

Review Essay

Reorienting Japan

Rajan Menon

Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose

Kenneth B. Pyle. New York: PublicAffairs, 2007. £17.99/\$29.95. 420 pp.

Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia

Richard J. Samuels. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007. \$29.95. 277 pp.

PROOF

Of all the countries to emerge from the wreckage of the Second World War, perhaps none overcame post-war adversity quite as successfully as Japan. By the time the country surrendered in 1945, it was in dire straits. It had lost some 2.8 million people during the war, 3.8% of its 1939 population. Thousands more were so severely maimed or ill that they would never resume productive lives. The once-prosperous Japanese economy was in ruins, and virtually everything the country needed to recover traversed long, vulnerable sea lanes. There were plenty of threats in Japan's neighbourhood, most notably the Soviet Union, China and North Korea. But Japan could not protect itself by rearming. Its rampages during the 1930s and 1940s, characterised by blood-curdling brutality, had culminated in the conquest of virtually all of East Asia. Not surprisingly, its

Rajan Menon is Monroe J. Rathbone Professor of International Relations at Lehigh University, and a Fellow of the New America Foundation. He is the author of *The End of Alliances*, published last year by Oxford University Press.


wary neighbours watched its every move. Moreover, the horrors of the war, especially the atomic bombardment of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, convinced the Japanese people that violence must never again be an instrument of statecraft. This was a goal at once noble and sensible. Still, Japan had to confront the world as it was, not as Tokyo wished it to be. At minimum, living in a world in which power is the prime currency required a plan for survival.

Sixty years later, it is evident that Japan, its unenviable starting point notwithstanding, has been extraordinarily successful. It has become an

economic powerhouse – its \$4.4 trillion economy is now second only to that of the United States – fuelled by technological vitality and booming exports. Part of the reason for this achievement is that Japan has been able to remain safe in a dangerous world while spending on average less than 1% of its gross domestic product on soldiers and armaments.

Kenneth Pyle, a historian at the University of Washington, and Richard J. Samuels, a political scientist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, offer superb explanations of Japan's success in the realm of national security. Their books are marked by erudition,


thorough research, sound judgement, clear prose and the absence of arid theories and leaden jargon – a rare combination in academic writing. Both studies have wide sweep – especially Pyle's, which devotes roughly half its pages to the latter part of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth – but neither was written to provide a history of Japan's international relations. (The bulk of Samuels's book is devoted to the years following the Second World War.) Both authors are interested primarily in how the end of the Cold War will affect Japan's national-security strategy. This obliges them to consider the future of Japan's alliance with the United States in some detail, for while Japan's leaders managed the challenges they confronted after the Second World War with consummate skill, they could not have done so without the protection of a powerful patron: the United States.



Under the US umbrella

Of course, by extending its protection to Japan, the United States was serving its own interests (which state does not?), the principal one being its determination to deny the Soviet Union control over a country that was both a critical centre of wealth and technological know-how, and situated athwart the maritime passageways connecting the USSR, China, Taiwan and the Korean peninsula with the rest of the world. Moscow did not have to occupy Japan to redefine the global balance of power. Such brazenness would have frightened even states sympathetic toward the Soviet Union or determined to stay out of the epic struggle between the two super-powers, to say nothing of America's allies. That, in turn, would have benefited the United States. It would have been more sensible for Moscow to 'Finlandise' Japan, and this is precisely what Washington was determined to prevent.

American leaders did not wish merely to deny Japan to their nemesis; they also wished to harness its wealth and location in the service of their 'containment' strategy. This entailed establishing protectorates (with the consent and enthusiasm of the protected, it should be noted) around the perimeter of the USSR so as to stretch Soviet forces across widely separated fronts; creating multiple emplacements from which to attack the Soviet empire if necessary; confining the Red Army within the spheres of influence established at the end of the Second World War; and placing the USSR at a strategic disadvantage by ensuring that the principal centres of global wealth were aligned with the United States. The contest between the rival alliances lasted nearly five decades, but as time wore on, it became clear – certainly to the Soviet leaders – that it was skewed. The United States not only had a much larger and more innovative economy, it had the allies and friends that mattered. There was nothing inevitable about the way the Cold War ended, but, in retrospect, the outcome reaffirmed the proposition that when major powers compete (or fight), those that are richer and more technologically advanced invariably prevail.¹ Thus, Japan was not just one more American ally. It was, alongside



