Foreign Policy: New America Events

Rethinking Nuclear Weapons

Communications — Thu, 24 Jul 2008 14:30:00 -0400

A New America Event
07/24/2008 - 2:30pm

The effectiveness of nuclear weapons has rarely been an issue. During the Cold War it was axiomatic that they were too risky to use even once. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Bush Administration's search for new and expanded roles for nuclear weapons, the question of effectiveness is back on the table.

Hiroshima is at the heart of any debate about whether nuclear weapons translate into usable power. Scholar Ward Wilson argues unequivocally that bombing Hiroshima did not coerce the Japanese (the Soviet invasion was decisive) and further that nuclear weapons, in general, have few uses even if you have them and your opponent does not.

Making Sense of the Arab-Israel Nightmare

Communications — Thu, 26 Jun 2008 22:30:00 -0400

A New America Event
06/27/2008 - 9:30am

On June 27th, the New America Foundation and the Century Foundation co-hosted “Making Sense of the Arab-Israel Nightmare”, an event which aimed to investigate the status quo, the future available to the Bush Administration, and a measure of “crystal ball gazing” into what one can hope for from the next Administration Special Assistant to Ambassador Morton Abramowitz at the Century Foundation, Jonathan Kolieb, hosted a Q&A-style session with three former practitioners in a lively discussion that explored the lessons to be learned from the current and previous administrations and its implications for the future. The speakers were former State Department negotiator, Aaron David Miller, Director of the Middle East Policy Initiative at New America, Daniel Levy, and former advisor to Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas and current Senior Research Fellow in the American Strategy Program, Ghaith al-Omari. An MP3 audio recording can be downloaded below, while video is available at right.

Kolieb’s first question, directed at Miller, asked what the latter’s assessment was of the Bush Administration what its legacy will be. Miller began by citing former Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and James Baker and the Jimmy Carter Adminsitration as the three most successful American efforts at Middle East peace. What distinguished these three was each made peace a top priority and was tough on each side of the issue. Additionally, each had an exquisite sense of timing and did not over-engage or disengage. Finally, each was tenacious and viewed it through the lens of American national interest. For Miller, Bush is the “great disengager” looking to its other priorities even as opportunities for peace came along. For example, it did not take the opportunity given in Fall 2004 when Yasser Arafat died but rather let chance, randomness, and Ariel Sharon dictate the political terrain. It is now, for him, “painful to imagine” a happy ending to the conflict in the short-term. The next six months should, then, aim to do no harm. It should support codifying whatever Palestinian and Israeli talks on permanent issues occur, the Syrian-Israeli negotiations, and prevent a major confrontation between Hamas and Israel. If these were to pass, there would be a remote possibility of serious and good things happening in the new Adminstrations.

Miller turned, then, his attention to the future Administration and observed that the legacy Bush bestows will be important. Miller proposed, then, four ways to change the way America approaches the situation. First, it should be a national priority and Israel-Palestine negotiations will go nowhere without a strong American presence. Second, there must be a chance of success because a young administration will not risk a monumental failure and thus Bush must leave his successor with a viable starting-point on the conflict. Third, America is perceived as weak and incompetent in the Middle East and tough and serious diplomacy is the only way to reemerge as a regional power. Finally, it needs tactical flexibility and strategic independence in its conduct with respect to the Israeli-Arab conflict. If there is the perception that America is the lawyer to one side of the conflict, the minimal level of trust will be inexistent. America’s “special relationship” with Israel is valuable but should not be an exclusive relationship which does not criticize inappropriate behavior by Israelis.

Kolieb’s next question, directed at al-Omari, asked for his take on what the last years of the Administration will look like and his suggestions to it. al-Omari initially observed that the current Annapolis process is dependant on the US because of Olmert’s and Abbas’s political weakness. Additionally, if the next President inherits an active conflict and a dead process, it will have little incentive to work at reviving it. The focus of the next six months should, then, be to strengthen the prospects for peace until the next Administration arrives. To achieve this goal, a four-pronged approach is necessary. This mistake of Annapolis was to focus on the big peace deal while ignoring the reality on the ground. The Israeli and Palestinian publics found no substantial movement in their daily experience and thus the deal had no credibility or support. Furthermore, America needs to assess the situation on final status in order to make sure that the parties do not lock up into orthodoxy and constantly revert to opening positions. America’s role is to be a tough third-party negotiator to ensure things do not go backwards. Major political action is necessary, for example, Israel needs settlement freezing and Palestinians need vigorous action to reassure Israel’s security concerns. Confidence building measures are necessary to create a sense that progress is happening. The fourth prong is to avoid a Hamas-Israel war. If there was to be a major invasion, it would kill the process and be a complete failure for Israel. It is, lastly, the responsibility of the current Administration also for the President-elect.

