Rajan Menon: All Publications, Events and Press

Defining Victory Down

Cecille Isidro — Sat, 14 Mar 2009 08:34:00 -0400

What Is The Definition Of Success In Afghanistan? | NPR

Cecille Isidro — Thu, 19 Feb 2009 17:11:00 -0500

On Tuesday, President Obama ordered the deployment of an additional 17,000 combat troops in Afghanistan, citing a "deteriorating situation" that "demands urgent attention and swift action." More troops heading to the country raises questions about how exactly to define success in Afghanistan. Original article and audio

Obama's Afghan Challenge

Cecille Isidro — Fri, 09 Jan 2009 14:58:00 -0500

For Barack Obama, Iraq is the bad war and Afghanistan the good war. The president-elect has promised to cut back our involvement in the former and wage the latter with vigor, committing more troops and money. Paradoxically, Obama's solution for Afghanistan could worsen its problems.

Terrorist Group Moves Beyond Kashmir | Forward

Communications — Thu, 04 Dec 2008 17:40:00 -0500

“The closer Israel-India cooperation has given fodder to their belief in a big anti-Islamic conspiracy between Hindus and Jews,” said Rajan Menon, ...

NATO, R.I.P.

Cecille Isidro — Sat, 01 Nov 2008 00:52:00 -0400

In what might be described as a quest for coherence through commodification, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has hired a former Coca-Cola executive to foster greater understanding about its reason for being.^[1] But can an alliance emulate a soft drink giant's success at reinvention? Not likely. Coke has been creative--though not always successful--in its self-presentation, but no one has ever doubted what it is: a beverage. NATO's problem is that its purpose is

Progress in Kashmir

Cecille Isidro — Sat, 25 Oct 2008 12:50:00 -0400

Pakistan, goodness knows, deserves some uplifting news, given its predicament. In one of its provinces, Baluchistan, a decades-long insurgency continues to rage. In Northwest Frontier Province, the Pakistani wing of the Taliban rules swaths of territory and goes unchallenged by the army, or bloodies the military's nose when challenged. Adjacent are the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, havens for Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban and the most likely hiding place of Osama bin Laden.

The threat posed by Islamic militancy and terrorism leaves Pakistan's newly formed democratic government with only bad choices. To please the United States, it has to deal more aggressively with both threats -- and take bigger losses in the process. But if it starts getting tougher, it not only risks alienating the public, which dislikes Pakistan's role as America's adjutant in the war on terrorism, it could cause the violence to spread.

On top of all this, Pakistan's economy is a mess: Inflation is running at 25%, unemployment is at more than 8% and rising, foreign currency reserves are drying up, and the country could default on its debt.

So what's the good news? Oddly enough, it has to do with Pakistan's nemesis, India, and what is arguably the biggest problem separating them: Kashmir. This is the Muslim-majority territory over which they have fought two full-scale wars and had countless skirmishes.

Separating the Indian-administered segment of Kashmir from that run by Pakistan is the "line of control," established after the first Kashmir war ended in 1948. Despite a 2004 truce, Indian and Pakistani troops traded gunfire there as recently as July, and India routinely excoriates Pakistan for sending terrorist groups across it to wreak havoc in Kashmir and to aid separatists, whom India has fought since 1989 in a war that has claimed 60,000 lives.

Yet it is this dicey demarcation that now brings (some) good cheer. On Tuesday, trade began to flow across this cease-fire line in both directions for the first time. Trucks laden with merchandise headed in search of markets; some heady entrepreneurs in India and Pakistan dream that, if all goes well, this new pathway will provide access to larger markets beyond their two countries. Kashmiris cautiously hope that there will be additional steps -- bus service between the two parts of Kashmir was opened in 2005 -- that increase contact between their communities, which have been cruelly separated for 60 years.

This new development would not have been possible but for two important shifts. The first is that since 2002, under heavy U.S. pressure, Pakistan began to rein in terrorist groups that it had long trained and equipped to infiltrate the line of control. Initially skeptical, the Indians now recognize that there has been a real change.

In addition, Indian leaders have changed their thinking about Pakistan. They used to see Pakistan's misfortune as India's good fortune. In 1971, for example, Indians reveled in their victory over Pakistan in the war that brought Bangladesh into being and that truncated Pakistan.

To many Indians, the very existence of Pakistan -- an Islamic state created for South Asian Muslims -- was a challenge to India's secular polity. What was the need for Pakistan, this line of thought went, when millions of Muslims live in India?

Things are different now.

A failed state in a Pakistan armed with nuclear weapons and teeming with Islamic radicals and terrorist groups would make it far harder for India to maintain control of Kashmir (a task already made difficult because of the reputation for brutality that the Indian army has among Kashmiris). But there's an even bigger problem. If Pakistan unravels, chaos and violence will engulf India's western flank, from Kashmir across Pakistan and into Afghanistan. And any Indian attempt to reduce its intensity will strengthen it by producing a popular backlash.

Now, Pakistan's misfortune is India's misfortune.

What's happening along the line of control is but a thin silver lining in a menacing black cloud. Trade per se is no panacea for conflict, especially on so small a scale. The roots of the Kashmir conflict remain: Kashmiris seek self-determination; India and Pakistan each claim to be the rightful owners. But commerce that continues and expands can create mutual gains that widen benefits and build trust. And trust is what's needed for any advances -- however incremental -- on the Kashmir dispute.

That's why those trucks are so important.

Rajan Menon in the Council on Foreign Relations | 'Solving the Crisis in the Caucasus'

Communications — Tue, 19 Aug 2008 12:20:00 -0400

...As global leaders scramble to find a solution, CFR.org asked five regional experts what must be done to end the violence and create a climate where lasting peace can be nurtured...

Rajan Menon, Monroe J. Rathbone Professor of International Relations, Lehigh University; Fellow, New America Foundation:

Like it or not, the balance of forces decisively favors Russia (IHT). Feel-good ultimatums from us will merely increase Russia’s intransigence. And lofty rhetoric with implied promises to Georgia that we cannot keep will only erode our credibility, further weakening Georgia’s position. As to specific steps, we should:

Coordinate efforts with the EU to craft a strategy for ensuring that a permanent cease-fire agreement provides for a demilitarized South Ossetia. Russia won’t allow Georgian troops back into the enclave in any event, but with the alleged Georgian “threat” to its client removed, there is an opening to push for the withdrawal of Russian forces.

Work with the EU to persuade Russia and the South Ossetians to accept neutral, third-party peacekeepers in South Ossetia. Those deployed there since the early 1990s hail from these three countries. Georgia has never seen them as neutral—and certainly won’t after this war. Given the current animosity between Washington and Moscow, the U.S. (short on troops in any event) should let EU or UN forces handle peacekeeping... LINK… more

Rajan Menon on Minnesota Public Radio | 'What Does a Peace Agreement Mean for Georgia's Future?'