West Germany, one of the two most important by virtue of its wealth, technical prowess and location on the Soviet Union's flank.²

As part of its alliance strategy, Washington encouraged both countries to rearm, and they complied. In response to American entreaties, Japan's leaders went beyond what a literal reading of the country's American-designed constitution would seem to allow. But Japan's first post-war prime minister, Shigeru Yoshida (who served from 1946 to 1954), bargained hard, and successfully, to do as little as possible, and his gambit was continued by two successors, Hayato Ikeda (1960–64) and Eisaku Sato (1964–72). The Japanese Self-Defense Forces – the name aptly conveyed the minimalism underlying Yoshida's strategy – could not wage offensive war. Nor, in fact, could they even defend the homeland without American help. The United States pledged to defend Japan under the terms of the 1951 defence treaty (modified in 1960) and through the presence in Japan of tens of thousands of American troops from all branches of the US military. This commitment was fortified, albeit tacitly, by the 'extended deterrence' provided by Washington's nuclear arsenal.

Japan may not have had a *free* ride, but it was certainly an *easy* one. By delegating responsibility for its security to the world's foremost power, it has been able to spend a smaller proportion of its gross domestic product on troops and weapons than just about any other country, while focusing almost single-mindedly on economic advancement. True, Yoshida's successors did adjust his formula in response to American pressure. From the 1980s onward, especially as Japan began to rack up huge trade surpluses, the United States demanded that Tokyo do more to defend itself and embrace a wider conception of national security (while also revaluing the yen). Specifically, Japan was pushed to develop capabilities to defend Pacific sea-lanes and offer more extensive logistical support to US forces. But while Tokyo did take on more responsibilities of this nature, notably during the term of Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone (1982–87), for the most part the essentials of Yoshida's design remained in place. Japan's past, the anxiety and suspicion of its neighbours, and Article IX of the Japanese constitution (under which Japan renounced the implements of war) could be invoked to parry Washington and to hew to military minimalism.

Lessons of the past

Yet Japan's history should serve as a warning not to assume that the course plotted by Yoshida will be followed indefinitely. Japan's relations with the outside world have been characterised by sharp and sudden twists and turns. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, the country discarded the hermit-like policy that the Tokugawa shogunate had adhered to for more than 250 years (1600–1867). The Meiji era that followed (1868–1912) witnessed a feverish emulation of the West (though hardly the abandonment of Japanese culture and identity), industrialisation and the pursuit of great-power status – all at a time when the rest of Asia was under Western domination. Japan also built up its armed forces, subjugated Taiwan and Korea, and earned the grudging respect of the West, although industrialisation was its foremost preoccupation.

The 1920s brought yet another shift, the Taisho era's experiment with liberalism and democracy (1912–26). This proved to be an interregnum; Japan's fragile democracy failed because of adverse conditions at home and abroad. The militarism and imperialism of the 1930s and 1940s followed. Starting with the creation of the puppet state of Manchukuo in northeastern China in 1931, Japan seized virtually all of East Asia. This imperial adventure proved catastrophic. The 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor brought a reluctant United States into the war, a development that would have terrible consequences for Japan. The levelling of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, perhaps the most devastating experience in Japan's long history, ended the glorification of war and imperialism and made the Yoshida Doctrine a safe, sane choice. The trading states of Genoa and Venice were seen as models for Japan's future.

The lesson here – made explicit by Pyle in the opening pages of his book, and implicitly accepted by Samuels – is that Japan has been anything but predictable. Over the past 150 years (the ambit of Pyle's analysis) Japan's sense of self, its conception of the world and its behaviour in the international arena have changed profoundly, and sometimes abruptly. So while the Yoshida Doctrine has been a reliable map for the past 60 years, it is wrong to assume that the Japan of today is the Japan that always will be. This is a trite point, perhaps – nothing last forever – but it bears repeating, because the consensus among experts and lay observers alike is that, with