Kolieb’s follow-up question asked what the bright spots were in the current disaster in Palestinian politics. Al-Omari bluntly stated there were no bright spots but insisted the only way to fix it is to have the US stop trying to control it. Palestinian politics is obscure and opaque to Western visions and every attempt at manipulation has ended in failure. The US should negotiate with Abbas but, at the same time, not constrict his domestic readings. If he wants a Hamas truce, then the US should not try to block it and let the Palestinians manage their own affairs.

Lastly, Kolieb turned to Levy for his own assessments and advice of the Bush Administration and the next one. The first thing Levy indicates is to let the cease-fire work and prevent a catastrophe between Israel and Gaza. His reading of the situation sees active American opposition to the cease-fire no longer existing but the latter is still fragile. There have been a half-dozen rockets landing in Israel running parallel to military operations in the West Bank, Gaza, and economic closures. There is furthermore a need to abandon the Clinton approach of forcing an agreement on a peace of paper. The Middle East is still not ready for the kind of deal that America insists upon. While he is pessimistic on the prospects of this happening, he suggests a non-public paper to reflect where the parties are at. Another proposal, although he is again pessimistic on this, is to repeat the Camp David parameters but making it such that it will pass over to the next Administration and does not force the timetable upon the Israelis and Palestinians. If they get the content of the parameters correct and choreograph this with the next President, then these measures would work. However, Levy warns against a managerial approach to the conflict as long as there is occupation and its attendant insecurity. If the decision is for an agreement and the political will exists then one should push forward but, if it does not, an extension of time will not necessarily create it. He concurs with al-Omari in saying confidence building measures would be helpful

Kolieb followed up by asking the status of Israeli politics and whether its instabilities are endemic. Levy responded by observing the immediate term still sees some measure of decision-making capacity despite Olmert’s weakness albeit shallow and unable to create a peace deal with the Palestinians. The road ahead will either see the Kadima party elect a new leader in a primary who will create a new coalition and avoid elections or disunity in the Kadima party leading to elections happening which would bring in Benjamin Netanyahu. The last possibility would be an election loss for Netanyahu although most polls show him winning if there was to be an election. In general, Israeli coalition politics is extremely fractured with thirteen parties answering to often sectarian, sometimes ethnic constituencies. This creates a structural weight for a Prime Minister and serves as a constricting factor in the ability to make big decisions.

Kolieb’s next question was to Miller. He asked how America should deal with the two polities’ systems. Miller is dismissive of the US capacity of being able to soberly assess and act in their politics. A unified Palestinian political voice is a prerequisite for even the beginnings of a resolution. It is, for Miller, a delusion to believe that Israel would make existential concessions. Israeli political fractures have prevented a leader with the moral authority and legitimacy to emerge. Miller concurs, in the end, with al-Omari’s injunction to have the US stop meddling within domestic politics.

The next question had al-Omari discuss the importance of the US. The US is key because it is the only member that Israel trusts and is comfortable in negotiating with. Yet, this should not mean American monopoly but rather a reinvigorated multilateral effort to resolve the Israel-Palestine dispute is necessary. Finally, engaging Arabs is necessary to give them the incentive and a level of dignity so they can be constructive partners in negotiations.

-Kailash Srinivasan, Research Intern for The Century Foundation

Clash or Cooperation? The Chinese Climate Change Dilemma

Communications — Thu, 26 Jun 2008 07:15:00 -0400

A New America Event
06/26/2008 - 12:15pm

On June 26 The New America Foundation's American Strategy Program and the Heinrich Böll Foundation hosted Reinhard Bütikofer, the leader of Germany's Green Party, for a discussion about possibilities of cooperation with China over the issue of climate change. Steve Clemons, the director of the American Strategy Program, moderated the discussion. An MP3 audio recording can be downloaded below, while video is available at right.

Bütikofer began by detailing the importance for Europe of involving China in projects to control climate change; they are the world's biggest CO2 emitter, and he stated that the United States would be unlikely to support a climate change regime that did not also apply to Russia and rapidly developing countries such as China, India, and Brazil. At the same time, Bütikofer acknowledged that any plan for a climate regime would still need to protect economic growth, in order to get China to sign on to it. This would require a new developmental model that offsets carbon output.

He also detailed China's reasons for supporting a comprehensive move against climate change, listing the many environmental consequences of climate change for China. These included more powerful storms, rising sea levels, damage to important river systems, and a drop in food production.

In response to these challenges, Bütikofer suggested a number of things the west can do to help curb emissions in China. These include sharing research on climate change, transferring technology that can raise energy efficiency, and also transferring administrative experience, to allow the Chinese government to overcome the inefficiency and obstructiveness of regional and local leaders. He suggested that more democracy would also be helpful, because reversing climate change requires the unified effort of civil society to check corruption and make sure necessary change occurs.

-Andrew Lebovich, Research Intern, American Strategy Program.

This event was co-sponsored with The Heinrich Böll Foundation of North America.