Communications — Mon, 18 Aug 2008 12:06:00 -0400

Though a cease fire agreement has been signed between Georgia and Russia, there are conflicting reports as to when hostilities actually will stop. Russian troops plan to stay in a security zone in the region.

Featured Guests: Rajan Menon: Professor of international relations at Lehigh University and a fellow at the New America Foundation. Jeffrey Mankoff: Adjunct fellow for Russian Eurasian Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.

LINK to audio

The Grim Realities of Power

Cecille Isidro — Wed, 13 Aug 2008 07:44:00 -0400

During the Peloponnesian War, as powerful Athens prepared to put the independent-minded, but tiny, island of Melos to the sword, the Melians appealed to principles of honor and fair play in a bid to save themselves.

The Athenians scoffed, noting that "the strong do as they will and the weak suffer as they must." And suffer the Melians did -- alone and unassisted.

Georgia is a latter-day Melos. It has been battered by Russia's over-the-top reaction to what began as a shoot-out between Georgian troops and forces belonging to the Russian-supported breakaway territory of South Ossetia and segued into a clash between Russian and Georgian military units.

Even if one accepts the Russian version in its entirety, the severity of Moscow's response was both unnecessary and unjustified. The United States and its European allies are indignant over the Kremlin's conduct. But, simply put, they will not do anything that truly makes Russia feel pain.

The reasons for patience and for taking the long view are already being offered: There are too many important issues on which Russia's cooperation is critical, pushing it into a corner will only strengthen its authoritarianism and bellicosity, the better course is to practice patient diplomacy... and so on.

The proposals now being proffered by pundits to arm Georgia, to boycott the 2014 Winter Olympics that will be held in Russia's Black Sea resort of Sochi, and to evict Russia from the Group of 8 will have no takers. Such measures may have been applied in an ideal world; they won't in the real one. This is unfair to Georgia, which is the victim; but it is nevertheless the reality.

Another unpalatable truth is that Russia's behavior in this instance is the norm, not the exception: Great powers impose their will on weaker neighbors and limit their freedom of action -- all the time.

Airy discourses about the commerce-driven dynamics of globalization and new norms of international conduct will not vanquish realpolitik. Just as other powerful states have done, Russia will be persistent in preventing weak neighbors that it considers to be part of its legitimate sphere of influence from forging links with its adversaries; the means used will vary, but not the ends. In today's Russia, Vladimir Putin personifies this policy, but it reflects deeper realities rooted in balance of power politics.

In this crisis, America and Europe have also behaved as states invariably have: They do not want to spend blood and treasure when the risks are too high and vital interests are not involved. In this instance, no state within NATO wants to pick a fight with Russia right on its doorstep. Nor do they wish to offer Georgia a guarantee of future protection.

The prevailing view seems to be that Russia's full-bore attack on Georgia increases Georgia's chance to gain entry into NATO; the reverse is more likely to be the case. NATO, as seem at its Bucharest summit meeting earlier this year, is already divided on Georgia's membership, and the discord is apt to deepen now that the implications of including it in the alliance are clear. Russia's attack on Georgia also illustrates how little gratitude matters in the politics among nations and how easily it is trumped by the dictates of power.

When Georgia's president, Mikheil Saakashvili, sent troops to Iraq, and was hailed as a steadfast democratic ally by President George W. Bush, he no doubt expected to win some good will that could be redeemed in an hour of need. Perhaps he believed that the United States would mobilize its allies and admonish Russia if it were to attack Georgia -- perhaps even offer tangible assistance.

If so, he miscalculated, and the United States is culpable for not making it clear that its thanks would not translate into tanks.

This crisis also tells us something - and it's not reassuring -- about the efficacy of international organizations when it comes to handling aggression. Some observers have looked to the United Nations to do right by Georgia. But what does that mean exactly? The UN can no more check Russia than it could block the Bush administration's preventive war against Iraq.

That Washington lacked a UN mandate and was criticized by most of its members mattered little to the White House. The same is true of the Kremlin; it will continue to debate its critics in the Security Council, and joined by its ally, China, will veto any resolution that condemns Russia.

In short, what happens in the UN will make for good theater: There have been, and will be, pious declarations, angry denunciations and sanctimonious finger-pointing. But none of this will help Georgia's fundamental problem, which is the disparity between its power and Russia's, and Moscow's determination to press that advantage to define what Georgia can and cannot do.

Utterly unsentimental and thoroughly cynical, Putin understands the arithmetic of power. In attacking a small and weak state located across Russia's border he did not take any big risks; and he bet that the West wouldn't either.

Bush did not look deeply enough into the Russian prime minister's soul -- and he apparently hadn't read his Thucydides in awhile.

Reorienting Japan

Ron Tang — Fri, 20 Jun 2008 03:25:00 -0400

Of all the countries to emerge from the wreckage of the Second World War, perhaps none overcame post-war adversity quite as successfully as Japan. By the time the country surrendered in 1945, it was in dire straits. It had lost some 2.8 million people during the war, 3.8% of its 1939 population. Thousands more were so severely maimed or ill that they would never resume productive lives. The once-prosperous Japanese economy was in ruins, and virtually everything the country needed to recover traversed long, vulnerable sea lanes. There were plenty of threats in Japan’s neighbourhood, most notably the Soviet Union, China and North Korea. But Japan could not protect itself by rearming. Its rampages during the 1930s and 1940s, characterised by blood-curdling brutality, had culminated in the conquest of virtually all of East Asia. Not surprisingly, its wary neighbours watched its every move. Moreover, the horrors of the war, especially the atomic bombardment of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, convinced the Japanese people that violence must never again be an instrument of statecraft. This was a goal at once noble and sensible. Still, Japan had to confront the world as it was, not as Tokyo wished it to be. At minimum, living in a world in which power is the prime currency required a plan for survival.

Sixty years later, it is evident that Japan, its unenviable starting point notwithstanding, has been extraordinarily successful. It has become an economic powerhouse -- its $4.4 trillion economy is now second only to that of the United States -- fuelled by technological vitality and booming exports. Part of the reason for this achievement is that Japan has been able to remain safe in a dangerous world while spending on average less than 1% of its gross domestic product on soldiers and armaments.

Kenneth Pyle, a historian at the University of Washington, and Richard J. Samuels, a political scientist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, offer superb explanations of Japan’s success in the realm of national security. Their books are marked by erudition, thorough research, sound judgement, clear prose and the absence of arid theories and leaden jargon -- a rare combination in academic writing. Both studies have wide sweep -- especially Pyle’s, which devotes roughly half its pages to the latter part of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth -- but neither was written to provide a history of Japan’s international relations. (The bulk of Samuels’s book is devoted to the years following the Second World War.) Both authors are interested primarily in how the end of the Cold War will affect Japan’s national-security strategy. This obliges them to consider the future of Japan’s alliance with the United States in some detail, for while Japan’s leaders managed the challenges they confronted after the Second World War with consummate skill, they could not have done so without the protection of a powerful patron: the United States...

