The Real State of the Union 2006

General Clark delivered the keynote address at this special event, where an honest assessment of the United States' foreign policy drove a lively discussion. The morning began with Steve Clemons and John O'Sullivan leading a discussion on "Benchmarking Successes and Failures: The Condition of America's Great Purposes and Evolving 21st Century Challenges". Next, a panel of experts discussed "Global Outlooks: American Grand Strategy and Widening Arcs of Instability."

The final panel,"Taking Stock of the U.S. National Interest: Comments on Post-Cold War Strategies That Address Tomorrow's Global Stress Points," finished shortly before noon, when General Clark addressed the conference. More-detailed summaries of each panel can be found below.

Participants

• Wesley Clark
  


• Steven C. Clemons
  Director, American Strategy Program


• John O'Sullivan
  Editor, National Interest and Editor-at-Large, National Review


• Kevin Nealer
  The Scowcroft Group


• Peter Bergen
  Schwartz Fellow


• Anatol Lieven
  Senior Research Fellow


• Michael Lind
  Whitehead Senior Fellow


• Dimitri Simes
  President, Nixon Center; and author, "America's Imperial Dilemma," Foreign Affairs


• Wendy R. Sherman
  Principal, The Albright Group, LLC


• Clyde Prestowitz
  President, Economic Strategy Institute


• Sherle R. Schwenninger
  Director, Bernard L. Schwartz Fellows Program


• Sidney Blumenthal
  Senior Fellow, NYU Center on Law & Security

Agenda

Panel 1: Benchmarking Successes and Failures

John O’Sullivan, Director of the Center for European Studies at the Hudson Institute, and Steve Clemons, Director of the American Strategy Program at the New America Foundation, led off the conference by discussing the recent successes and failures of the Bush administration’s foreign policy.

Sullivan cited the Bush doctrine of pre-emption in the post-9/11 environment and the push for UN reform as pivotal moves on the administration’s part to reshape foreign policy and the international landscape. A self-described neo-conservative realist, he also made mention of the new unfolding possibilities for a U.S. role between Israel and Palestine, not despite but as a result of the democratic election of Hamas to the helm of Palestinian leadership.

O’Sullivan went on to describe the future of American foreign policy against the backdrop of two central features of the international landscape: the rise of China and India and the continued integration of Europe. O’Sullivan warned of continued European integration beyond economies and trade to the levels of a shared defense force and common foreign policy that might spell the unraveling of the western alliance with the U.S.

Steve Clemons challenged a number of administration policies, particularly its failure to ensure transformational diplomacy in Iraq and its failure to establish a set of political winners bound to the new institutions created by the U.S. The failures of our regime change and nation-building efforts, he argued, have punctured the American mystique of our boundaries and capabilities, inciting enemies to move against us and allies to move away from us.

Clemons went on the describe the seemingly evident tension in administration between Secretary Rice’s push toward and Vice-President Cheney’s reticence to re-engage in the conversation of international law on topics ranging from detention centers to rendition to the International Criminal Court. Clemons stressed that the United States must embark on a new transformational diplomacy that will offer avenues for global middle class development to redress some of the grievances against us, particularly those emanating from the Middle East.
-Sameer Lalwani

Panel 2: American Grand Strategy and Widening Arcs of Instability

In Session 2, “Global Outlooks: American Grand Strategy and Widening Arcs of Instability,” panelists assessed international economic security, the successes and failures of the war on terror, roots and consequences of the strategy of democratization, and the false assumptions underlying current U.S. policy-making.

Kevin Nearler kicked off the panel with a comprehensive rundown of the international events in store in 2006, including the upcoming elections in Iraq, Palestine, Japan, and Latin America. He highlighted what he sees as a higher degree of realism in the Bush administration’s foreign policy in recent months, and predicted a resumption of the Six Party Talks to re-engage North Korea on the issue of nuclear weapons.

Mr. Nealer also focused on the economic aspects of American strategy abroad outlining several areas of concern in the international economy, particularly in Asia. He noted that despite China’s rapid growth, its stock market remains one of the worst performing in the world. Fewer than 1% of the country’s loans go to truly private enterprises. And despite widely-held expectations that economic liberalization will lead to political openness, the last year has seen a growth in repression by the Chinese government, one that has been difficult to account for. Mr. Nealer concluded by expressing concern that U.S. allies have found American policy in areas outside of the war on terror plagued with “jet lag” or preoccupation, and cautioned against neglecting the economic aspects of American security.

Peter Bergen assessed U.S. foreign policy through the lens of the war on terror. He tallied the positive, mixed, and negative indicators of how successful the war has been thus far. The single most important indicator of success is that Osama bin Laden has failed to strike within the United States since 9/11. The Muslim-American community has resoundingly rejected al-Qaeda, and as the jihadists continue to kill Muslim civilians, public opinion in other parts of the world may increasingly turn as well.