Confronting Foreign Intelligence and Information Gaps

Communications — Sun, 22 Jun 2008 19:00:00 -0400

A New America Event
06/23/2008 - 12:00pm

Like it or not, security is a partisan issue. But in his discussion June 23 at the New America Foundation, Senator Russ Feingold (D-WI) outlined a post-partisan "purple state"-style strategy for reform in intelligence and information gathering, buttressed by withdrawal from Iraq.

Sen. Feingold focused first on Iraq, arguing that the biggest policy mistake after 9/11 was not actually taking on Al Qaeda directly.

"Instead," Feingold said, "we have conflated Al Qaeda with Iraq, and launched a war in Iraq that perpetuates our military, intelligence, diplomatic and fiscal deficits and leaves us exposed - in fact increases our exposure – to very real threats to our domestic safety."

Feingold argued further what has been for some time and will continue to be the democratic stance on Iraq; that not only has Iraq weakened America, but it has distracted the government and military from Afghanistan, and especially the Afghanistan-Pakistan border regions, where Osama bin Laden and top members of Al Qaeda are believed to be hiding, training and regrouping.

But as he would do throughout the speech, Feingold cited statements not from members of his own party or liberal experts, but respected military leaders like Joint Chiefs Chairman Admiral Mike Mullen and General James Jones that Afghanistan and Pakistan served as Al Qaeda safe-havens, and are still the central source of Al Qaeda activity.

But withdrawal from Iraq, according to Feingold, is only part of a wider plan to regain "global and strategic perspective", and a defined strategy of American foreign policy for the future.

This new strategy entails a hard look at the way American resources are used. As Feingold said, "an effective 21st century national security strategy must include improved resources to collect covert and public information, enhance multilateral diplomacy and prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons."

This new approach includes dramatically increased spending on "civilian elements of national security" like diplomacy, foreign aid, economic reconstruction and strategic communications, coupled with a cut in expensive and outdated military programs.

Again, Feingold portrayed this approach and the need for a new strategy as beyond partisanship; in arguing for this need, he referenced Senators Chuck Hagel (R-NE), Joseph Biden (D-DE) and Richard Lugar (R-IN), as well as Defense Secretary Gates, and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, among others.

The need for a new strategy brought Feingold to his final point of discussion, addressing intelligence reform. Feingold argued convincingly that, "the problem is our deficits in information collection, as well as reporting and analysis." This information encompasses not just clandestine information, but equally valuable open-source intelligence and observations gathered by sources outside the intelligence community, such as diplomats.

In order to ensure a comprehensive approach to intelligence reform, one that addresses the large strategic questions, Feingold proposed an independent commission to address intelligence collection, as well as questions of resource allocation and interagency coordination, which he and Senator Hagel have introduced as S.3041. This commission would then make its recommendations directly to the executive branch and to the congress.

This is one approach to addressing problems of American security in the post-9/11 world. The New America Foundation has seen other ideas, notably from NIC Chairman Thomas Fingar, who spoke here June 4. But the need for new strategic thinking is undeniable, one that combines pragmatism with a willingness to look at tough questions, across a wide spectrum of issues.

--Andrew Lebovich, Research Intern, American Strategy Program

Pakistan’s Dangerous Turn

Communications — Fri, 20 Jun 2008 01:15:00 -0400

A New America Event
06/20/2008 - 12:15pm

On June 20th the New America Foundation’s American Strategy Program hosted the release of Terror Free Tomorrow’s groundbreaking new surveys of Pakistani public opinion, presented by Terror Free Tomorrow’s President Ken Ballen. New America scholars Peter Bergen and Nicholas Schmidle then provided expert analysis of the data and the detailed the implications of the report for future American policy toward Pakistan and the war in Afghanistan. American Strategy Program Deputy Director Patrick Doherty moderated the discussion.

Peter Bergen zeroed in on the fact that unlike other countries that have suffered extensive terrorism, Pakistanis have not to date conclusively given up support for terrorist groups. He argued that the Pakistani military does not as yet have a coherent counter insurgency strategy, one that combines military action and negotiation with supervised economic aid for poorer, more extreme regions of Pakistan. He also urged that the United States needs to make a long-term commitment to Afghanistan of more soldiers, and should be frank about this commitment with Afghanis and Pakistanis. This, he said, would ensure that people do not feel that the United States will abandon the region, as it did following the Soviet-Afghan war in 1989.

Nicholas Schmidle continued the discussion of insurgency and resistance to both America and the Pakistani government, focusing in part on domestic politics in Pakistan. He described a Pakistan in a state of confusion, with no clear view of who is in charge. He further described Pakistani support for terrorism as a result of the abstract nature of terrorism in the country; while an overwhelming majority of Pakistanis are opposed to suicide bombing, he said, many support Al Qaeda’s agenda of killing Americans, even though Al Qaeda relies on suicide bombings.

Ultimately, Schmidle said, America can repair its image in Pakistan, but will face difficulty in sustaining any gains made without a sustained American economic and potentially military presence in the country.