For the full text of the article, please see the PDF attached below.

Books reviewed in this article

Kenneth B. Pyle, Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose, 420pp., Public Affairs.

Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia, 277pp., Cornell University Press.

Rajan Menon in the Kansas City Star | 'Fear of diseases, Competition Drive Global Concerns of U.S. Beef'

Communications — Sat, 14 Jun 2008 15:34:00 -0400

With many South Koreans already hostile to Washington over trade policies and the unease over the fact that Korean forces would fall under U.S. command in a war with North Korea, analysts say the country was especially receptive to fears about American beef.

“There’s a sense there that Korea is subordinate. They don’t like the U.S. military presence,” said Rajan Menon of the New America Foundation think tank. “That changes how they see things...” LINK

Steve Coll and Rajan Menon in IPS News | 'U.S. Reactions to Pakistani Election Results Are Mixed'

Communications — Wed, 20 Feb 2008 17:40:00 -0500

Pakistan: U.S. Reactions to Pakistani Election Results Are Mixed (Inter Press Service News)

..."[The Islamist parties] have been replaced by secular Pashtun nationalist parties who are hostile to the Taliban and who, at a minimum, will not allow the institutions of these provincial governments to be used by collaborators of the Taliban," Steve Coll, a South Asia expert and president of the New America Foundation, told an interviewer on public television Tuesday.

..."There is this notion that if a coalition can be stitched together, this will strengthen the war on terror," said Rajan Menon, a South Asia expert at Lehigh University. "It will not, because the war has very, very little support among Pakistanis, regardless of social class, ethnic background, or religious commitment who feel that it has only spread the violence without translating into any tangible benefit for average Pakistanis.

"If you have a democratic government headed by the PPP or Sharif, it will have to reflect this popular sentiment," Menon said, noting that Zardari has already called for more dialogue with militant Islamists in the tribal areas than military confrontation.

The Changing of the Guard

Ron Tang — Tue, 01 Jan 2008 00:00:00 -0500

The view that sometime during this century a “changing of the guard” will occur, when China will displace the United States in much the same way as America did Britain, is widely held. It unites liberals and conservatives, optimists and pessimists, most of whom accept the proposition that “the East is back”, with China leading the pack. The debate is over when the shift will happen and what a world that currently bears an American stamp will look like after China has become Mr. Big.

The main problem with the narrative about China’s challenge to American supremacy (the limits of which are being illustrated in Iraq, just as they were thirty years earlier in Vietnam) is its linear, deterministic quality. Even under the most favorable conditions, China has a long way to go before it catches up with the United States. Consider some typical measures of power. China’s GDP, rendered in current exchange rates, was $2.5 trillion in 2007, less than one-fifth of America’s $13.2 trillion. The gap is even wider if one takes account of those states (India, the major West European states and Vietnam) most likely to join the United States in a countervailing coalition against a “revisionist” China. Then there is the matter of America’s peerless capacity for technological innovation; China is in no position to close that gap anytime soon.

The same disparity is evident in military power. The American defense budget was $518 billion in 2005, roughly 43 percent of global military spending and equal to those of the next 47 countries combined. By contrast, China’s was $81 billion. Even assuming that Chinese spending is understated by 50 percent, the American military budget is four times larger. True, money is not the measure of all things, but a meticulous assessment of the Chinese armed forces by Anthony Cordesman and Martin Kleiber demonstrates that China lags far behind in more specific elements of military power as well. The People’s Liberation Army relies heavily on armaments that are knockoffs or modernized variants of Soviet systems from the 1950s and 1960s and are no match for their American equivalents in range, firepower, speed, accuracy and overall technological advancement. The Chinese leadership’s dogged efforts to create a modern military force by cutting manpower; upgrading the technological caliber of armor, aircraft, missiles and ships (with massive purchases from Russia); and investing in electronic and information warfare have not changed this picture -- and will not for decades to come.

The one advantage that Beijing has is that the United States has chosen to assume worldwide military commitments, while China concentrates its forces closer to home. The most important consequence of this contrast, itself indicative of the gap in power between America and China, is that while China would still be defeated in any confrontation over Taiwan, it has raised the risk that the United States would have to run to protect Taiwan.

The Chinese leadership would have to be extremely reckless and willing to jeopardize China’s galloping economic growth to initiate a war with the United States, and there is no evidence that it is made up of wild-eyed gamblers. Rather, Beijing, as Bates Gill shows, has chosen moderation of late and has sought to allay regional fears about its ascendancy by stressing that it is engaged in “peaceful development”, taking a leaf right out of Bismarck’s playbook.

One might counter that talk is cheap and dismiss the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) soothing messages as proof of its well-honed propaganda skills. But beyond the words, there have been real changes in Beijing’s deeds. Once suspicious of multilateral approaches to east Asian problems, China has begun to embrace them. For example, it has become an active participant in the ASEAN Plus-5 forum and an advocate of regional security structures for consultations. China has also begun to favor multilateral approaches to confidence building and territorial disputes. Beijing once derided the hypocrisy and double standard behind calls for nuclear non-proliferation but now supports efforts to stop the spread of nuclear arms and other Weapons of Mass Destruction; it has, for example, played a pivotal part in the six-party talks on North Korea’s nuclear program. Likewise, it once viewed terrorism as a manifestation of class struggle and a weapon of the oppressed but now sees it as a scourge, no doubt partly because of sporadic attacks in the Turkic-Muslim Xinjiang Autonomous Region. By and large, this strategy of reassurance has worked, allaying east Asian fears that Chinese dominance will bring upheaval and bullying in its wake. Moreover, in some parts of the region, Washington, not Beijing, is deemed the greater threat to peace.

Yet the expectation that China will remain responsible rather than turn revisionist, even as the balance of power starts to tip in its favor, could be upended by events. For one thing, it does not allow for the unexpected, most notably a latter-day Sarajevo-style syndrome, in which a crisis spins out of control, culminating in a large-scale conflict that nobody wanted, or even anticipated. Susan Shirk offers the latest version of this argument, stressing the Chinese leadership’s desire to exploit rising nationalism for its own ends. The CCP has done so because it faces a very big problem: It needs a new source of legitimacy. The arid slogans of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism have lost whatever appeal they may once have had for the populace, and the party has little to offer when it comes to building a 21^st-century economic system and making it more innovative. With its censorship of the Internet and other dysfunctional proclivities, it is more of an obstacle to innovation than a spur. The party leadership has adapted by leaning heavily on nationalism, stoking it during crises, and using it more generally to articulate the theme that China under its stewardship has erased the humiliations of the 19^thcentury and is fast becoming a front-rank power, respected by all, pushed around by none.

This is a risky gambit, though; China’s materialistic youths are also very nationalistic (though hardly unique in that regard). They monitor whether the regime is delivering on its bravado and whether it is standing up to adversaries, especially Japan and the United States. Prominent examples include the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during the war over Kosovo in May 1999, the collision between a Chinese fighter jet and an American EP-3 surveillance aircraft in April 2001, and Japanese leaders’ visits to the Yasukuni shrine and sugarcoating of past imperialism.

