Suddenly it's two down and one to go in George W. Bush's "Axis of Evil." North Korea agreed this week to close its main nuclear reactor, the key to its plutonium processing program that four months ago produced its first successful nuclear test. It also said it would invite back international inspectors, in exchange for enormous shipments of fuel and aid...

The stunning deal came as Washington has been stepping up a military buildup aimed at pressuring another member of the Axis of Evil, Iran, to suspend its uranium enrichment program, which the UN believes is aimed at developing a nuclear weapon. European nations have been trying to engage Iran in negotiations, but Tehran has refused to suspend enrichment, which analysts say could reach industrial scale in a year...

While it appears that Iran isn't on the verge of developing nuclear weapons, the Bush administration may not be inclined to see it that way. No one can really be sure how far Iran has actually proceeded or when it might achieve a weapon, and Vice-President Dick Cheney has articulated the famous one per cent doctrine--if there is a one per cent chance that Iran has nuclear weapons that could fall into the hands of terrorists, the U.S. must act. Bush, meanwhile, gives the impression of adhering to a self-imposed deadline of the end of his term. "The perception is that President Bush really doesn't want to leave this file to his successor, because he thinks his successor, especially a Democrat, would not handle this properly, and may allow Iran to go nuclear," says Afshin Molavi, a fellow at the New America Foundation, a Washington think tank, and author of The Soul of Iran. "He believes he has this historical burden to solve this problem..."

The West should also pay less--a lot less-- attention to Ahmadinejad. For one thing, the Iranian presidency is a weak office in Tehran--making him only fifth or sixth in the power hierarchy--and the president actually has little influence in foreign affairs... And his influence appears to be waning. Ahmadinejad was elected on an economic platform, but the Iranian economy is plagued by double-digit inflation and high unemployment. His supporters endured large defeats in local elections in December, while sanctions have dried up investment and prevented many foreigners from doing business in Iran, crippling the development of the country's oil riches. "Iranians are not waking up in the morning hoping their government is enriching uranium. They are waking up worrying about the price of meat and about jobs," says Molavi. "The nuclear issue is a test of whether Iran wants to be a cause or a country..."

What Tehran seems to crave most of all is some sort of legitimacy, a welcoming into the international fold, and a recognition of Iran's status in the region. Of course, Washington doesn't want to be seen legitimizing a regime that throws dissidents in jails. But the Cold War taught that it is useful to engage with one's adversaries. "There is an argument that you are selling out the democracy activists and dissidents in Iran, but that is not the case," says Molavi. "Most democrats and dissidents in Iran tend to favour dialogue. When you have it, it tends to lower the tensions below and allows NGOs and activists to operate more freely."

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