The future of Pakistan is of vital importance to the United States, both for its influence on the war in Afghanistan and because it possesses nuclear weapons. The data compiled by Terror Free Tomorrow starkly demonstrates both the dire challenges faced by America, as well as the glimmer of hope that through intelligent, pragmatic and concerted effort, America can recapture support in Pakistan and diminish the importance of Al Qaeda and other extremist groups in the region.

-Andrew Lebovich, Research Intern, American Strategy Program

NY Event: Lessons from Iraq

Communications — Tue, 17 Jun 2008 18:30:00 -0400

A New America Event
06/17/2008 - 6:30pm

Is there an upside to the worst foreign policy disaster in U.S. history? Maybe. The current war in Iraq should definitively, permanently settle a handful of critical questions about American conduct in the world. Lessons from Iraq: Avoiding the Next War provides a list of those questions and even ventures some answers in the form of key lessons from Iraq.

Join us for a lively discussion of these lessons with noted contributors. The panel will be followed by a wine and cheese reception and copies of the book will be available for sale.

This event is co-sponsored by the Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public Service at NYU, The Nation Institute, and The Century Foundation.

Examining the Next Year on the Israeli-Palestinian Front

Communications — Mon, 16 Jun 2008 06:30:00 -0400

A New America Event
06/16/2008 - 12:30pm

On June 16th, the New America Foundation co-sponsored an event with The Century Foundation examining the status quo of the Israel-Palestine conflict and the future it portends. The event hosted was hosted by Patrick Doherty, Deputy Director of the American Strategy Program, featuring three speakers representing the Palestinian, Israeli, and American perspectives on the conflict. An MP3 audio recording can be downloaded below, while video is available at right.

Palestinian activist and former presidential candidate, Mustafa Barghouti offered the Palestinian perspective—outlining the measures taken by the Israeli government in the wake of the Annapolis agreement that is increasingly making the two-state solution impossible. First, contrary to the promises made at Annapolis, the Israeli government has overseen twenty times more settlement expansion than any time before Annapolis. It has recently, for example, signed off on the creation of 7,974 new housing units in East Jerusalem, six times more than for the four years between 2002 and 2006 where 1,600 units were built. Furthermore, the wall that surrounds the West Bank has served as a form of functional annexation as large parts of it reside within the territory. For Barghouti, these expansions increasingly emaciate a potential Palestinian state making it an unviable entity. In addition to these two problems, the increased rate of Israeli military attacks even in the West Bank where there are no rocket attacks are alienating Palestinians and undermines the authority of Palestinian governance and the peace process in general. Since the pre-Annapolis period, attacks have increased by 300% and the checkpoints which constrict Palestinian freedom of movement have increased from 521 to 670. His second line of criticism was of the U.S. The U.S. has, for him, full rights for its bias toward Israel but heavily protests the former’s demand to hold a monopoly on mediating the peace process. In the end, the only solution he finds is a unification of the Palestinian polity under the sign of democracy.

The second speaker, Daniel Levy, Senior Fellow and Director of the Middle East Initiative in the American Strategy Program at New America, gave the Israeli perspective on the situation. His first observation on the status quo was critical of Bush’s appropriation of the failed Clinton legacy. The latter is marked by an attempt to rush a last-minute peace deal after years of disengagement which is hard to see as working in light of how intransigent the conflict has been over the years. In general, Levy does not think conditions are conducive to reaching an agreement on paper between now and the end of the year. Neither Prime Ministers Ehud Olmert nor Mahmoud Abbas have the degree of legitimacy that can hope to sign and sell a historical agreement. The challenge for the next 6 months is, then, two-fold. First, the Administration should attempt to lock in some of the content of what is being negotiated in order to ensure the next round of negotiations do not start from scratch and, second, to try and change the day-to-day situation on the ground to prevent further slippage on the two-state front. One should be modest in expectations that peace agreements being signed in the short-term will guarantee next administrations will follow them. The option available is for Secretary Condoleeza Rice to set out the parameters of the U.S. position. The first caveat is getting it right in content and negotiating this with the next Administration. Finally, there is a need for a honest conversation between the US and Israel. The former should clearly state its desire for a two-state solution and, if Israel is willing, to ask what parameters it wants. If they are not realistic, however, the American President should take the position that it will not force Israel into a position but that it will also not have sham negotiations. Instead, the U.S. will focus on keeping the two-state solution alive and make the conversation about settlements and not eroding existent conditions. The important content agreement is a ceasefire being signed between Hamas in Gaza and Israel (which has occurred since the event). Finally, Levy thinks the US-Israel relationship needs a healthy dose of instrumentalism. The U.S. should realize that the price of slippage is too high. It is bad for the US’s image, its alliance building, and is a gift to its adversaries. From the Israeli side, it should realize that American hegemony is on the decline and Israel has a fundamental interest in permanent borders while American power is such that it can achieve that.

