Ghaith al-Omari: All Publications, Events and Press

Middle East Envoy George Mitchell No Stranger to Conflicts | The Los Angeles Times

Cecille Isidro — Fri, 23 Jan 2009 23:28:00 -0500

"Neither side was entirely happy, and that was a good thing," said Ghaith al Omari, who was then a Palestinian negotiator and is now with the American Task ...

As Obama Visits State Dept., Clinton Announces Two Special Envoys | The Washington Post

Cecille Isidro — Thu, 22 Jan 2009 22:12:00 -0500

Ghaith al-Omari, a former adviser to Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, said "the policies are the same" but "Obama signaled early engagement ...

Gaza Crisis Is Another Challenge for Obama, Who Defers to Bush for Now | The New York Times

Communications — Sun, 28 Dec 2008 22:28:00 -0500

“You can ignore it, you can put it on the back burner, but it will always come up to bite you,” said Ghaith al-Omari, a former Palestinian peace negotiator. ...

Ghaith al-Omari in Jerusalem Post | 'Abbas, Bush Stress Need for Peace Push'

Communications — Thu, 25 Sep 2008 09:42:00 -0400

Former Abbas aide Ghaith al-Omari described the meeting as one of maintenance rather than decisiveness, given Israeli political developments and other hindrances to the process.

He said that while chances of an agreement appeared dim, the sides had a vested political interest in keeping the process going.

"You can feel a real concern that they don't want to see it collapse," said Omari, now with the Washington-based American Task Force for Palestine, pointing to a White House meeting as helpful in that respect. LINK

Ghaith al-Omari and Daniel Levy in the Washington Report on Middle East Affairs | 'Making Sense of the Arab-Israeli Nightmare'

Cecille Isidro — Mon, 01 Sep 2008 14:46:00 -0400

In a June 27 panel entitled “Making Sense of the Arab-Israel Nightmare” held at the New America Foundation in Washington, DC, speakers discussed the lessons to be learned from past administrations and prospects for the Bush administration in its final months, as well as prospects for the next administration. Ghaith al-Omari, a former policy adviser to Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, Daniel Levy, former senior policy adviser in the Israeli prime minister’s office, and Aaron Miller, author of The Much Too Promised Land, addressed the Arab-Israeli conflict largely as an inherited problem. LINK

Ghaith al-Omari in the New York Times | 'Israel’s Political Situation Dims Hopes for Peace Deal'

Communications — Fri, 01 Aug 2008 08:42:00 -0400

“There is zero chance” now, said Ghaith al-Omari, a former negotiator for Mr. Abbas. Mr. Omari said that the best the Palestinians could now expect was that Ms. Rice could manage to preserve something to hand to the next administration.

“The best we can hope for is a stabilization package that will make it easier for the next president to engage the process,” Mr. Omari said. LINK

Ghaith al-Omari in Reuters | 'Olmert Departure Makes Mideast Peace More Elusive'

Communications — Thu, 31 Jul 2008 07:48:00 -0400

Reflecting the considerable uncertainty brought on by Olmert's decision, Ghaith Al-Omari, advocacy director for the Washington-based American Task Force on Palestine, offered a pessimistic assessment.

"In my view, it seals the fact that there will be no conflict-ending deal by the end of this year," said Al-Omari, who was a member of the Palestinian negotiating team during the failed 2000 Camp David U.S.-backed peace-making effort.

Al-Omari said he did not think Olmert had the moral authority to negotiate a deal and said his chief negotiator and possible successor, Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, would be unable to make concessions in a political season.

"Livni will not enter the election season with 'Dividing Jerusalem' on her banner. She cannot make the necessary compromises," he said. "We are going to get into a holding pattern on the negotiations ... I think it's politically impossible to reach a deal by the end of the year." LINK

Ghaith al-Omari in the Jewish Daily Forward | 'Amid Pessisism on Peace Prospects, Rice Meets Parties in Last Push for Accord'

Communications — Wed, 30 Jul 2008 08:28:00 -0400

“Public trust in the peace process is very low” said Ghaith al-Omari, a former adviser to the Palestinian president. Al-Omari, who now serves as director of advocacy for the American Task Force on Palestine, said that the Palestinian public does not believe reports of progress in the talks because they clash with the reality on the ground.