some modifications, Japan will stay on the path it chose in 1945. The United States has become comfortable with Yoshida's Japan, even as Americans complain about its free-riding. Perhaps the past will indeed prove to be prologue, but Pyle in particular urges his readers to place Japan's current strategy in perspective and to see it as one of many that the country has chosen. Neither he nor Samuels is predicting an apocalyptic transformation: a Japan with nuclear weapons or an expansionist Japan. Nor would they embrace the argument advanced in my recent book, *The End of Alliances*, that Japan will soon have to figure out cost-effective ways to serve its interests without the security of the American alliance, and that it has the capacity for strategic thinking and the material wherewithal to do so.³ But both authors make compelling – and in Samuels's case, detailed – arguments that Japan could be engaged in a strategic reassessment, and that changes within the Japanese polity (Samuels's emphasis) and the East Asian balance of power (highlighted by Pyle) will be the catalysts. The evidence they present to sustain this thesis differs, as does their view of what the most important sources of change will be. Pyle anticipates a more radical shift – as he puts it, 'a sea change' – than does Samuels. Still, neither can be entirely certain how Japan's policies will change, and the effects this will have on the country and its region.

In accounting for past reorientations in Japan's trajectory and elaborating on his prediction that Japan will soon jettison 'more than half a century of national pacifism and isolationism ... and become a major player in the strategic struggles of the twenty-first century', Pyle leans on the theoretical edifice of 'neo-realism', the principal claim of which is that all states, despite their cultural and political differences, are subject to the iron logic of the balance-of-power system and must adapt their institutions and strategies in the face of new external circumstances. The failure to do so effectively can carry a prohibitive price. Pyle's text is strewn with references to the historians and political scientists most closely identified with this perspective: Thucydides, Otto Hintze, Leopold von Ranke, Robert Gilpin and Kenneth Waltz. The essence of Pyle's argument is that Japan has a long history of anticipating and adjusting to recalibrations in the global balance of power, and has done so with surprising rapidity. The overview he provides of

Japan's development since the Meiji Restoration is intended to drive this point home and, by the time he is done, most readers will be convinced. In Pyle's view, the new threats that Japan will face, or is already facing, cannot be addressed successfully in the old, familiar way. These include the rise of China, the danger of a nuclear-armed North Korea, terrorism and doubts about the reliability of American protection.

The corollary of Pyle's interpretation is that Japan, which tends to regard itself as unique, and is often seen by outsiders as unfathomable, is no different from other states facing the do-or-die imperatives of a world in which threats abound and no central authority exists. Faced with this, Japan has not been less willing to engage in the 'pragmatic, often opportunistic pursuit of power' than other countries. The Japanese politicians and intellectuals who want a more muscular national-security policy and to wrest control over their country's fate from the United States call for Japan to become a 'normal country'. Pyle's thesis is that it has never been anything else. In making this case, he shreds essentialist accounts that present pacifism as either intrinsic to Japan's national outlook or unchangeable because of the catastrophe of 1945.

Domestic pressures

Samuels would not reject the thrust of Pyle's account nor, one suspects, the usefulness of the neo-realist paradigm. He is well aware that Japan's posture toward the world has been influenced by changing external threats and opportunities. The distinctiveness of Samuels's analysis lies in his intricate demonstration of how shifts in Japan's foreign policy are best understood by focusing on the interplay between changes outside the country and changes within it. With great skill, he shows how this reciprocal process rearranges the relative influence of domestic coalitions vying to shape national security policy, and even brings new ones into the arena. Accordingly, while keeping his eye on the regional balance of power, Samuels takes us deep inside Japan's body politic. He identifies the main groups, shows how each represents a particular vision of Japan's appropriate role in the world, explains how and why their relative influence has changed, and provides an assessment of where this process could take Japan in the years to come.

The groups that want to follow Yoshida's lead and limit Japan to accommodating – within narrow limits – American pressure for a more balanced distribution of the costs and risks created by the alliance are still influential, and some of their goals accord with another constituency, Japan's largely marginalised pacifist left. What has changed is that Yoshida's disciples no longer command centre stage, and could become even less influential for two reasons. The first is the emergence of new threats, and the increasing gravity of old ones. Both Samuels and Pyle agree that China presents the main challenge to Tokyo. China fits both categories because it has presented problems for Japan in the past but is likely to pose new and more serious ones in the future, a conclusion widely accepted by Japanese officials and specialists on national security. The second catalyst is a Japanese attitude toward the United States that seems contradictory at first but, upon closer consideration, is quite logical. On the one hand, Japanese leaders resent having to demonstrate loyalty to the United States by assuming responsibilities that often stretch constitutional limits and involve the risk of entanglement in conflicts that are not in Japan's interest. But they also worry that the United States will redefine its interests and abandon Japan.

