fought in large numbers on the Italian side.
Today, what the outside world sees as an incomprehensible war
has a relentless logic to it. Ethiopia, dominated by ethnic
Amharas from around the capital of Addis Ababa, has often been
less a nation than an empire, with the Amharas ruling Tigreans,
Oromos and others. Consolidating that empire means subjugating
the Eritreans, who control access to the Red Sea, without which
Ethiopia is a landlocked state.
The Italians' defeat in World War II led eventually to a United
Nations mandate that made Eritrea a semi-autonomous territory
of Ethiopia. But Emperor Haile Selassie never respected the
autonomy agreement, and a guerrilla movement grew up in Eritrea,
with war breaking out in 1961. In 1978, after the overthrow
of Selassie and the consolidation of power in Ethiopia by the
new Stalinist dictator, Mengistu Haile Mariam, Tigreans, too,
revolted. The 1980's saw Ethiopia embroiled in war and famine.
Fighting ended in the early 1990's with Mengistu's departure
and the emergence of the Tigreans as the new rulers in Addis
Ababa.
While the Eritreans and Tigreans were uneasy allies against
Mengistu's regime in the 1980's, the Tigreans, once ensconced
in the Ethiopian capital, have adopted the imperialistic legacy
of their former enemies. At the moment, the rulers in Addis
Ababa are trying to consolidate their empire in the Horn of
Africa, much as Moscow is trying to do in Chechnya. While they
seem to be winning now, history shows that there is no such
thing as victory in the Horn of Africa.
Copyright 2000, The New York Times
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