Other indicators are more ambiguous. Islamist parties are increasingly doing well in Middle East elections. The situation in Afghanistan is mixed at best: the country has held successful elections, yet has descended into a “narco-state,” as it currently produces 60% of its GDP in opium. Violence, in the form of improvised explosive devices and suicide attacks, has actually increased in the last year. Most worrisome of all, there are a series of indicators that the war on terror is failing in key areas. The incidences of international terrorism continue to increase dramatically, and Anti-Americanism, though most likely not irreversible, remains high. We still have not found bin Laden, whose influence, in the form of 35 audio and videotapes produced between him and his deputy Zawarhiri since 9/11, has not diminished.

Mr. Bergen further argued that we will most likely see a much larger fall out from the war in Iraq than the Soviets’ war in Afghanistan. Today, those fighting on behalf of bin Laden in Iraq are facing the most advanced and well-funded army in the world; they are likely to become even more dangerous once the war has ended.

Anatol Lieven focused on the role of democratization as a strategy in the war on terror. He argued that Hamas’ recent electoral victory illustrated one of the largest flaws in this strategy: the Orwellian contradiction between the language of democratization and contempt for Arab opinion. The strategy is certainly not a solution to any immediate security problems, which must be mitigated by diplomacy. The distance between our rhetoric and the reality on the ground in Iraq leads to the conclusion that the U.S.’s democratization strategy was not created as a response to any basic contemplation or analysis of the Arab world.

Instead, America’s impulse to spread democracy is rooted a sense of America’s mission to spread democracy and freedom. It also results from a false analogy between the war on terror and the cold war. Democratization in Eastern Europe at the end of the cold war represented a clear alternative to Soviet domination, and was assisted by the strong force of local nationalism. There is no parallel in the Middle East. In addition, democratization in the Middle East should be described “not as a strategy but as an excuse for a strategy” – an acknowledgement that the other justifications for war in Iraq failed.

Anatol concluded that the resulting quagmire in Iraq has destroyed the possibility of future preventive wars and illustrates the flaws in the strategy of democratization, yet the administration has articulated little else to guide U.S. policy.

As the panel’s last speaker, Michael Lind set about to dismantle what he described as the three primary assumptions which have mistakenly guided U.S. foreign policy over the past several years. The first is the idea that we live in a unipolar world. This is true, he argued, only in terms of military spending and the ability to project power around the world. But this power has not been translated into the diplomatic realm.

The limits of military power have been demonstrated in Iraq, where the counter-insurgency, like that against the French in Algeria and the Russians in Afghanistan, requires a political rather than a military solution. It is also clear that the challenges posed by Iran and North Korea cannot be solved militarily.

The second false assumption underlying U.S. policy-making is that of irreversible globalization. Mr. Lind pointed to the growth of regional trade blocs, such as ASEAN and NAFTA, and the rise of populist political movements which aim to slow the liberalization of trade and immigration, forces as potent as that of globalization. The third assumption is that democratization leads to peace. People’s values and beliefs are not universal, Lind argued, as election results in Iran and Palestine have illustrated. In fact, if real elections were to occur in Pakistan, we would most likely find a government in power much less amiable to U.S. interests.

In light of the flaws in these assumptions, the biggest challenge facing U.S. foreign policy makers is the challenge of thinking straight. For practical purposes, this requires recognizing multipolarity in the international system, the importance of regional blocs, and the awareness that democratization is not the answer to everything.
-Erica DeBruin

Panel 3: Taking Stock of the U.S. National Interest

In Session 3, “Taking Stock of the U.S. National Interest: Comments on Post Cold War Strategies That Address Tomorrow’s Global Stress Points,” the discussion of U.S. national interest veered from fiscal solvency and energy efficiency to democratic values and the War on Terror, but the panel seemed to agree that, no matter what realm, our current course of action is not sustainable for the future.

Dimitri Simes stressed the importance of acknowledging the true consequences of US foreign policy, particularly the democratization of other countries. Citing the recent victory of Hamas through democratic elections as an awakening for the US, Simes reminded the audience that democracy does not necessarily lead to peaceful, strong economies and called for an honest discussion on foreign policy.

Sidney Blumenthal echoed Simes’ remarks on the unintended consequences of democracy, declaring that President Bush “does not live in a post-Hamas, post-Iraq world.” He chided the Bush Administration for rejecting diplomatic outreach and miscalculating Iran’s influence as a consequence of the Iraq war. He concluded that “To restore American power and ideals, we need a clear sense of national interest and must have credibility; visions without a sense of national interest damage the national interest and discredit the words used to describe democracy.”

The Honorable Wendy Sherman discussed how the U.S. projects values of peace, prosperity, and security around the world with good intentions, but fails to recognize that “most people would rather eat than vote and have security than civil liberties.” She warned that serious challenges for U.S. policymakers include restoring our broken military, dealing with our debt to China and Japan, and reducing anti-American sentiment throughout the world.

Clyde Prestowitz, Jr. posited that a single number describes the current state of the union – the $800 billion trade deficit. He warned that“our economy is on life support” as it continues to consume in massive amounts with the burden of financing our account resting on Asia. Sherle Schwenninger declared that the key to U.S. security lies in oil, the dollar, and jobs. “We are constrained by things we used to control,” said Schwenninger. Looking ahead, he cited the need for a consumer boom in Asia, especially China, a simultaneous investment boom in the U.S. with alternative energy production, and a job boom in the Middle East.
-Soumya Bhat

Related Links

• Text of General Clark's Speech