Efforts to launch a new round of World Trade Organization negotiations are gaining momentum. A number of items have emerged for those discussions, such as the elimination of tariffs in some industrial sectors and liberalizing agricultural trade. Unfortunately, none really goes to the core of the most pressing international trade problems confronting the world trading system.

Perhaps the most serious of these is the replacement of governmental trade barriers with private-sector efforts to restrict trade through collusion. Forging a meaningful international policy on antitrust and competition to combat this problem is an admirable goal for a new WTO round, but it is one that also raises some risks for the United States.

Although they might disagree over specific enforcement actions, most would agree that vigorous enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws from the turn of the century onward, and the subsequent break-up of the trusts, was good for the United States. Competition encouraged innovation, lowered consumer prices, and made the U.S. economy much more vibrant and entrepreneurial.

If antitrust laws worked well domestically, similar benefits might be enjoyed internationally. Unfortunately, none of the world's major powers has been as vigorous as the United States in enforcing antitrust laws.

In Japan, both vertical and horizontal trusts are very much in evidence, and collusion restricts imports of photographic film, steel, flat glass and many other products.

In Korea, trusts, known as chaebols, still dominate much of the economy and distort trade and investment.

Even in Europe, which shares with the United States many of the same concepts of an appropriate competition policy, there are significant differences, and cartels do function in key sectors, such as steel.

Some national enforcement efforts have been launched, but in Japan, Korea and other countries, they seem, at best, minimal and, at worst, merely shams to quiet foreign complaints.

As the U.S. loss before the WTO in the Kodak film case nearly two years ago clearly showed, the WTO, as currently conceived, is not willing or able to play an active role in enforcing a free flow of commerce when it comes to confronting private-sector trade barriers.

In the Kodak case, the United States demonstrated a compelling picture of collusion -- often encouraged by the government -- that restricted Kodak's access to the market and benefited Japan's Fuji film.

But the WTO panel ignored the issue, perhaps fearing the precedent that would be set by ruling in favor of the United States.

It is certainly true that ruling in favor of the United States would have required a restructuring of the Japanese economy, not only in the film sector, but also in dozens of others. It is also true that Japan is certainly not the only country that would be pressed to undertake such efforts.

This, however, is exactly the scope of change that is required to create competitive markets worldwide and to create real reciprocal trade opportunities for the United States.

Obviously, with so many countries taking a different view of appropriate antitrust policy, negotiations aimed at this goal will not be easy. But neither were negotiations on protection of intellectual property, services, or many other now-settled international trade issues.

The United States cannot and should not tolerate the weakening of its domestic antitrust policies or rules slanted against U.S. companies. A reality of economic globalization, however, is that there will be continuing pressure for standardization of rules across borders. Where possible, the United States should try to shape the rules on antitrust and other matters.

A related risk in the new round of trade talks is that other countries will try to weaken U.S. anti-dumping laws.

Anti-dumping laws are the most effective means for the United States to establish and maintain a level playing field. Those foreign countries and companies that want unfettered access to the U.S. market on their terms will inevitably use every international trade negotiation as an opportunity to attack U.S. anti-dumping laws.

In connection with antitrust and all other issues, the United States must simply remain resolute and willing to pull the plug if an unreasonable price, such as the weakening of anti-dumping laws, is put on global antitrust reform.

WTO negotiations on antitrust/competition policy offer opportunities as well as risks. Unfortunately, in this case, abandoning the field likely means continuing to tolerate an inequitable situation. Still, given the risks, the Clinton administration is well advised to proceed cautiously on this topic, as it has to this point.

U.S. negotiators must ensure that an international agreement on antitrust does not undermine domestic antitrust laws or anti-dumping laws; to do otherwise would amount to taking two steps backward to go one uncertain step forward.