Not only is the regime aware that it is judged by its performance rather than its pronouncements, it knows that mass demonstrations occasioned by perceived slights to China -- and such large-scale protests occurred during the incidents just mentioned -- could turn into mass protests aimed at the regime itself. This fear is not paranoiac; there is no dearth of kindling to stoke the fire. Today’s China is rife with revolts, some involving clashes with the security services, by workers and peasants -- and other segments of society -- over a range of issues: job losses, land seizures, rising socioeconomic inequality, corruption, environmental degradation and the ineffectiveness of courts. Moreover, the protests are growing in number and size and are becoming better organized. According to official Chinese data, the number of protests increased from 58,000 in 2003 to 85,000 in 2005 (almost four million people took part in 2004), and the Ministry of Public Safety likened the sharp upswing since the latter half of the 1990s to a “violent wind.” The true number -- tightly guarded by the authorities -- is quite likely to be much higher.¹

The question is whether the regime will be able to ride the nationalist wave during crises by showing the toughness needed to placate its citizenry, while also avoiding a conflict with potential adversaries like the United States or Japan. This is something of a high-wire act, particularly because the ability of the Chinese population to mobilize itself has been transformed by the Internet and mobile phones, themselves important symbols of the modernization that has followed Deng Xiaoping’s ditching of Maoist nostrums. Just recall how the Falun Gong faithful organized rallies and, following the regime’s crackdown, used the Internet to publicize their plight.

The possibility of conflict is all the more unpalatable for Beijing because China’s economic miracle is the result of shedding autarky and embracing economic interdependence or, in its turbo-charged variant, globalization. For example, if China were to unload its dollar holdings and opt for the euro as its main reserve currency, it would damage the American economy (the U.S. government would have to hike interest rates to keep attracting dollars). But Beijing would also wound itself. While Americans certainly benefit from the relatively inexpensive goods that U.S. companies import from China, it is no less true that a reliable American market is important to China. Its exports to the United States totaled $287 billion in 2006, making the United States the number one foreign destination for Chinese goods; on top of that, the United States is the fifth-largest source of foreign direct investment in China.

So, the costs of willfully creating instability -- indeed, of upheaval unrelated to Chinese actions -- have risen now that China’s economic engine is powered by capital inflows, global markets and reliable energy supplies. And the constraints imposed by such dependence will not diminish even though China will be less susceptible to economic sanctions as rising incomes expand the internal market.

Another side effect of economic success that is far more challenging for Beijing is the extent to which Deng’s reforms have transformed Chinese society. To ensure its survival, the CCP needs to maintain a monopoly on political power, a litany of social controls and communist ideology, all increasingly at odds with a complex, modern and materialistic society. This contradiction will have to be resolved. The far-reaching transformation of China will aggravate the tension between a static and repressive polity on the one hand, and a dynamic society and economy on the other, which are not only jettisoning the avowed ideals of the CCP, but also rendering the party itself an anachronism. Whether this occurs through sporadic clashes between the rulers and the ruled (the Tiananmen massacre was an early harbinger of this possibility, and recurrent protests by workers and peasants show that that event was not necessarily an aberration), the shedding of totalitarianism for a light-touch Singapore-style authoritarianism, the gradual emergence of a democratic polity or the breakdown of the system is hard to predict. But the problem is as substantial as it is undeniable.

Very few of the Sinologists who have been daring enough to venture predictions about China’s future have picked the last of these outcomes; rather, most assume that the regime will manage the problems it faces and that they are a sideshow to the main event: China’s emergence as a superpower. Not Gordon Chang. He believes China is headed for a crack-up and offers a long list of problems to back his claim. The banking system, forced for political reasons to lend money to sustain loss-making, state-owned enterprises -- millions are employed in these companies -- is vulnerable to what in the antiseptic language of economics are called “non-performing” loans, and Chang is convinced that the banks’ insolvency will spark an economic crisis. Along with the benefits it brings, accession to the WTO introduces competition from abroad, affecting production and employment at home. China’s rapid economic growth has raised living standards for millions, but has also created deep divides between the coastal regions and the interior and west, as well as between the poor peasants and workers and urban elite, something that the leadership and Chinese academics have noted with growing concern, viewing these chasms not only as unfortunate by-products of the economic boom, but also sources of social strife. These concerns are well-founded, judging by the increasing incidence of demonstrations -- some violent -- by poorer Chinese who feel that they have been denied their fair share of the burgeoning wealth or who have been evicted from their lands to make way for new homes and factories. Chang, like Shirk, also argues that an increasingly nationalistic generation of Chinese places pressure on the leadership to stand tall when tested by foreign adversaries -- or to lose what is fast becoming its principal source of legitimacy.

One manifestation of the inequality accompanying the skyrocketing economy is the so-called “floating population” of 140 million, consisting primarily of people who have fled the poverty of the countryside only to find themselves living on the margins of life in large cities, without rights to permanent residence and identity cards, and lacking reliable sources of income, decent housing and access to social services. Moreover, city dwellers view them, not without justification, as contributing to the increase in crime and believe that their willingness to work for less pushes wages down.² Perhaps sustained economic growth will solve such problems. To ensure this -- a precondition for social stability -- the regime needs investment capital, but there will be other claims on such funds. Now that birth rates have fallen sharply for the past several decades (on average, Chinese women now have 1.7 children, less than the 2.1 needed to maintain the current size of the population), the aged account for an increasing proportion of China’s population (the median age was 22 in 1980 but is estimated to increase to 41 in 2030).³ They must be cared for by the state or entrusted to their children, reducing net savings and investment in either case. Then there are environmental problems: It will also be exceedingly expensive to ameliorate the health problems rampant pollution is producing; water shortages are becoming severe and will worsen as a result of further economic growth and urbanization. The price tag of the multiple effects of environmental damage is estimated to be between 8 and 12 percent of China’s GNP, and continued economic growth will surely increase the burden.⁴ Finally, there is what might be called the Tiananmen–Falun Gong problem. The increasingly modern and educated citizenry created by the economic miracle will start chafing under the regime’s panoply of political restrictions and gain the confidence to make its dissatisfaction known, the more so if socioeconomic inequality and environmental problems continue to increase, widening and deepening popular discontent.

None of these difficulties in themselves will necessarily bring down the regime. Indeed, its success in managing numerous problems is striking. But their persistence and combined effects could take China down a road not anticipated by the orthodox “China rising paradigm.” The Soviet Union’s rapid disappearance should serve as a cautionary tale: The unexpected can occur, catching everyone off guard, and China’s current rulers, like their predecessors, could lose the “mandate of heaven.”