“It’s unfortunate that Condi Rice keeps on being so ideological instead of focusing on issues on the ground, such as the settlements,” al-Omari said. LINK

Making Sense of the Arab-Israel Nightmare

Communications — Thu, 26 Jun 2008 22:30:00 -0400

A New America Event
06/27/2008 - 9:30am

On June 27th, the New America Foundation and the Century Foundation co-hosted “Making Sense of the Arab-Israel Nightmare”, an event which aimed to investigate the status quo, the future available to the Bush Administration, and a measure of “crystal ball gazing” into what one can hope for from the next Administration Special Assistant to Ambassador Morton Abramowitz at the Century Foundation, Jonathan Kolieb, hosted a Q&A-style session with three former practitioners in a lively discussion that explored the lessons to… more

The Perils Of Unconditional Engagement

Ron Tang — Fri, 02 May 2008 09:38:00 -0400

The issue of whether or not to engage Hamas boils down to the following question: would such engagement help moderate the organization, or would it simply improve Hamas’ chances of dominating the Palestinian political scene and encourage extremism throughout the Middle East? For now, any engagement that goes beyond achieving de-escalation in Gaza would serve to bolster Hamas at the expense of those working toward a two-state solution.

Those who argue that engagement would bring about a significant change in Hamas’ policies proceed from a faulty assumption regarding the way the organization thinks. Hamas does not reject the two-state solution and engage in terrorism because it fails to understand what is objectionable about this approach, or because it is unaware that this contradicts the basic values and behavioral norms of members of the international community. Its behavior is based on a cold, rational cost-benefit calculation. This calculus relates to Hamas’ domestic political goals, the regional dimension and its relations with Israel. Like any political party, its primary goal is to gain and hold onto power, in this case within Palestinian society.

In any engagement, Hamas -- like any rational political actor -- will seek to maximize its benefits and minimize its costs. It will use any international dialogue it can achieve to send one overriding message to its local, regional and global constituencies alike: namely, that it can maintain its positions regarding the peace process, Israel and the use of violence, while at the same time gaining international legitimacy. It will argue that it provides at least as many benefits as its secular opponents, without making any compromises. Engaging Hamas without the terms of engagement being clear and without it first paying the political price of admission to the international club -- particularly by accepting the two-state solution and disarming -- amounts to a political free lunch. As recently demonstrated by President Jimmy Carter’s meetings with Hamas, it will pocket and cash the gains from cost-free engagement without feeling any incentive to change.

On the domestic front, Hamas seeks exclusive dominance over Palestinian political life. Since the Oslo Accords, it has consistently used terrorism to undermine the peace process. Hamas has also exploited the lack of results from this process to undermine its main rival, the secular nationalist Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and discredit the PLO’s political platform of statehood through negotiations. It is no coincidence that in the numerous so-called “Palestinian national unity” talks, Hamas was unwilling to compromise on its anti-two state platform or to relinquish its arms and militias. These are strategic assets that Hamas wants to keep in reserve to use when it sees fit. This was vividly demonstrated in Gaza last June and more recently when Hamas led the breach of the Rafah border with Egypt.

At the regional level, Hamas is part of the larger trend of revolutionary political Islam which represents the main challenge to pro-Western regimes in the Middle East. The Muslim Brotherhood and other similar organizations in Jordan, Egypt and elsewhere are looking to see how far Hamas can push the envelope. Similarly, pro-U.S. Arab governments are watching nervously to see whether the international community will be wittingly or unwittingly complicit in undermining Palestinian leaders like President Mahmoud Abbas and Prime Minister Salam Fayyad. Any hint of international legitimization of an unmodified Hamas will cause the various regional players to draw their own lessons.

In terms of relations with Israel, even the most pragmatic Hamas voices have stated a willingness only to accept Israel as a matter of transient practical necessity. They speak only of a temporary truce that will not bring about a permanent end to the conflict. This might not be a matter of immediate concern for those interested in short-term security stabilization, which could explain the Israeli public’s interest in engaging Hamas. However, the long-term implications in terms of regional normalization and stabilization, as well as in terms of encouraging extremism and irredentism, are problematic.

Unconditional political engagement with Hamas would send a myriad of unhelpful messages. To the Palestinian public, the message would be that extremism pays while moderation does not. To Arab Islamist parties, the message would be that terrorism and violent coups will not only be tolerated, they will be rewarded. To pro-Western Arab governments, the message would be that they cannot rely on Western support. To Israel, the message would be that it is doomed to live in a sea of hostility and that the best it can hope for are short periods of calm that punctuate a future of perpetual conflict.