These twin fears may be overwrought; they are certainly not new, having been present even during the best years of the alliance. But they are likely to become much more pronounced now that the basic rationale for the alliance and the direction of American policy are less clear than was true during the Cold War. Japan may try to resolve the entanglement–abandonment dilemma by increasing its military capacity, under the assumption that this will give it greater bargaining power in what is an unequal alliance, and better enable it to resist American efforts to redefine the alliance in ways that decrease Japan's security. Japan may also calculate that a stronger military will be needed in any event, especially should the United States prove to be an unreliable protector. It is common for the Japanese to worry that China's power will increase to the point that defending Japan becomes much more dangerous for the United States, or that Washington will reassess its interests and reduce its role in the North Pacific. And they do not necessarily regard these two scenarios as distinct.

Apprehensions such as these, and the changes under way in the East Asian balance of power, have increased the influence of groups that reject the premises of the Yoshida school. One argues that Japan should hold fast to the alliance but create a more equal partnership that prolongs the life of the pact, a strategy that requires the removal of constitutional barriers and military weaknesses that prevent Japan from undertaking more ambitious missions. Those who favour this course want to amend Article IX and clear the way, *inter alia*, for Japan to participate in UN peacekeeping operations in ways that transcend the limits imposed when such missions were enabled by legislation passed in 1992, and to acquire materiel that will permit an increase the Self-Defense Forces' range of operations.

The influence of this coalition accounts in part for the steps that have already been taken to strengthen Japan's military, a process that the 2003 Defense White Paper indicates will continue. As I show in *The End of Alliances*, the Self-Defense Forces are not nearly as weak as is generally supposed, and an examination of their equipment, especially their combat aircraft, battleships and submarine fleet, make this evident. Of particular importance is the addition to the fleet of *Osumi*-class destroyers, capable of carrying helicopters and troop transporters; the expansion of Japan's F-2 fighters' range; the purchase of Boeing KC-767 aerial-refuelling tankers; and the funding of a 13,500-tonne 16DDH destroyer, which can accommodate helicopters and combat aircraft.⁴ Another change – albeit one that remains in the realm of words and not deeds – involves nuclear weapons; this once-taboo subject is now part of the defence debate. While there is virtually no support within Japan for building nuclear weapons, nor any evidence that Tokyo plans to do so, it is also true that despite the three 'non-nuclear principles' presented by Sato in 1967 and adopted by the Japanese Diet in 1968, no Japanese prime minister has definitively shut the door on this option, which remains viable given Japan's advanced technology and its massive plutonium programme.

Japan presently lacks the political will to undertake a major build-up of its armed forces, but it certainly has the wealth to do so. From a political standpoint, the 1976 limit of 1% of gross domestic product placed on military expenditures is a policy, not a law. From a financial perspective, Japan's

defence budget could be raised to, say, 1.5% of gross domestic product without significant strain, and given the size of Japan's economy, even such a small increase in the proportion devoted to defence would yield substantial sums to beef up the Self-Defense Forces. Furthermore, the current lack of public support for boosting the defence budget is not innate, and could change should Japan's environs become more treacherous, or if changes within the United States or its relationship with Japan erode Japanese faith in the alliance.