No matter what happens, Japan cannot help but be affected. If China’s ascent is uninterrupted, no other state will feel the consequences more, given the realities of demography (China’s huge advantage in population), geography (China’s proximity to Japan) and history (the legacies of conflict between China and Japan). So what will Japan do in the face of a China that seeks to rearrange the regional balance of power and defies the predictions of those who claim that its common sense and growing stake in stability will lead it to choose statesmanship over saber-rattling? Two important books, Securing Japan by Richard J. Samuels and Japan Rising by Kenneth Pyle, superbly assess the choices Japan is likely to make, while placing them in historical context.

Most observers expect little or no change in the way Japan has pursued security since 1945 and predict that it will continue a variant of the Yoshida Doctrine, promulgated by Japan’s first post–World War II prime minister, Yoshida Shigeru, which involved concentrating on economic development and trusting in American protection.

But while Japan may continue this “trading state” strategy, the assumption that it has no other realistic choice is not borne out by its history, a case that I have also made recently, and that Samuels and Pyle develop in more detail. (Though they do not believe that Japan will shift course as dramatically as I do -- going beyond beefing up its military power toward a strategy of autonomy, propelled by an increasing awareness that the American commitment to defend Japan is becoming less reliable.)⁵

The two most important conditions that could place Japan on a new path are China’s emergence as a front-rank power and Japan’s loss of confidence in America’s protection, or even its robust presence in northeast Asia. The Japanese officials and experts who believe that the American guarantee could become unreliable are not of one mind. Some believe that economic conditions in the United States (persistent budget and current-account deficits and mounting social problems) may prompt it to scale back military spending and commitments. Others doubt that the United States can be counted on to the degree it has been in the past because China’s growing might will require it to take increasing risks on behalf of its allies in the North Pacific.

To this list I would add the possibility that the United States will recast its own grand strategy. As I argue in The End of Alliances, for most of its history, the Republic was led by individuals who were chary of the expenses and obligations that accompany permanent alliances. Seen thus, the Cold War strategy of assuming expansive military commitments and forging open-ended alliances changed the prior pattern of American statecraft; since it was a fundamental change, a new orientation could scarcely be excluded. While neither Pyle nor Samuels predict so far-reaching an American reassessment -- that is not the purpose animating their books -- they show that the possibility is much discussed in Japanese national-security circles these days.

Samuels delves deep into Japanese political dynamics and reveals how Yoshida’s game plan, while still dominant, is now fiercely contested. Those who favor minimal additions to Japan’s military budget and forces still hold positions of power and the belief that there is no need to supplant a solution that has worked so well for so long is shared by most Japanese. Moreover, there are some points of convergence between Yoshida’s disciples and the pacifist left, particularly when it comes to preserving Article IX of the constitution, which commits Japan to renouncing the implements of war. (Japan skirted the literal wording of this provision in response to Washington’s reassessment -- particularly evident after the Korean War -- that its earlier decision to demilitarize Japan had to be abandoned because of the threats posed by China, the USSR and North Korea. Yoshida acceded to American wishes with great reluctance but insisted that Japan’s military power and obligations be placed within narrow bounds.)

But by the 1980s, a segment of Japan’s political class and foreign-policy community -- which has become particularly influential following the Cold War -- was arguing that while Japan should hold firm to the American alliance, it should strengthen its military capabilities. This segment also argued that Japan should undertake defensive missions further from the homeland, participate in UN peacekeeping operations and provide greater assistance to American forces in the Pacific. They advocated revising Article IX, discarding the self-imposed limits on defense spending (the 1 percent of the GNP ceiling that soon attained sacrosanct status) and the ban on exporting arms and military technology, and acquiring armaments that would provide Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) more muscle and reach. Apart from such specific changes, the advocates of a stronger military with a more ambitious mandate want Japan to stop what they consider its self-flagellation for past misdeeds, abandon its pacifist security blanket and become a “normal country.”⁶

The extent to which this school has moved Japan away from the Yoshida consensus, while also strengthening the alliance with the United States, was evident even before the tenure of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, but its influence became particularly pronounced once he was elected. Calls for rethinking Article IX have become standard. The Defense Agency gained ministerial status in 2007, and its influence has grown as the controls exercised by the powerful Cabinet Legislative Office have been diminished. Japanese ships provided logistical support for U.S. forces operating in Iraq and Afghanistan. Senior officials stated that pre-emptive attacks were justified to parry the threat presented by North Korea’s ballistic missiles and nuclear program. A small contingent from the JSDF was deployed to Iraq. Even the nuclear option, once a taboo, is now part of the national-security debate.

Political currents within Japan could also take Tokyo’s defense policy in a new direction. Those who favored unarmed neutrality, principally the Socialist Party, have become marginalized. Meanwhile, another group, although it certainly does not represent mainstream thinking, has become more prominent. Its adherents favor far more radical changes, including an end to the alliance with the United States, which they consider a symbol of subordination. The governor of Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara, is the best-known advocate of these positions, but Samuels shows that they are supported by a number of other prominent thinkers, who present a coherent, if somewhat overwrought, appraisal of the growing threats facing Japan -- China in particular -- and stress America’s unreliability. Japan, these nationalists warn, will find itself alone and vulnerable unless it ditches the Yoshida Doctrine and goes well beyond the bounds envisaged by the “normal country” folks. But even if they prove to have little influence, the fact remains that the Nakasone-Koizumi line is well established and has already made a difference that would have appeared quite unlikely as late as the 1970s.

If the United States, for whatever reason, reduces its military presence in the North Pacific, China begins to throw its weight around and the comity between Tokyo and Washington starts to erode, Pyle’s argument will almost certainly be validated. The idea that external shifts will bring about major changes in the theory and practice of Japan’s military policy may even exceed what he envisions -- the gap between the “normal country” proponents and nationalist groups that Samuels analyzes could close and public opinion could come to favor a reevaluation of the limits placed on the JSDF. This scenario goes beyond what even Pyle expects, and far beyond what Samuels foresees, but it is hardly improbable, certainly not if one considers the long sweep of Japanese history and the major recalibrations that have occurred in the balance of power over the centuries.

Would northeast Asia become a more dangerous place if there were to be so radical a change? The mainstream view is that it would, and it certainly cannot be dismissed. But if in fact China proves the optimists wrong -- does not collapse as Gordon Chang expects and instead surpasses the United States much more rapidly than he envisaged and sets out to alter the balance of power aggressively -- Japan’s choices are not limited to minimalism or militarism. It can develop a far more capable military and, together with a coalition that could include the United States, India, Vietnam, Indonesia and Australia (and perhaps Russia, depending on whether it chooses to help balance China or to safeguard its sparsely populated and hard-to-defend Far East by placating Beijing), create a new equilibrium.