The final speech was delivered by Aaron David Miller, former Middle East negotiator in the State Department, on the American perspective. He had six points. First, no conflict-ending solution is possible in the short-term. Second, there is the possibility of some kind of agreement that will advance the goal for peace and make the situation better. It will not be a comprehensive nor implementable piece of paper but is necessary. Third, a cease-fire in Gaza will be a respite but a road to nowhere because of the crisis in Palestinian politics of a fractured polity. Harmonizing the divisions is the only chance for a realistic agreement. No Palestinian leader can commit the public to conflict-ending issues without legitimacy and no Israeli Prime Minister can make existential concessions to a partner who does not have the monopoly on the forces of violence within its community. Fourth, Israeli and Syrian negotiations are welcome but limited because the reason behind the negotiations have more to do with domestic politics and to maintain quiet on the northern border. Neither side is willing, however, to pay the price needed for an agreement. Furthermore, the U.S. is indispensible to marshal support and broker the gaps but has not been interested in peace. Five, the U.S. acts like a modern-day Gulliver wandering as a superpower while tying itself down. The eight years of Bush has been, for Miller, a “galactic stumbling” in Middle East policy. Sixth and finally, the next President needs a sober assessment of history and reality before going off on adventures in peace-making or transformative diplomacy. Another Clinton-esque late-in-the-day attempt to bridge divides will be catastrophic. An agreement on the cheap is impossible to sell for both Israelis and Palestinians. Miller’s last criticism was of U.S.-Israel relations. Miller supports the “special relationship” with Israel and considers supporting states with similar values an important part of U.S. strategy. Yet, one should not make this an exclusive relationship preventing the U.S. from approaching other actors and being a constant yes-man to bad Israeli policies.

-Kailash Srinivasan, Research Intern for The Century Foundation

Anxieties, Anti-Americanism and Expectations of the Next U.S. President

Communications — Mon, 16 Jun 2008 01:15:00 -0400

A New America Event
06/16/2008 - 12:15pm

On June 16, 2008, the New America Foundation hosted a presentation by Bruce Stokes and Richard Wike on the discoveries and implications of the recently released 2008 Pew Global Attitudes Survey. An MP3 audio recording can be downloaded below, while video is available at right.

Richard Wike, Associate Director Pew Global Attitudes Project, laid out the primary findings of the report. Overall, the United States has seen modest gains in its perception around the world, with ten surveyed nations displaying increases in their favorable opinions of the U.S. and only three nations showing declines. The historic 2008 presidential race between Senators McCain and Obama garnered immense international attention. Many nations also expressed a more hopeful view of the next presidential administration, with Senator Obama being the favored choice of large majorities in most nations.

Wike also touched on changing global opinion of China. While perceived as increasingly influential and important in international affairs, China’s favorable perception around the world has slipped. Nations are coming to view China as a unilateralist and a danger to world stability. Though there continues to exist widespread international approval for the Beijing Olympic Games, it is substantially lower in the West.

Bruce Stokes, International Economics Columnist for the National Journal and Consultant for the Pew Global Attitudes Project, discussed the implications and difficulties that the report poses for future U.S. policies. He mentioned pessimism on Iraq and lack of support for an expansion of operations in Afghanistan as serious restraints on the actions of future administrations. Growing concern and blame of the U.S. over global economic instability and climate change will impact future decision making. Stokes also identified the world’s growing concern over China’s environmental and security impacts as a potential gap that could be exploited by the next administration.

-Ian McAllister, Intern for the American Strategy Program

The Presidential Election and U.S. Foreign Policy

Communications — Tue, 10 Jun 2008 10:30:00 -0400

A New America Event
06/10/2008 - 5:30pm

The American Strategy Program gathered four celebrated political scientists—Prof. Charles Kupchan of Georgetown University, Prof. Peter Trubowitz of the University of Texas at Austin, Prof. Daniel Deudney of Johns Hopkins University, and Prof. John Ikenberry of Princeton University—for a discussion of the future of Liberal Internationalism in American foreign policy. An MP3 audio recording can be downloaded below, while video is available at right.

Profs. Kupchan and Trubowitz spoke first, outlining the argument from their recent paper asserting the demise of Liberal Internationalism in the post- Cold War era. They defined Liberal Internationalism as the combination of a commitment to multilateral institutions backed up by a willingness to use the military in a variety of international situations.

Prof. Kupchan stated that all of the present speakers (and moderator and American Strategy Director Steve Clemons) would consider themselves Liberal Internationalists, but that their disagreement rests on the view of the current state of Liberal Internationalism, and the current American political environment.

Prof. Trubowitz then spoke, providing more details about his and Prof. Kupchan’s argument. He argued that the rise of Liberal Internationalism was contingent on a rare combination of circumstances: on the one hand, the presence of an international rival (the Soviet Union) that gave an incentive for politicians to favor centrism. On the other, a domestic scene that was becoming less regionally divided and less politically polarized. As these circumstances have changed, Liberal Internationalism has faded as a politically viable idea.

Prof. Kupchan then returned to give policy suggestions for the future that would be acceptable in this new political environment: these included engagement with adversaries, looking for others (such as the EU) to share international burdens, and to engage in flexible partnerships, rather than formal alliances, both with other countries and with members of other political parties.

