Student Loans

Credit Crunch Easing for Student Loan Providers?

Dept. of Ed Relaxes Preferred Lender Rules

Sallie Mae Computer Glitch Sends Credit Scores Falling

Report Illustrates Disparities Between States in Community College Use

The Department of Education recently announced modifications to its lender of last resort program as part of its effort to prepare for the possibility of federal student loan shortages as a result of the credit crunch. The net result is a contraption Rube Goldberg would be proud of -- what in effect are direct student loans that are more difficult to administer and more costly for taxpayers than the regular Direct Loan program.

The lender of last resort (LLR) program is designed to ensure all students have access to Federal Family Education Loans (FFEL) by requiring that guaranty agencies provide loans to students that have been turned down by conventional lenders. Though we support guaranteeing access to student loans, the similarities (and costly differences) to the regular Direct Loan program make LLR a significantly inferior option. In fact, Washington appears to be trying to avoid the more obvious and efficient solution -- boosting the regular Direct Loan program.

White House, Fed Move on Student Loans

Lawmakers Mobilize to Boost G.I. Education Benefits

Education Department Puts Off Review of ABA as Law School Accreditor

Coalition Offers Help to Schools Considering Switch to Direct Lending

Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke says the government’s biggest student loan program, the Federal Family Education Loan (FFEL) program, is poorly designed. His suggested solution sounds a lot like an endorsement for an auction. In a letter to Sen. Chris Dodd (D-CT) on Federal Reserve action to help student lenders weather credit market turmoil, Bernanke notes that the structure of the FFEL program is problematic. He writes:

The other side of the profitability equation--the reimbursement spread paid to lenders under this program--is under the control of the Congress and the executive branch. In particular, Congress may well wish to revisit the question of whether setting a fixed spread over the commercial paper rate is the best approach. You may decide that a more market-sensitive approach--flexible enough to provide a wider spread during times of market stress and a narrower one during normal times--could provide a more robust structure.

Here is what’s behind Bernanke’s assessment of the FFEL program and his suggestion for a "more market sensitive approach."

Two Parts to the FFEL Profit Equation

By Art Hauptman

Current arrangements for providing financial support to college students and their families in this country are not meeting many of the objectives for which they were intended. The Spellings Commission summed it up well in its final report: "The entire financial aid system - including federal, state, institutional, and private programs - is confusing, complex, inefficient, duplicative, and frequently does not direct aid to students who truly need it." As a result, the Commission and a number of other groups with wide ranging political agendas have recommended that "the entire student financial system be restructured". But what would that entail?

Since first established in the 1960s, the federal student aid programs of grants, loans, and work-study - in concert with state, institutional, and private efforts - have provided access to a postsecondary education for millions of Americans who otherwise might not have had enough funds to attend. More recently, federal tax offsets against current tuition expenses and tax-preferred incentives for college savings serve as an important source of financial relief for hard-pressed taxpayers from a range of incomes who worry that they will be unable to pay the constantly mounting bill for tuition and other expenses.

Student Loan Credit Crunch Bill Sent to President

One in Five Colleges Considering Switch to Direct Lending

Tuition On the Rise, but Spending for Instruction is Not

Report Calls for Revised Pell Grant Formula

Representatives of the same student loan providers who ripped-off taxpayers more than $1 billion a year through use and abuse of the so-called "9.5 percent loan" legislative loophole are at it once again. This time, this special group of lenders is quietly lobbying for a lucrative carve out (also ready to be exploited) in pending student loan credit crunch legislation.

Inside Higher Ed reported the money grab story yesterday, but we've got more details on the proposal that the Education Finance Council is peddling on Capitol Hill. See their legislative language below.

We've bolded some of the most notable elements like entitling the lender to a government purchase of their product, setting a price in statute, mandating no servicer change on the relevant loans, etc, etc... And of course the proposal gives taxpayers nothing in return in the way of business practice reform, like say, banning the mingling of private and federal student loan assets, a cash reserve requirement to avoid this problem in the future, or perish the thought, restrictions on executive compensation.

House Passes Bill to Ease Credit Crunch Impact on Student Loans, Others in the Works

No Crisis Here, Says American Council on Education

Dems Introduce Legislation to Allow Private College TA Unions

Student Aid Bill Approved by House Committee

Fed Chairman Rebuffs Calls from Pro-FFEL Lawmakers for Lender Bail Out

Settlement Doesn't Stop Sallie's Online Presence, Chronicle Investigation Finds

According to recent reports, some lenders are pulling out of the Federal Family Education Loan (FFEL program due to malfunctioning credit markets - and, some loan industry officials say, due to cuts in federal subsidies. The authors of these reports appear to believe that fewer lenders is bad news. But is it necessarily bad to have fewer lenders participate in the FFEL program and better to have more? Are there too many now or too few?

These questions expose FFEL’s fundamental policy flaw. An auction system, like the one Congress enacted for PLUS loans set to begin in 2009, provides the remedy.

FFEL Can’t Get it Right

The FFEL program's fundamental policy flaw is that it is not designed to ensure that an optimal number of lenders (or any lenders at all) participate in the program at a reasonable price for taxpayers. The result is a continuous debate about how much lenders should be subsidized to ensure that "enough" lenders participate in the program.

More lenders in the program ensures a well capitalized program and greater competition for school and student business, fostering better customer service. On the other hand, more lenders in the FFEL program requires higher subsidies and costs taxpayers more money, making fewer dollars available for say, student grants or other priorities. Unfortunately, Congress, the media and student loan lobbyists never confront these tradeoffs head on. A framework is therefore needed that forces policymakers to be explicit about the tradeoffs. The PLUS auction provides that framework.