The Clinton administration and China appear set to proceed with negotiations aimed at finally bringing Beijing into the World Trade Organization, 13 years after it applied.

Assuming they succeed, the administration will trumpet this as a diplomatic victory. This victory may prove quite fleeting, however, as problems are likely to quickly emerge. Fortunately, there may be ways to ameliorate some of these difficulties.

The first problem is likely to be a Chinese decision to devalue their currency shortly after gaining membership in the WTO. China has a long history of devaluing its currency to encourage exports and discourage imports. Under pressure from the United States, it has kept its currency steady through the Asian crisis, although it has boosted export subsidies. With the crisis past and no obvious rewards for continued good behavior, China is almost certain to devalue sharply its currency.

The administration has predicted large export gains as a result of China's WTO accession. But if accession is coupled with a sharp devaluation, the result is instead likely to be a drop in U.S. exports to China, a big increase in imports, and a considerable widening of the U.S. trade deficit.

This is likely to pose a severe political problem for Vice President Al Gore next year as well as a significant drag on U.S. growth. A Chinese devaluation would also significantly weaken the prospects for economic recovery in the rest of Asia if China siphons off needed export markets from its neighbors.

Unfortunately, there is no certain or easy solution to this problem. All that can be done is to obtain a commitment from China not to devalue through diplomatic means.

Beyond the short-term shock of devaluation, there is a longer-term problem. China has a poor record of keeping its promises on trade. At times, China has violated trade agreements with the United States on protection of intellectual property, market access, shipment of textiles, and export of goods made with forced labor. In fact, there is no major trade agreement with China that has been faithfully implemented by the Chinese.

The fundamental problem is that China lacks a clearly defined rule of law. Even if some reform-minded leaders in Beijing plan to keep the promises they make, there is no guarantee that they can convince other central government ministries and provincial governments to comply.

Unfortunately, the WTO is the ultimate rule of law-based institution. When disputes emerge -- and they certainly will, the United States is unlikely to convince a WTO panel to rule in its favor when no paper trail can be established.

Beyond that, China has demonstrated its considerable skill in playing international politics to frustrate action by international organizations. Ultimately, the credibility of the WTO could severely suffer, if China proves it can ignore the rules with impunity.

Here again, there is no easy solution. The best option is to retain what is known in WTO parlance as a general safeguard, which would allow the United States to impose sanctions if China did not live up to its commitments. But the Clinton administration has been unwilling to press this issue with the Chinese.

Another option would be to devise an ongoing multilateral oversight committee through the WTO to systematically hold China to its word. This may be helpful, but it is important not to exaggerate the utility of such an international group, which is likely to be hamstrung by an unwillingness of many to confront China and vulnerable to Chinese politicking.

Perhaps the most attractive idea is for Congress to take an active role. For example, Congress could require an annual report from the administration on China's compliance with the WTO. To give this process teeth, the Congress could create a procedure that allowed it to initiate Section 301 investigations of Chinese practices if it felt China was not abiding by its commitments. This would not be a magic bullet; there would still be the problem of gaining WTO support for U.S. action to sanction China.

It would, however, give Congress a lever to force both Beijing and the administration to put enforcement at the top of the agenda.

China is a square peg to be fit into the round hole of the WTO. It is naive to think any piece of paper will, by itself, make that possible. A successful U.S. trade policy toward China requires an ongoing commitment to making WTO compliance a reality and ensuring that expected benefits actually emerge. Hopefully, the administration will show as much enthusiasm for this task as it does for making China a WTO member.