Prof. Deudney then took the podium, arguing instead that Liberal Internationalism is as relevant as ever. He said that ideas similar to Liberal Internationalism have been in use since America’s founding, and have been designed both domestically and internationally to ensure security and political liberty. He then described vividly the threats facing America, stating that a large-scale attack from nuclear weapons is inevitable. In a post-September 11 world, he said, Liberal Internationalism is more important than ever to preserve our liberties at home and work with allies to contain threats to America from abroad.

Prof. Ikenberry concluded with a more hopeful message on the future of Liberal Internationalism. He contended that looking at the global system over the last few centuries, the key event is the continued rise of liberal states and open economies. This “liberal ascendancy” and its impact on the international system will remain, even if American power or influence wanes. Ikenberry described a future of more Liberal Internationalism, not less, where the only impossibility is a return to the isolationism that marked America before World War II.

-Andrew Lebovich, Research Intern, American Strategy Program

Implosion at the Pentagon

Communications — Tue, 10 Jun 2008 06:15:00 -0400

A New America Event
06/10/2008 - 12:15pm

On June 10th the American Strategy Program brought in Senior Adviser to CSIS and the Atlantic council, Washington Times columnist, and renowned expert on military affairs Harlan Ullman for a thought-provoking discussion with American Strategy Director Steve Clemons on the drastic need for reform at the Pentagon. An MP3 audio recording can be downloaded below, while video is available at right.

Harlan Ullman outlined in stark terms the problems faced by our military in the coming years: ballooning defense budgets that cannot easily be paid for, a bloated and inefficient procurement process, the cost of enlarging the military, and a powerful military that is nonetheless poorly equipped and trained for the wars it is currently fighting.

To face these issues, Ullman discussed a series of ideas for reform, drawing on history and modern thought alike. He proposed several ideas, from revamping the procurement process to increasing enrollment at the service academies and the National Defense University, and redefining NATO as a security alliance, rather than a defensive one. But his most striking idea was that the military needs to rethink its entire concept of war-fighting, and decide once and for all whether it will be a force that fights big, conventional wars, or one that fights the “smaller” asymmetric wars seen in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Steve Clemons then highlighted the loss of prestige suffered by an overextended military in Iraq, and the urgent need to decide how America uses its influence in the world, whether it is through military or other means.

Discussion of military reform is crucial, given both the changing nature of warfare and the potential for conflict erupting around the world, whether with states like China or Iran or non-state actors like Al-Qaeda. As these threats emerge, they can only be dealt with by a prepared, well-trained military and a defense establishment capable of making the hard decisions about how the military should be run, without partisan considerations. For more on this topic, see Steve Clemon’s recent blog post detailing the political back-and-forth surrounding possible military strikes on Iran.

-Andrew Lebovich, Research Intern, American Strategy Program

National Intelligence Estimates

Communications — Wed, 04 Jun 2008 02:15:00 -0400

A New America Event
06/04/2008 - 12:15pm

On June 4th, Dr. Thomas Fingar, Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, spoke at the New America Foundation on public controversy surrounding recent National Intelligence Estimates and reforming the data collection and analysis processes used to generate them.

Fingar began by discussing the wide ranging process of data collection and intelligence input needed to produce a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), a procedure that can include input from as many as sixteen different government agencies. He then explained the process used to generate a complete NIE, from conception to publication and presentation, which can take more than a year for cases such as Iran, where information is spotty and constantly changing.

He also called the flawed Iraq NIE a crucial “vehicle for transformation of the agency” which provided an impetus to implement wide ranging reforms in the NIE generation process, including: increased emphasis on source accuracy, noting and explaining dissenting opinions, the adoption of clear analytic standards, and the use of in-house analyst evaluations. Another important reform has been an extensive effort to sever analysis from political affiliations.

A question and answer session followed with questions including the differences between classified and publicly available NIE’s, the level of pre-existing politicization in the analysis process, and the utility of open source functions in data assembly and analysis.

-Ian McAllister, Research Intern, American Strategy Program

The Future of Iraq

Communications — Wed, 04 Jun 2008 00:30:00 -0400

A New America Event
06/04/2008 - 9:30am

Former Iraqi Foreign Minister Adnan Pachachi on U.S.-Iraqi Relations including U.S. Forces, Bases and Iraq's Relations with the Broader Middle East.

POSTPONED: Egypt on the Brink of a Revolution

Communications — Thu, 29 May 2008 09:15:00 -0400

A New America Event
05/29/2008 - 12:15pm

This event has been postponed until further notice. We apologize for the inconvenience.

Egypt has long played a pivotal role in the Arab world's cultural and political development. Five decades after the coup d'état that overthrew Nasser, John Bradley sorts through Egypt's tense political conditions with particular emphasis on a coming succession crisis in the face of a rising Islamist movement, corruption, and violence.