There are already some signs that new alignments are jelling in anticipation of a stronger China. After decades of estrangement during the Cold War, India and the United States are forming a strategic partnership, with Washington violating its non-proliferation policy to help consolidate the alliance. American arms manufacturers are eyeing an Indian market once dominated by the Soviet Union, anticipating that India will need to modernize its armed forces and have the cash to buy what it needs. India and Japan have begun military-to-military contacts and have also held joint naval exercises and operations in which Australia and the United States have participated. The United States and Vietnam have moved from enmity to cooperation. Leaders in these countries deny that China has anything to do with all this (and Indian officials, eager to dispel the notion that they are colluding with Washington, will doubtless point to an India-China naval exercise), but such protestations are scarcely persuasive, for the historical record is unambiguously clear: When a state makes dramatic gains in power, it provokes an opposing coalition. And there is no doubt who is the rising power.

The replication of this process in Asia would be neither an aberration nor, necessarily, something to fear. Imagine a China that continues to shed its revolutionary past, adopts pragmatism and stability as its watchwords, and becomes ever more intertwined with the global economy. The awareness that the intemperate quest for a Pax Sinica would inevitably provoke a countervailing alignment, tax China’s resources and overextend its military power should restrain Beijing. Conversely, a belligerent China’s freedom of action would be reduced by an opposing coalition, especially one that stretches Chinese resources across several widely separated fronts. Everyone benefits if a state bidding to become the new hegemon treads lightly -- including the putative hegemon itself. That is a lesson offered by both Sun Tzu and Bismarck.

Books Discussed in this Article

Anthony H. Cordesman and Martin Kleiber, Chinese Military Modernization: Force Development and Strategic Capabilities (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007), 226 pp.

Bates Gill, Rising Star: China’s New Security Diplomacy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2007), 267 pp.

Susan L. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 336 pp.

Gordon Chang, The Coming Collapse of China (New York: Random House, 2001), 346 pp.

Kenneth B. Pyle, Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose (New York: PublicAffairs, 2007), 420 pp.

Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007), 277 pp.

Notes

1. Thomas Lum, “Social Unrest in China”, Congressional Research Service, May 8, 2006, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33416.pdf; “China Grows More Wary over Rash of Protest”, washingtonpost.com, August 10, 2005; the quotation is from Sinologist Dorothy Solinger, “Worker Protest in China -- Plentiful but Preempted”, Taipei Times, February 18, 2005.

2. T. Wing Lo and Guoping Jiang, “Inequality, Crime, and the Floating Population in China”, Asian Criminology, Vol. 1 (2006), pp. 112.

3. Data from Nicholas Eberstadt, “Will China Continue to Rise?” (unpublished manuscript).

4. Elizabeth Economy, “The Great Leap Backwards”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 5 (September/October 2007), pp. 47.

5. Rajan Menon, The End of Alliances (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).

6. The JSDF has capabilities that are much greater than its innocuous-sounding name would suggest. Japan may spend barely 1 percent of its GDP on defense, but given the size of its economy, its military budget is the fourth highest (or fifth, depending on the year) in the world, which means that even a small increase in the proportion devoted to the military can make a considerable difference. Furthermore, its technological prowess gives it the capacity to manufacture modern weapons that few other states can.

ABC Radio Australia Interviews Rajan Menon on Pakistan

Communications — Wed, 17 Oct 2007 00:47:00 -0400

Last week Former Pakistan Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto addressed her power-sharing deal with General Pervez Musharraf at her press confrerence. “Many have criticized the deal but it is being done to avoid bloodshed and ensure an orderly transfer of power to the people,” she said.

In an interview with ABC Radio Australia, New America Foundation Fellow Rajan Menon discussed Bhutto’s political situation upon her return to Pakistan after eight years in exile.

Has Bhutto been damaged politically by the amnesty deal struck with General Musharraf?

“Yes… There’s no question that within her own party there was great unease about deal cutting with Musharraf. Not only was there the feeling she might taint herself while doing it, but in effect Musharraf was reeling in on the ropes... she rang the bell ending the round. Needlessly she allowed him a second shot as it were,” said Menon.

For the complete interview with Menon and more on the situation in Pakistan, please follow this link.

It's Pakistan's Choice

Cecille Isidro — Thu, 06 Sep 2007 09:23:00 -0400

As Pakistan’s president, Pervez Musharraf, struggles to retain power, the United States finds itself in a familiar predicament, one that illustrates a recurring pathology in its foreign policy. Having yet again cast its lot with a strongman, Washington is confounded now that his political position has become precarious. It’s the Anastasio Somoza, shah of Iran, Ferdinand Marcos dynamic in a different guise. Though Musharraf won’t be forced into exile like those friends of Washington, the best he can hope for is to survive the current turmoil with vastly reduced authority.

The Bush administration’s problem in Pakistan is that it has had a Musharraf policy but not one that engages the interests and aspirations of Pakistan’s citizenry. Pakistanis may have welcomed Musharraf in 1999 when, as army chief, he overthrew the inept and corrupt government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, but that enthusiasm has evaporated.

Pakistan’s Islamic extremists, of whom the militants associated with the Red Mosque are representative, want Musharraf dead. Al Qaeda and the Taliban, which share this sentiment, enjoy considerable support among radical Islamist circles within Pakistan. They also have established bastions in the country’s wild northwest, which Pakistani governments, like the British imperial authorities that preceded them, have never been able to control. The commercial class may be divided on Musharraf, but the professionals and intelligentsia generally revile him. In their eyes, he acquired power illegally and has retained it by serially subverting the democratic process.

There is disquiet even within Musharraf’s principal bastions of support -- the armed forces and the intelligence services. His plummeting political stock makes him a liability and threatens their political clout and vast economic empire. But if they turn to another general, Washington will again become identified with a leader who wields raw power but enjoys little popular appeal; worse, Pakistanis will hold the U.S. responsible for arranging another coup.

Faced with Musharraf’s mounting weakness, the administration has pressed him to come to terms with his nemesis, the exiled former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, who cannily, if transparently, has been hyping the threat posed by terrorism and Islamic extremism, knowing that this is music to Washington’s ears. She has much to gain if, under U.S. pressure, Musharraf agrees to her terms (the most important being that he resign as head of the armed forces before running for president again and guarantee that she will not be arrested on corruption charges if she returns), enabling her to come home as something of a conquering hero.

But even if the two longtime foes do come to terms, it won’t matter nearly as much as news reports here and abroad suggest. Having invoked principle and having opposed Musharraf for years, Bhutto risks being diminished politically by striking a backroom bargain with him. Already, Sharif, leader of the Muslim League (two parties bear this name, one of which supports Musharraf), has been positioning himself as the unbending defender of democracy and lambasting Bhutto for what he portrays as her clandestine maneuvers with a discredited coup-maker. Sharif also is preparing to return from exile.

Even some of Bhutto’s supporters are dismayed. They believe that Musharraf is reeling and don’t want an accord with her to be the bell that saves him.

More important, the hope the Bush administration is investing in Bhutto is misplaced and is another instance of a personality-driven policy. There is no reason to assume that she will be any more successful in expelling Al Qaeda and the Taliban from their redoubts or curbing Pakistani jihadists than Musharraf has been, and she will certainly have less support within the national security bureaucracy.

