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Myths In Al Qaeda's 'Home'

Ron Tang — Thu, 10 Jul 2008 09:36:00 -0400

With continuous cross-border attacks from Pakistan fueling a resilient insurgency, Afghan President Hamid Karzai finally snapped. If Islamabad did not move more forcefully against Islamic militants in the country's tribal region, he declared recently, Afghan forces would enter Pakistan and do it themselves.

While the remark shocked Pakistani authorities and sparked a brief diplomatic row, it is not just President Karzai who is concerned about militancy in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Policymakers in London, New Delhi, and Washington are also worried about a territory increasingly referred to as Al Qaeda's new home.

Given the growing reach of FATA-affiliated militants, it is becoming clear that developments in the tribal areas are central to NATO's success in Afghanistan, as well as an important factor in the stability of nuclear-armed Pakistan and the security of both Europe and the United States. Yet many Western policymakers and pundits misread current events, espousing views and prescribing policies that are based more on stereotypes than on a solid grasp of the region's history and culture.

Conventional wisdom suggests that the Pakistani Taliban pose a unique and insurmountable threat, that the Pashtuns are the problem, that the tribal areas are lawless and chaotic, and that the targeted assassinations are an effective deterrent against Islamic militancy. But none of these assertions are accurate.

Although the conventional thinking holds that the Pakistani Taliban and their leader Baitullah Mehsud are a formidable and unprecedented threat to the region, the movement is neither historically unique nor overwhelmingly powerful.

FATA's history shows many charismatic, Islamic fundamentalist tribal leaders waging war against foreign powers -- and none of them successfully. In 1672, Khushal Khan Khattak led a rebellion against the Mughal emperor, but was undermined as his tribal alliance crumbled. In 1936, the Faqir of Ipi led an insurgency against the British; he was eventually marginalized through political attrition. As for Mr. Mehsud, reports indicate that he commands fewer than 1,000 fighters, even taking into account the other fractious tribes that have pledged support to his umbrella group.

Mainstream beliefs about the Pashtuns are also based on inaccuracies. While the Pashtuns, the dominant ethnic group in the FATA, are often portrayed as rebellious and violent, scant attention is paid to the overwhelming majority of them who live peacefully. As militants have swarmed tourist paradises such as the Swat Valley, the contrast between the small number of militants and the vastly larger number of nonmilitant Pashtuns who oppose them is striking.

Particularly in comparison to other ethnic groups, the Pashtuns can hardly be considered uniquely prone to militancy. In the Balochistan province, the Balochi have been waging a low-intensity resistance movement against Islamabad ever since they discovered vast deposits of natural gas. And the Sindhi have faced an urban insurgency in Karachi for many years as well. Moreover, the recent influx of foreigners -- whether Arab, Uzbek, or Chechen -- has further ratcheted up internal violence in Pakistan. Affixing the blame for militancy on Pashtuns alone oversimplifies the situation.

Contrary to another myth, the Pakistani tribal areas do have an established system of order. Historically, the FATA has been ruled either through bribery from a foreign power or by their own village elders. Many central governments have had productive relationships with local elders, albeit on local terms. Furthermore, although Pashtunwali -- the unwritten code of conduct similar to medieval chivalry -- receives much attention for being capricious and violent, it is nonetheless a stable method of self-rule that has long governed the area.

Most destructive of conventional thinking is the notion that targeted assassinations of militant leaders in the FATA is an effective counterterrorism tactic. In fact, this strategy has not deterred Islamic militancy.

In 2004, directly after the signing of the first peace accord in Waziristan, the prominent militant Nek Muhammed was killed by a US strike. But his successor-to-be, Mehsud, was not cowed, vowing to continue hostilities.

Other strikes, such as those against Abu Laith al-Libi and Ayman al-Zawahiri, have been similarly ineffective in undercutting Islamic militancy. The deaths of militant leaders rarely discourage additional violence; on the contrary, there is always a successor willing to step up. Just as NATO airstrikes in Afghanistan have bolstered popular support for the Taliban, targeted assassinations in Pakistan -- with the inevitable deaths of civilians that result -- lead to greater sympathy for radicalism and increase grass-roots support for violence.

Karzai's threat -- to initiate cross-border operations against FATA-based militants -- may be just talk. But international focus is increasingly looking at this small stretch of land as a formidable problem. As a result, a range of policy options -- from the reactionary and simplistic to the thoughtful and nuanced -- are being debated in Western capitals.