Conversing with Miliband

Communications — Wed, 21 May 2008 05:30:00 -0400

A New America Event
05/21/2008 - 10:30am

At this May 21 event, British Foreign Secretary David Miliband discussed the challenge of promoting Western style liberalism, democracy, civil society development in a world that in some corners views the word “democracy” suspiciously. He also addressed evolving national and global “identity” currents and challenges.

Briefing on Beirut

Communications — Tue, 13 May 2008 06:30:00 -0400

A New America Event
05/13/2008 - 9:30am

On May 13th the American Strategy Program brought together five leading experts on Middle East and Foreign Policy to discuss the current crisis in Lebanon: a political standoff between the prominent militia Hezbollah and Lebanon’s government. Those participating in the discussion were Rami Khouri, the Editor-at-large of the Daily Star, Hisham Melhem, the DC Bureau Chief of Al Arabiyah, Nir Rosen, a fellow at NYU’s Center on Law and Security and New America, Daniel Levy, the Director of New America’s Middle East Policy Initiative, and Flynt Leverett, the Director of New America’s Geopolitics of Energy Initiative. Steven Clemons, the Director of the American Strategy Program moderated the event. An MP3 audio recording can be downloaded below, while video is available at right.

Rami Khouri joined the discussion via telephone from Lebanon. He stated that Lebanon was on the brink of change and the Lebanese people had one choice to make: whether they would move towards Baghdad, a violent civil war based on ethnic and religious divisions or Belfast, an inclusive, fair, and functioning government. Mr. Khouri was optimistic that the Lebanese would be able to work out the internal strife and form a pluralistic society that will integrate the Western and Arab ideals that are prominent in Lebanon. He stated that Lebanon was the best hope for Middle East pluralism and could serve as an example for the rest of the region once they move past the current crisis.

Hisham Melhem was less optimistic about Lebanon’s immediate future. He stated that Hezbollah’s armed offense signaled “the beginning of the end of Lebanese politics.” The rise of the militia’s strength and influence represent transformation and the loss of Lebanese liberalism and western orientation. He remained pragmatically hopeful that an accommodation would be reached, yet expressed concern that Hezbollah would become more extreme rather than moderate.

Nir Rosen also participated via telephone from Lebanon. “Nobody really knows what’s going on here,” Mr. Rosen said on the disarray in Beirut. He drew several comparisons to Iraq: the armed occupation of Beirut, by Hezbollah fighters, and the Sunni-Shi’a conflict. Mr. Rosen also believed that the Lebanese army was complicit, either by looking the other way or supporting Hezbollah during their siege.

Flynt Leverett stated that there have been major mistakes in U.S. policy towards Lebanon. By fully supporting the government led by PM Siniora, the U.S. overlooked unfair representation and power-sharing in Lebanon. Mr. Leverett opined that the U.S.’ role in Lebanon has been erosive to its standing in the Middle East.

Daniel Levy offered a few theories as to why the conflict erupted so quickly. It is possible the government miscalculated Hezbollah’s reaction or they were setting a trap for Hezbollah. Mr. Levy said it may have been by virtue of necessity; Lebanon was in a political and ideological stalemate for a long time and needed outside support or intervention.

-Faith Smith, American Strategy Intern

Foreign Policy Follies

Communications — Tue, 13 May 2008 03:15:00 -0400

A New America Event
05/13/2008 - 12:15pm

While one political party offers a bold, coherent, and failed vision for foreign policy, the other has proffered an inchoate and incoherent response that falls far short of a strategy. Matthew Yglesias -- a known "ringleader-of-sorts for the D.C. blogging community" -- suggests looking past both parties to offer a set of tried-and-true approaches for renewed internationalism and U.S. engagement with the world.

Risks & Rewards of a Multilateral Counterterrorism Strategy

Communications — Fri, 09 May 2008 08:15:00 -0400

A New America Event
05/09/2008 - 12:15pm

In "Building Global Alliances in the Fight Against Terrorism," a new report commissioned by the Better World Campaign, Alistair Millar and Eric Rosand contend that while targeting and capturing terrorists remain at the forefront of the nation's counterterrorism strategy, the United States will need to adopt a much more internationalist approach -- relying on multilateral cooperation for information sharing, enhancing counterterrorism capacities of states big and small, engagement of non-traditional allies, and international legitimacy. But in a changing international landscape, what trade-offs will the next administration face?

This event is co-sponsored by the Better World Campaign, the advocacy arm of the United Nations Foundation.

How Many Nuclear Weapons Do We Need?

Communications — Wed, 07 May 2008 08:30:00 -0400

A New America Event
05/07/2008 - 2:30pm

On May 7th the New America Foundation’s Nuclear Strategy and Nonproliferation Initiative joined AAAS’s Center for Science, Technology, and Security Policy for a discussion on the present and future role of nuclear weapons in U.S. and World security. The event featured Dr. Arnold Kanter, Principle and Founding Member of the Scowcroft Group, Dr. Morton Halperin, Director of U.S. Advocacy for the Open Society Institute, and Dr. Barry Blechman, co-founder of the Harry L. Stimson Center. Dr. Jeffrey Lewis, Director of the Nuclear Strategy and Nonproliferation Initiative, moderated the event. An MP3 audio recording can be downloaded below, while video is available at right.