In addition to providing the Self-Defense Forces with more potent armaments, Japanese governments have taken decisions in recent years designed to remove long-standing restraints on Japan's national security policy. Following the passage of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Bill in October 2001, Japanese ships sailed to the Indian Ocean to provide logistical support to American and allied warships involved in the campaign in Afghanistan (they were recalled in late 2007 after the opposition Democratic Party refused to support a renewal of their mandate). When the US-led coalition invaded Iraq, a small Japan Self-Defense Forces contingent was deployed to the country's Muthanna province, though under narrowly defined rules of engagement, and with the aim of aiding reconstruction, not engaging in combat. (Even these constraints could not, however, override the lack of support at home and the unit, deployed in 2004, was withdrawn in 2006.) Evidence that North Korea's ballistic-missile and nuclear programmes were advancing prompted various senior Japanese officials to call for a re-evaluation of pre-emptive strikes, long considered an unacceptable strategy, though the proponents faced a firestorm of criticism for their audacity. Japan now cooperates with the United States in developing a regional ballistic-missile-defence system, and its F-2 fighter was the product of a joint venture. A Diet resolution passed in 2004 ended a ban on sharing military technology, thereby increasing the scope of defence cooperation with the United States; and the launch, starting in 2003, of surveillance satellites by Japan has prompted discussions about lifting the 1969 ban on using space for military purposes. These changes, many of which crystallised during Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's tenure (2001–06), were intended at least in part to please Washington. They seemed to do this, but at the

same time they alarmed Japan's neighbours, notably China and North and South Korea.

Far more worrisome for most East Asian states, as well as for Yoshida's acolytes and Japan's pacifists, is the rise of another Japanese school whose views go well beyond desiring a stronger Japan anchored by an US alliance. This group – the 'hawks' of Japan – regard the American alliance as a demeaning symbol of their nation's submission and a mechanism for using Japanese national security to serve Washington's interests. (This is ironic, given that Washington tends to complain that Japan is not doing enough in the service of common interests.) Moreover, they believe that the alliance is unreliable, and warn that Japan is courting grave danger by entrusting its security to the United States, especially now that China, with which many hawks are obsessed, is becoming at once more powerful, nationalistic and ambitious. Not all hawks want to terminate the alliance or develop doctrines and forces that enable an independent defence, but all of them want policies that exceed what the nationalists, à la Koizumi, advocate, and they are not squeamish about offending the sensibilities of the United States or Japan's neighbours. They are much more vehement than the nationalists in opposing apologies to Japan's neighbours for past misdeeds, and some even deny that any wrongdoing occurred. This line of thought is most often identified with the right-wing governor of Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara, but Samuels, while taking care to say that it is presently a minority view, provides a plethora of evidence that it has a deeper resonance in Japanese politics than prevailing views of Japan would suggest, and that its appeal could increase.

The way of the future

Though he foresees a 'sea-change' in Japan's foreign policy, Pyle does not detail, to the same degree that Samuels does, what he has in mind. But both expect that any shifts in Japan's policies will unfold within the framework of the alliance, which they see as durable and capable of adapting to the new conditions and uncertainties created by the end of the Cold War. The odds are that they are correct. Yet it is surely worth considering what Japan will do if it loses faith in the American commitment, or if Washington's

priorities change. What if the United States pares down its military presence in the North Pacific? This could happen for a variety of reasons. American leaders could conclude that the economic costs of maintaining a global military presence are no longer affordable because of festering problems at home (terrible schools, blighted cities, outdated infrastructure and the like). Even though Japan began subsidising the US military presence in 1978 and now pays \$25 billion annually, Americans could grow weary of defending Japan which, like Europe, can now manifestly defend itself, but which gets by with defence expenditures that, as a proportion of gross domestic product, are far below what the United States spends. Washington could also tire of a pact that is asymmetric (under the defence treaty, Washington is obligated to defend Japan, but Japan is required to defend American forces only under very narrowly defined eventualities) and seems destined to remain so in light of Japan's resistance to changes that would make it more equitable. Or the focus of US national-security policy could shift away from the locales that were chosen in the context of the Cold War. None of these changes is imminent, but given the transformations that have occurred over the past three decades (China's move from Mao to the market, the fall of the USSR, the attacks of 11 September 2001, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq), they can surely not be ruled out. The decision taken in 2006 to redeploy 8,000 Marines from Okinawa to Guam could be a harbinger of things to come.