Moving beyond the myths, toward analysis based on historical and cultural realities, is a critical step in thinking pragmatically about the Pakistani tribal areas.

The Myth of Moroccan Democracy

Ron Tang — Thu, 20 Sep 2007 09:37:00 -0400

Earlier this month Morocco, one of America's closest Arab allies, held national elections. Touted as a bold step toward democracy, the vote was closely watched in the West. But the elections, rather than proving a success, have raised difficult questions about the future of Moroccan democracy and highlighted the flaws in America's approach to democracy promotion.

In the lead-up to the polls, analysts painted the contest as a test of Islam's political strength. Islamists had risen to power in Iraq, Palestine, and Turkey; and many wondered whether Morocco would be next.

The main Islamist organization in the country -- the Justice and Development Party (PJD) -- was widely expected to win the largest number of seats, following the lead of religious-based groups like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the similarly named Justice and Development Party in Turkey. But instead of securing a projected 70 - 80 seats, the PJD won only 47, coming in second to the secular Istiqlal Party. This is the first time an Islamist party has disappointed after an unprecedented series of electoral gains for Islamists throughout the Middle East.

But the story here is not about the impending failure of political Islam. After all, Islamist parties, like their secular counterparts, will experience fluctuations in support from election to election. The larger story -- one that has rarely been discussed in the Western press -- is about the failure of so-called Moroccan "democracy" and, by extension, the failure of a paradigm that hoped gradual, top-down democratization would pave the way forward for the Middle East.

In 2004-5, with landmark elections in Iraq, Lebanon, and Egypt, observers heralded what would come to be known as the "Arab Spring." Even as spring turned to winter, and hopes of a democratic transformation dimmed, Morocco appeared a lone bright spot in a region once again losing its way.

King Mohammed VI, Western-educated and refined, was a visionary, American officials believed, and was boldly moving his country toward economic and political progress. In a 2006 trip to Casablanca, Undersecretary of State Karen Hughes called Morocco an "important model for the wider region" and a country "at the forefront" of political reform. Since 2004, the U.S. has rewarded Morocco by tripling economic aid. On Aug. 31, in a move that received little fanfare at home, the United States agreed to grant Morocco $700 million over five years through the Millennium Challenge Account, one of the last remaining relics of the Bush administration's "freedom agenda."

But on the ground is a different reality, one which U.S. policymakers are loathe to admit. In the past several years, genuine democratic reform has been limited, if not nonexistent, and there are few indications this will change. Ultimate authority in Morocco rests squarely with the monarchy. The king appoints the prime minister who in turn appoints the cabinet. The parliament itself has no jurisdiction over major areas like trade policy, foreign affairs, and national security. Historically, parliament has served mostly as a glorified debating forum. Elected representatives know this better than anyone else, and most choose not to even show up when parliament is in session.

Indeed, Morocco's process of political reform has been little more than a cynical charade designed to strengthen the monarchy's grip on power. In the late 1990s, the monarchy's decision to bring opposition parties into the government was hailed as a step toward democratic change. But, as Marina Ottaway and Meredith Riley note in a 2006 Carnegie report, the king maintained full control over most of the decision making, thereby "co-opting the two main opposition parties of long standing without being forced to give up any power or change policies." More recently, a new electoral law has further undercut the power of parliament by making it nearly impossible for any one party to win a majority of seats.

This is what some scholars have referred to as "managed" or "defensive" democratization, whereby regimes implement risk-free, cosmetic reforms that give their citizens an outlet to vent but little more. By having elected parliaments and periodic elections, Arab dictatorships can deflect citizen demands, while getting the international legitimacy they crave.

Not surprisingly, Moroccans have had little faith in their king's promise of democracy. Since the 67 percent turnout of the 1984 election -- which was generally regarded as free and fair -- voter apathy has risen dramatically. In the 2002 polls, turnout dipped to 52 percent, with 17 percent of voters casting blank protest ballots. In these latest elections, Moroccans still aren't buying it -- they voted by staying home in record numbers. Turnout was at an all-time low of 37 percent, a clear indication that Moroccans increasingly feel their votes are irrelevant.

Although American policymakers have been quick to put their trust in the hands of an "enlightened" monarch, this top-down style of reform has led Morocco not toward democracy, but away from it. With little sustained U.S. pressure, the king has been unwilling to cede power to democratic institutions. Ultimately, last week's vote may very well prove to be a turning point, but not in the way people expect: The greatest casualty is not political Islam but rather the image of a democratic oasis the Moroccan regime has worked so hard to create and that the United States has been more than willing to accept without question.