After a brief introduction, Dr. Kanter began by discussing the need for a new nuclear strategy in the U.S. Drs. Kanter, Lewis, and Halperin are part of a team drafting presidential guidance for the future of U.S. nuclear posture. The paper proposes many revisions in the current policy towards nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation treaties. One suggestion offered is that the U.S. and Russia, as the most heavily armed nuclear powers, should lead the way in disarmament. Dr. Kanter stated that the U.S. should offer security to other parties to prevent them from seeking their own nuclear weapons. He asserted that revising U.S. nuclear strategy would be a three part process beginning with unilateral action by the U.S., hopefully with Russia taking complementary measures. This would be followed by reciprocal responses from other nuclear parties. The final step would be far-reaching and binding measures on nuclear security.

Dr. Blechman responded by stating the need for a radical approach to revising nuclear strategy. He laid out a plan calling for elimination of all nuclear weapons in a twenty year time frame by working unilaterally and within international organizations. Dr. Blechman believes that the current dangers facing the U.S., including nuclear ambitions in Iran and North Korea, require a radical approach rather than the incremental steps proposed by Dr. Kanter.

Dr. Halperin debated Dr. Blechman by claiming that the effort to eliminate nuclear weapons is often misplaced. He also stated that full elimination is an unrealistic goal. The debate should be reframed to answer the question: What kind of nuclear program should the U.S. have in a nuclear world? Dr. Halperin also stated that there are unilateral steps the U.S. can take to discourage proliferation abroad, such as reducing the military stockpile and vowing to cease further testing. The event concluded with a lively debate between the participants reflecting the complexity and broad range of opinions on the topic.

-Faith Smith, intern for the American Strategy Program

Beyond the Torture Debate

Communications — Tue, 06 May 2008 08:30:00 -0400

A New America Event
05/06/2008 - 3:30pm

On May 6th the American Strategy Program hosted an event with Philippe Sands, Professor of International Law at University College London and Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson, former Chief of Staff for Colon Powell. Mr. Sands was in DC to testify to the House Judiciary Committee about the findings in his new book, Torture Team, which examines the legal implications of the Bush administration’s policy of torture. Col. Wilkerson was on hand for commentary on the subject. The event was moderated by Patrick Doherty, deputy director of the American Strategy program.

Mr. Doherty began the event by declaring the legalization of torture, “a dark and dismal period in American history.” After a brief introduction, Mr. Sands paraphrased his book, which is the story of a single memo, signed by Donald Rumsfeld, authorizing the use of coercive interrogation techniques on Guantanamo detainees. Mr. Sands offered his expertise in international and human rights law to this topic. He stated that “a conscious decision was made to put aside the Geneva Convention” by Rumsfeld and the administration’s legal team, which violated international law. Mr. Sands shared the sense of deep concern abroad that American leadership violated international law and attempted to cover up this violation with legal documents. Mr. Sands then expressed his optimism that America was capable of self-correcting, would find out the truth and require accountability at the highest levels. His recent experience at the House Judiciary Committee confirmed that America was concerned with justice and returning to its core values.

Col. Wilkerson agreed with Mr. Sands claim that a crime was committed, there was a cover up, and that there will be accountability. He opined that there was a need to demilitarize U.S. foreign presence abroad by balancing military personnel with diplomatic. Col Wilkerson also expressed concern about the international view of America at present; “The rest of the world judges us not by what we say, but what we do, and what we’ve been doing has not been good.”

-Faith Smith, American Strategy Intern

Understanding the Bin Ladens

Communications — Thu, 01 May 2008 22:15:00 -0400

A New America Event
05/02/2008 - 12:15pm

On May 2, The New America Foundation hosted a book event for President and CEO Steve Coll’s new book The Bin Ladens. An MP3 audio recording can be downloaded below, while video is available at right.

Coll delivered a talk about the experience of Saudi Arabia, dealing with the pressures and prizes of modernity and globalization, through the prism of the Bin Laden family. He conveyed the diversity of experience that permeated the different members of the family.

Coll spoke of three prominent family members: Muhammad (the family patriarch), Salem (the oldest son) and Osama. He spoke of reinterpreting Osama as a member of this powerful family and as a Saudi dissident, hoping to compliment the existing body of knowledge on the notorious Bin Laden.

Ultimately, Osama Bin Laden was an expression of his membership in a talented, well-connected Saudi family. He shared many of the outstanding talents of his father and older brother including: the ability to lead a diverse team toward a common goal, an embrace of modern technology, marketing and branding savvy, and comfort of preforming in front of an audience. Coll’s book shows the diversity and remarkable skills of the Bin Laden family while also trying to help explain the environment that ultimately produced its most notorious member.

-Jonathan Wallace, Assistant to the President