Even if Hamas does gain international legitimacy, it will not go away. The question of what to do with Hamas and its considerable capacity to play the role of a spoiler remains. In the long term, primacy within the Palestinian political arena will be determined above all by the outcome of the peace process: if negotiations produce a viable Palestinian state, moderates will reap the political rewards. If negotiations fails, Hamas will be able to claim that its platform of “resistance” is the only avenue left for achieving Palestinian national aspirations.

To get to a final peace agreement, the Annapolis process has to be re-energized and re-focused. As progress continues to be made by the Palestinian and Israeli negotiators on the large permanent status issues, visible changes must begin to occur on the ground. The Palestinian public needs to feel that Israel is serious about peacemaking and that the moderates are able to produce results. In particular, a settlement freeze is essential to restore faith in the peace process, while improvement in the daily lives and freedom of movement for Palestinians will help maintain a sense of hope. For its part, the Palestinian national movement needs to start rebuilding its own credibility in the fields of good governance and the imposition of law and order. Efforts undertaken by Prime Minister Fayyad in these fields are critical. If inefficiency, corruption and security chaos are not rooted out, and if Fatah -- as the leader of the PLO and the Palestinian Authority -- continues to be seen as a stumbling block in the way of reform, Hamas will continue to have public appeal.

In the short term, however, it could be possible to reach security stabilization with Hamas without paying too high a political price. A de-escalation package brokered by an Arab country that has pre-existing relations with Hamas (a role being played effectively by Egypt today) and an end to the siege of Gaza through the reopening of the Gaza crossing points under Palestinian Authority control, can help avoid -- for a period of time, at least -- a deeply destabilizing all out military confrontation in Gaza.

Once a measure of calm is achieved, political capital and energy should be focused not on the futile and counterproductive strategy of courting and rewarding Hamas for free. Rather, those who want to see long-term stability and the victory of moderation in the Middle East should focus on ensuring the success of the peace process and securing the establishment of a Palestinian state to live alongside Israel. Once that is achieved, Hamas will have to face the real challenge of either accepting the terms of the new political reality or consigning itself to irrelevance.

Daniel Levy and Ghaith al-Omari in Washington Post | In Search for Peace, a Shrinking White House Role

Communications — Sun, 02 Mar 2008 14:32:00 -0500

In Search for Peace, a Shrinking White House Role (The Washington Post)

. . . Daniel Levy, a former Israeli peace negotiator, said that key players in the region are moving beyond the Bush administration. "The feeling is that if you keep the flash points on a lower or somewhat higher flame, it will give you more cards when a new administration comes in," he said, speaking in a phone interview from Israel. "Everyone is sucking up to the Iranians," he added. . .

Ghaith al-Omari, a former adviser to Abbas and now advocacy director for the American Task Force on Palestine, faulted the Bush administration for not nurturing a process that it started. He noted that the administration has appointed three generals to assess various aspects of the issue, but that few people in the region understand their roles. Rice's two-day visit this week is her first substantive trip since the conference in November. . .

Ghaith al-Omari on the Charlie Rose Show | 'Bush Visits the Middle East'

Communications — Thu, 10 Jan 2008 09:34:00 -0500

A Discussion About Bush's Visit to the Middle East (Charlie Rose - PBS) A discussion about President Bush's visit to the Middle East with Dennis Ross, Special Middle East Coordinator under President Clinton & Ghaith al-Omari, Senior Research Fellow at the New America Foundation.

Ghaith Al-Omari in Washington Post | 'Egypt Opens Its Borders'

Communications — Thu, 03 Jan 2008 11:02:00 -0500

Egypt opened its main crossing into the Gaza Strip on Wednesday to allow more than 2,000 Palestinian pilgrims – including at least one official of the armed Hamas movement – to return to their homes there, outraging Israel in a growing dispute over border security. ...

Egyptian officials said at the time that the Hamas group had Saudi visas that had to be honored. Israeli officials assert that the visas were stamped at the Saudi Embassy in Cairo and probably were smuggled back into Gaza via tunnels that Israel asserts Egypt has failed to close. The Hamas group's departure "tremendously undermined" Abbas, said Ghaith al-Omari, a former adviser to Abbas who is now at the New America Foundation in Washington. He said the Palestinian Authority had understood it would coordinate the movement of the pilgrims, and by accepting the Hamas-sponsored pilgrims, Egypt and Saudi Arabia were "giving Hamas a level of recognition, establishing Hamas as an official counterpart" to the Abbas government. ...