Nor will Pakistanis bless the alignment with Washington if, in fact, they elect her prime minister. To the contrary, to be seen as a legitimate, independent leader, she will have to take account of their deep disaffection with U.S. policy. The White House and much of Congress seem unaware that most Pakistanis, regardless of their political outlook, oppose their country’s role in the Bush administration’s war on terrorism. The vast majority do not support the agenda of Al Qaeda, the Taliban and their local acolytes, and have never voted for the Islamist political parties in overwhelming numbers. But most believe that Pakistan has gained little from aiding the American offensive -- it’s India with whom the United States is forging a strategic partnership. And they fear that there will be more violence and instability if Pakistan continues being a platform for Washington’s anti-terrorism campaign.

The administration’s best course of action in Pakistan is inaction. Let Pakistanis find a solution to their crisis. Any made-in-America remedy will not only fail to make matters better, it will make them worse. President Bush would do well to remember the aphorism "First do no harm" or, given his penchant for the informal, a folksier variant: "Don’t do something, just stand there."

Benazir Bhutto Negotiates a Return to Pakistan's Politics

Cecille Isidro — Mon, 06 Aug 2007 14:19:00 -0400

Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan’s president and strongman, met his nemesis, the opposition leader Benazir Bhutto, in Abu Dhabi on July 27. Only extraordinary political circumstances could have thrown these two together. Musharraf sees Bhutto -- a former prime minister who’s lived in exile since the general brought corruption charges against her -- as emblematic of all that’s wrong with Pakistan’s inept and graft-ridden political parties. Bhutto, for her part, sees him as yet another military usurper, like the one who had her father -- then Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto -- hanged in 1979.

The sad fact is they’re both right. So what explains the possible union of these antagonists? The answer is simple: power. Musharraf wants to retain his; Bhutto wants to get hers back. But their underlying differences remain profound, and the dangers great. While Western leaders hope a deal between them will help calm Pakistan, the truth is it probably won’t.

The Bhutto and Musharraf camps have been holding backroom talks for some time. What probably pushed the leaders to finally meet face to face was the growing threat posed by Islamic extremists. The danger became acute several weeks ago, when Musharraf ordered the Army to storm Islamabad’s Red Mosque, which had been occupied by Taliban-style militants. The operation succeeded, but it was followed by suicide bombings and the extremist takeover last week of another mosque (this time in the Mohmand tribal district).

Suddenly Musharraf was under siege both by the radical Islamists (who have tried twice to kill him) and the civilian democrats, led by Bhutto’s Pakistan’s People’s Party and the Muslim League of Nawaz Sharif, another exiled ex-prime minister. The democrats had been leading massive protests ever since Musharraf suspended Supreme Court Chief Justice Ifthikar Muhammad Chaudry, who had challenged the president’s plan to run for re-election without resigning his Army post (as the constitution requires). Following the protests, the Supreme Court reinstated Chaudry, further embarrassing the president at a time when his most powerful ally -- Washington -- was complaining pointedly about his failure to root out Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters in Pakistan’s northwest. The beleaguered general needed a lifejacket. And that’s where Bhutto came in.

A deal with her, however, will hardly cure Pakistan’s ills. While her own followers would be elated, Sharif’s Muslim League has already condemned the negotiations, as have most Islamist parties. The extremists would continue their fight. And a pact with Bhutto would require Musharraf to make several painful concessions. He would have to finesse away the corruption charges against her, which would make him look weak on the one issue where he’s seemed strong until now. Bhutto has also demanded that Musharraf agree to have the next president chosen by a newly elected parliament rather than the current one, which he dominates. A proposed constitutional amendment barring prime ministers from serving a third term would also have to be set aside (since Bhutto has already held the job twice and wants another shot at it). And even if Bhutto won the elections, her government could prove as crooked and incompetent as its predecessors. Power sharing between Bhutto as prime minister and Musharraf as president, moreover, might only increase the country’s chaos.

The West wants a stable Pakistan as a bulwark against terror -- specifically, the Taliban and Al Qaeda forces that have been infiltrating Pakistan from Afghanistan. The confrontation at the Red Mosque and its violent aftermath have shown how powerful these forces have grown, shaking Musharaff to the core. However much he despises Bhutto and her ilk, they are far less dangerous to him than the jihadists. Bhutto has as much reason as Musharraf to fear further terrorism, which could tear Pakistan apart and end its economic boom. But as a relatively secular woman leader she would only be another target, not someone who could calm the radicals’ rage.

All this means that while the Musharraf-Bhutto deal could well pave the way for elections and the return of civilian rule, that would be a very limited blessing. For one thing, a free and fair vote could swing in any direction; the Islamist parties could make significant gains in the national and provincial legislatures, as they did in 2002. For another, Pakistan’s military and its intelligence services -- the country’s true power brokers -- would watch any change in leadership skeptically. The generals will be keen to protect their power and their economic empire, and they won’t hesitate to dislodge an elected government if either is threatened. Even if she could placate them, meanwhile, Bhutto would still have to act against Al Qaeda, the Taliban and Pakistan’s own extremists, without going too far -- since many Pakistanis worry that an offensive will only bring more bloodshed and turmoil.

If this sounds grim, it is. Pakistan faces a choice, it’s true -- but not one between good and bad options. It’s now a contest between bad and worse outcomes. Let’s hope the country picks carefully.

The U.S. and Turkey: End of an Alliance?

Cecille Isidro — Tue, 31 Jul 2007 11:52:00 -0400

This article is available only in the attached PDF format. Please download the file below for the full text.

Brian Lehrer Show Interviews Rajan Menon on Pakistan

Communications — Fri, 20 Jul 2007 14:13:00 -0400

The National Intelligence Estimate released this week revealed the continuing role of Pakistan in the survival of Al Qaeda. Former CIA analyst Paul Pillar and Lehigh University professor of international relations Rajan Menon talk about how US foreign policy could best address the problem.

To listen to this interview, please visit The Brian Lehrer Show website.

Pakistan's Uncertain Future

Cecille Isidro — Fri, 20 Jul 2007 06:59:00 -0400

After the shootout at Islamabad’s Red Mosque, the pro-democracy demonstrations against Pakistan’s President Pervez Musharraf in the months preceding it, and Islamists’ rallies and suicide bombings following it, the United States finds itself in a familiar situation, aligned with a general who grabbed power in a coup but has become politically isolated, perhaps beyond repair. The difference is that Pakistan is now a more dangerous place than it was under the three prior military strongmen, Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan, and Zia ul-Haq.

Although the upsurge of radical Islam began under Zia (a patron of the Red Mosque) the threat now posed by terrorist groups and seekers of a sharia-based society is unprecedented, even though they are a minority with thin public support. In their eyes, secularism and democracy are apostasy, the United States the prime enemy of both Pakistan and Islam, and Musharraf its lapdog. The new political landscape is particularly perilous now that Pakistan has nuclear weapons and is a haven for Al Qaeda and the Taliban.