Changes afoot in the global balance of power will also inevitably require a Japanese response. Of these, a rising China is Japan's biggest challenge. Tokyo has several options to deal with this development. One would be to expand the economic links it forged with China as far back as the 1960s, which by 2004 made it Japan's most important trading partner, surpassing the United States.⁵ The aim would be to domesticate China by using commerce, investment and educational exchanges (thousands of Chinese students attend Japanese universities) to steadily increase Beijing's stake in a harmonious relationship with Japan. A second option would be to yield on major disputes and choose to live under China's shadow. Japan could, as a third possibility, continue to improve the capabilities of the Self-Defense Forces while taking the lead in designing a regional security system intended to facilitate multilateral solutions to disputes and advance 'confidence-

building measures' and arms control. Finally, Japan could orchestrate an anti-China coalition comprising itself, the United States, India and Vietnam, while ramping up its military forces substantially and ceasing to rely on the US alliance. These last two choices would blur the distinctions that Samuels draws between the nationalists and the hawks and create the political context for changes in Japanese defence policy that go far beyond what Pyle or Samuels expect. There is no way to know which of these choices Japan will make if the basic conditions that have enabled the Yoshida strategy vanish. What is clear is that Japan has had to confront unsettling changes in the balance of power in the past and has made unexpected but fundamental recalculations with major consequences for itself and others.

The skills Japanese leaders have shown in negotiating treacherous waters during the past 60 years is admirable. By any reasonable standard, they have aligned means and ends with remarkable success, providing their country with the two indispensable attributes for success in the world: security and prosperity. It remains to be seen if Japan will change direction yet again and, if so, whether the turn will be so sharp that the 'trading state' state strategy will be remembered by history as only one of many.

Notes

- 1 The standard illustration of this proposition is Paul Kennedy's *The Rise and Fall of the Great Power* (New York: Vintage, 1989).
- 2 There was another similarity between West Germany and Japan. Both had run amok in their neighbourhoods, and the idea that they would do so again unless restrained, while it may have rested on crude stereotypes of Teutonic militarism and the samurai spirit, was nevertheless widely held. The fact that both states were restrained by their alliance with the United States reassured their nervous neighbours.
- 3 Rajan Menon, *The End of Alliances* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).
- 4 Menon, *End of Alliances*, pp. 113–16. On the F-5, Boeing-767, and 16DDH, see William E. Rapp, 'Past Its Prime – The Future of the US–Japan Alliance', *Parameters*, June 2004, <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/04summer/rapp.pdf>; and *Globalsecurity.org*, '16DDH "I3, 000 ton" Class', <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/japan/ddh-x.htm>.
- 5 Japan's trade with China amounted to \$213 billion in 2004, or 20% of the value of Japan's total trade. Trade between the United States and Japan amounted to \$197bn in the same year. *Washington Post*, 27 January 2005.

Would you like to advertise in Survival?

The leading forum for analysis and debate of international and strategic affairs

With a diverse range of authors, thoughtful reviews and review essays, *Survival* is scholarly in depth while vivid, well-written and policy-relevant in approach. It is essential reading for practitioners, analysts, teachers and followers of international affairs.

Advertising Office:

Prices, specifications, publication dates and deadlines for display advertisements and loose inserts are available from:

Linda Hann, LH Marketing Solutions,
Email: lhann@lhms.fsnet.co.uk
Tel/Fax: +44(0)1344 779945

Standard Positions

Mono Advertising Rates:	Size	Single Insertion
	Full page	US\$1495 / £799 / €1119
	Half page	US\$1121 / £600 / €839
Two Colour:	Full page	US\$1975 / £1056 / €1479
	Half page	US\$1601 / £856 / €1199
Four Colour:	Full page	US\$2595 / £1388 / €1943
	Half page	US\$2221 / £1188 / €1663

Special Positions

Outside back cover	Full page 4 colour only:	US\$4412 / £2359 / €3303
Inside front cover (full page only)	Mono:	US\$2392 / £1279 / €1791
	Four Colour:	US\$4152 / £2220 / €3108
Inside back cover (full page only)	Mono:	US\$2243 / £1199 / €1679
	Four Colour:	US\$3893 / £2082 / €2914
Loose Inserts (must be folded to A5 or smaller)		US\$1495 / £799 / €1119

Schedule (subject to change):

Issue	Booking Deadline	Artwork Deadline
February/March	6th December	20th December
April/May	29th January	12th February
June/July	31st March	14th April
August/September	3rd June	17th June
October/November	31st July	14th August
December/January	8th October	22nd October



Taylor & Francis
Taylor & Francis Group



- Now bimonthly
- Read by members of the IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies)
- 15% discount available to publishers and not-for-profit organisations
- 10% discount available to first-time advertisers
- Reductions available for series