For the complete story, click here.

Annapolis Conference, Ghaith Al-Omari and Daniel Levy on NPR

Communications — Sun, 25 Nov 2007 10:52:00 -0500

The Arab-Israeli conflict has not been high on President Bush's agenda until now. A conference in Annapolis, Md., is seen as a "relaunch" of a process meant to move the two sides toward peace. Ghaith Al-Omari and Daniel Levy of the New America Foundation discuss prospects for progress at the summit. ...

For the complete story, please visit the NPR website. Listen to the interview here and please visit the American Strategy Program's special section on the Annapolis conference.

C-SPAN's Washington Journal Interviews Ghaith Al-Omari on Annapolis Conference

Communications — Sun, 25 Nov 2007 10:46:00 -0500

The American Strategy Program's Senior Research Fellow Ghaith Al-Omari appeared as a guest on C-Span's 'Washington Journal' program where he discussed the upcoming Annapolis meeting as well as prospects and conditions for its success. ...

Please follow this link to the video. Ghaith Al-Omari is also advocacy director of the American Task Force on Palestine (ATFP). For more information on the Annapolis conference, visit the American Strategy Program website.

C-SPAN Airs Annapolis Event with Speakers Levy and Al-Omari

Communications — Tue, 20 Nov 2007 11:31:00 -0500

Former peace negotiators discussed the summit between Palestinian and Israeli officials to be held in Annapolis, Maryland. They talked about the likely processes, outcomes, and implications of the summit, as well as the political context in which the summit would be held. They also answered questions from the audience. ...

Click here for C-SPAN's coverage of this event. For more information on the Annapolis conference please visit the American Strategy Program's special section on the talks, which offers additional information on event speakers Ghaith Al-Omari and Daniel Levy and moderator Steve Clemons.

Ghaith Al-Omari and Daniel Levy on NPR's All Things Considered

Communications — Tue, 20 Nov 2007 11:14:00 -0500

MICHELE NORRIS, host: The formal invitations are just now going out for the Bush administration's Middle East peace conference in Annapolis next week. The idea of the gathering is to formalize final status peace talks between the Israelis and Palestinians and get the blessings of key players, especially from the Arab world. …

MICHELE KELEMEN, correspondent: There were initially high expectations that the Israelis and Palestinians would set out their end game in Annapolis. But despite numerous trips by Secretary of State Rice, they're expected to come up with a less-ambitious joint statement. … Minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian authority President Mahmoud Abbas seemed to have built up trust in their private talks. But both men are seen as politically weak and unable to make major concessions. Daniel Levy who was part of previous Israeli negotiating teams says it would be easier for Olmert to do nothing so his coalition stays with them.

Mr. DANIEL LEVY (Senior Fellow, New America Foundation; Former Member, Israeli Negotiating Team): But I think, first of all, that the Israeli prime minister does see a need in realizing a two-state solution. And secondly, he's not going to politically survive by doing nothing. He would much rather… more

Annapolis and Beyond: What (Not) to Expect

Communications — Tue, 20 Nov 2007 10:00:00 -0500

A New America Event
11/20/2007 - 10:00am

With the Annapolis peace summit approaching, this event featured three former peace negotiators from the Israeli, Palestinian, and American sides, offering their views on the likely process, outcomes and implications of the Annapolis summit. The former negotiators recently co-authored “Ten Commandments for Mideast Peace.”

The New America Foundation/American Strategy Program has been hosting a series of briefings to examine and discuss the expectations, opportunities and risks of renewed U.S. peace efforts within the current political context.

… more

Ghaith al-Omari and Daniel Levy in Middle East Times Analysis

Communications — Mon, 29 Oct 2007 07:47:00 -0400

Participants at the 2007 DACOR conference on the Middle East recently heatedly debated the "frying pan of Iraq, the fire of the Israel and Palestinian conflict."

The Iraq panel discussed the increasing fragmentation within the Arab country, agreeing that tribal affinities would color the future Iraqi economic and geopolitical landscape. ...

Meanwhile, early prognoses on the proposed Annapolis Middle East peace conference ruled the discussion on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict panel.