Musharraf’s victory at the Red Mosque will prove no more than tactical. The radical Islamists, who have already tried to kill him twice -- three times if the recent firing of a missile at his plane was their handiwork -- will now gun for him with greater determination, using the "martyrs" of the Red Mosque to mobilize their supporters and to gain more as witness the call to arms by Ayman al-Zawahiri, Al Qaeda’s deputy chief, and Pakistani fundamentalists. And while the parties and organizations demanding a return to civilian rule and democracy by and large supported his storming of the mosque, they will continue their campaigns.

What lies ahead? Four scenarios seem probable.

One is the continuation of the status quo, with Musharraf retaining power but becoming weaker as his political standing continues to erode. The radical Islamists will remain as much , if not more of a problem. While the Bush administration will continue to proclaim (in public) that Musharraf is a stalwart ally against terrorism, Al Qaeda will continue building its bastion in Pakistan’s northwestern tribal areas and the Taliban will keep crisscrossing the border with Afghanistan. The rift between Musharraf and the democratic will widen. Musharraf might attempt to reassert control by instituting martial law, but that would not solve the underlying political problems.

Mounting upheaval could lead to Musharraf’s ouster by another general who amasses support from the institutions that have been Pakistan’s true power brokers, the army and Inter Service Intelligence, but this second scenario won’t be a better one, and it could be worse. The jihadists won’t quit, the democratic political parties won’t be satisfied, and the new ruler, busy consolidating power, may prove less effective against hard line Islamists and their foreign partners.

A drift toward a civil war between the jihadists against the government is a third possible outcome. Pakistan would suffer more violence and terrorism, and its high economic growth rate would slow. Al Qaeda and the Taliban would be strengthened, and the danger of war in South Asia would increase because groups that have masterminded terrorist operations in Kashmir, and indeed elsewhere in India, operate with considerably greater freedom.

A fourth possibility is a compact between Musharraf and the opposition political parties. The result would be an interim national unity government that schedules elections that would be held under terms acceptable to all sides and monitored by international observers to verify their fairness.

Regrettably, Musharraf has spurned the moderate opposition parties rather than reaching out to them. For all their faults -- which include running inept and corrupt governments -- Pakistan’s democrats, whether secularists or moderate Muslims, regard the extremists as a dire threat (as does the majority of the public, despite its opposition to Musharraf’s participation in the White House’s "war on terror"). They urged action against the Red Mosque militants for months while Musharraf temporized, allowing the radicals to become ever more brazen, and applauded him when he finally moved.

This scenario is hardly perfect. Apart from the record of Pakistan’s elected governments, Islamist parties could do well in the elections (though they have not in the past and are not all of one mind; some even support Musharraf), and the extremists will surely persist.

But the only plausible outcomes for Pakistan in its present state are bad, terrible, and uncertain ones. If anyone has a plan for a better result, it’s a good time to present it.

World View: A Darkening In the North

Cecille Isidro — Mon, 18 Jun 2007 13:21:00 -0400

Iraq’s Kurdish north has offered a heartening contrast to an otherwise blood-soaked country. Its polity works; its economy thrives. But the reports last week of a Turkish military incursion, in pursuit of Kurdish rebels, is an eruption of only one of three steadily deepening problems that could combine to worsen the Bush administration’s predicament in Iraq.

The first is the dispute over Kirkuk, capital of At-Tamim province. The city and its environs contain some 10 billion of Iraq’s 112 billion barrels in proven oil reserves. Saddam Hussein expelled thousands of Kurds as well as Turkomans and Christians from the Kirkuk region in the 1980s and 1990s, replacing them with Arabs, mainly Shia from the south, themselves victims of his repression. With Saddam gone, roughly 350,000 Kurds moved back (some original residents, others not) with active support from the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Thousands of Arabs fled, alleging threats and attacks by Kurdish groups. The influx also displaced Turkomans, but they continue to stake their own claim to Kirkuk, supported by Turkey.

Iraq’s Constitution requires a referendum on Kirkuk’s future status by the end of this year, and as the deadline nears, the carnage increases. Car bombs, sectarian murders (fanned by Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia), and expulsions abound. The vote will make matters worse. The run-up will almost certainly be marred by violence, and Arabs and Turkomans will reject a Kurdish victory. But the Kurds threaten to leave Iraq’s government if it is postponed, as the Iraq Study Group recommended. Kirkuk looks like the Gordian knot that can’t be cut.

The second problem involves Mosul, Iraq’s third largest city and capital of Nineveh province, which lies just west of Iraqi Kurdistan. Sunni militias and Al Qaeda have been targeting Mosul’s Kurds, who are fleeing to Kurdistan or areas near its border. Kurdish militias have retaliated, but have not been drawn into a full-blown civil war. That could change, which is what Al Qaeda wants; a new front would further stretch American forces.

Nineveh’s tensions also stem from the underrepresentation of Sunnis, who boycotted the 2005 provincial elections. Some observers recommend fresh elections to redress the imbalance, but absent a minimum of trust, the elixir of elections won’t work and could make things worse. The Kurds constitute a third of Mosul province’s population but now hold three quarters of the seats in its council and also control most key administration positions; they won’t part with political power to placate the Sunnis.

The third problem is the redoubts established in Iraqi Kurdistan by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the militant separatist organization from Turkey’s Kurdish southeast. Turkey has periodically launched artillery and air strikes, covert operations and cross-border incursions against suspected PKK positions in northern Iraq. In recent weeks top Turkish generals and politicians have taken a hard line, warning of new incursions if the KRG does not take steps to expel the PKK. Ankara upped the ante this month by massing troops and armor on its border with Iraq, and though it denied the reports of a cross-border move by thousands of its troops on June 6, the tensions are clearly rising.

But the KRG won’t cave and evict the PKK. The Iraqi Kurds and their leaders are generally sympathetic to Turkish Kurds. In response to Turkish threats, the two top Iraq Kurdish leaders (Iraq’s President Jalal Talabani and KRG president Massoud Barzani) have countered that the KRG could retaliate by supporting Turkey’s restive Kurds.

U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates recently urged Turkey to stay out of northern Iraq, but can Washington stay Ankara’s hand? Only if the Kirkuk dispute is settled in a manner that does not hand the territory to the Kurds, the KRG checks the PKK, and Iraq holds together. One would be foolish to bet a large sum on any of these scenarios.

Moreover, the Iraq War has spawned strong anti-American nationalism in Turkey. Opinion polls show that a majority of Turks believe that Washington, a longtime ally, now seeks to truncate Turkey, presumably by allowing an independent Iraqi Kurdish state to emerge on its southern flank. This animosity has reduced any leverage Washington has on Turkish leaders.

With the surge having mixed results at best and Americans’ patience with the war eroding, the one place in Iraq where the Bush administration could show evidence of success seems headed for trouble. If northern Iraq descends into chaos, President Bush’s vow to stay the course will become even less credible -- not just to Americans, but also to Iraqi insurgents and Al Qaeda.