Ghaith Al Omari, a senior research fellow at the New America Foundation, maintained that the Annapolis summit, without a durable peace process and the diplomatic participation of surrounding Arab states, could not achieve its lofty objectives.

David Levy, a senior fellow and director of the Middle East Programs at the New American Foundation and The Century Foundation, also listed conditions for success at Annapolis, MD. In addition to a viable political process, Levy pointed to the need for the U.S. to present bridging proposals to bring the Israelis and Palestinians together. However, Levy also stressed the need for genuine American initiatives. "If the American ideas, when you unwrap them, start singing 'Hava Nagila,' then they're not American ideas and they don't help Israel either." ...

For the complete article, please more

Engaging Hamas: The When and the How

Cecille Isidro — Tue, 16 Oct 2007 13:28:00 -0400

The Hamas takeover of Gaza in June and the resulting West Bank-Gaza split has raised serious questions. What are the short-term prospects for reunification? Can serious political progress be made with Israel without Palestinian reconciliation? What are the elements of a successful and lasting future reconciliation?

There is no doubt that ultimately for political, economic and geopolitical reasons, the West Bank and Gaza must be one territorial unit. Hamas represents a sizable Palestinian constituency that must be engaged and become part of the political system. But the chances of that happening in the near future are slim. Engaging Hamas without a reversal of its Gaza takeover and its acceptance of the two-state solution paradigm and all related agreements will serve only to legitimize that takeover. It would also result in the re-freezing of direly needed international aid to the Palestinians and abort current peace prospects.

In addition, the Gaza takeover was conducted by elements of Hamas representing the hard-line ideological as opposed to pragmatic nationalist strains within the organization. Engaging these elements would validate their violent takeover and weaken the more moderate elements. However, official and unofficial messaging to Hamas must stress that their current isolation is not an effort to destroy them, but would end conditionally.

With reconciliation not a near-term option, concerns have been voiced that any agreement reached with Israel would lack legitimacy, since it excludes a sizable minority of the Palestinian people. In addition, Hamas may sabotage any agreement through violence against Israel, with the resultant and inevitable harsh Israeli response.

It is important here to distinguish between reaching an agreement and implementing it. It is entirely possible for Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to reach an agreement with the Israelis after the fall Mideast meeting without Hamas if a meaningful process toward Palestinian statehood is started following a document of principles setting the general contours of a peace agreement.

The process itself must include elements distinguishing it from previous ones, such as staggered Arab participation, rewards for both parties, reversal of Israeli actions in occupied East Jerusalem and a settlement freeze that goes beyond the declarative. In tandem must be a parallel process of internal security and governance reform in the Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authority.

Success will depend to a large degree on Israel. If no serious movement toward a political agreement is made and Israeli actions on the ground continue to undermine Palestinian statehood prospects, any PA security, governance and economic achievements will be spun by Hamas as the price the PA was paid for accepting and supporting the occupation.

Implementing a peace agreement will require Palestinian reconciliation, however. If such an agreement meets Palestinian national aspirations and is backed by key Arab countries, namely Saudi Arabia, it is hard to imagine Hamas opposing it and risking alienating the Palestinian people. In fact, a new telephone survey conducted in Gaza by Near East Consulting found that most Gazans do not regard the de facto Hamas government as legitimate and support a peace agreement with Israel.

Given the deep ideological differences between Hamas and Fatah and the fact that past attempts at national unity had papered these differences over, the reconciliation must include Hamas accepting the PLO charter, U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 and the two-state solution paradigm. Hamas must understand that even elections that legitimately brought it to power do not give it license to attempt to take over the PLO and dismantle the whole structure of "statehood through negotiations." Fatah for its part must relinquish its monopoly over governance and security institutions once Hamas accepts the above elements.

The PA’s basic message -- liberation through negotiation -- needs serious rehabilitation through significant, concrete and credible progress toward a permanent status deal and the establishment of a Palestinian state. If such progress is made, Hamas will find itself in the untenable and losing position of campaigning against a Palestinian state.

If, on the other hand, the national secular movement as represented by the PLO fails, the outlook will be bleak. We will witness either a full disintegration of the Palestinian polity or a Hamas takeover of the Palestinian society and political system. The Palestinian national cause will regress to where it was in the late 1960s: a movement fighting for recognition at the margins of the international system. The implications of this for Israel, the Arab world, and the West are best avoided.