Iran

ASP in the News | May 7-9

Ian McAllister — Fri, 09 May 2008 20:22:00 -0400

The Washington Post (05/08) features Peter Bergen savaging Morgan Spurlock's new documentary.
Wired Magazine (05/07) quotes Jeffrey Lewis on the dynamics of space warfare
The Orion (05/07) cites Afshin Molavi on the pressures within Iranian culture

ASP in the News | May 5-7

Ian McAllister — Wed, 07 May 2008 15:28:00 -0400

Pacific Daily News (05/07) analyzes Parag Khanna's hypothesis of the decline of U.S. hegemony.
US News (05/06) quotes Sherle Schwenninger on the cost of doing business in the U.S.
AFP (05/06) cites Steve Clemons discussing the negative impact of Clinton's comments on Iran.
Hard News (05/06) discusses Peter Bergen's research on the link between education and terrorist recruitment.
The People's Daily (04/25) quotes Steve Clemons arguing against a boycott of the Beijing Games.

White House Threatens Swiss Over $42b Iran Gas Deal

Patrick Doherty — Tue, 06 May 2008 14:57:00 -0400

As the Japanese are wont to say, "business is war." Apparrently, that is how the Bush White House sees the recently-announced deal between Switzerland and Iran over a $42 billion natural gas contract. And, living up to the their own dysfunctional war planning record, the White House is now considering a retaliation against Switzerland where it hurts the United States most: by ending the Swiss sponsorship of the U.S. and Cuban Interests Sections. That will teach them not to mess with us.

Of all the pathetic evidence that the Bush Administration had degraded U.S. influence in the world, this is up there. Rarely have we seen how weak the man behind the curtain really is.

It also is an object lesson in global leadership. Part one of that lesson is that states will always seek to satisfy their own calculation of their national interests. Unless the interest equation is changed, inertia will rule in the affairs of sovereign peoples. The Swiss need gas, Iran has it. The Bush administration did not, apparently, care enough to insert themselves effectively in the Swiss decision loop.

Part two of that lesson is that the international order is fundamentally governed more effectively by attractive forces than by coercive forces. The U.S. has done an incredibly poor job of making the American vision of the world the most attractive option since the end of the Cold War, especially since 9/11. This is not rocket science. Europe uses the attractiveness of its 450 million high-income consumers as the world's largest carrot. China even understands that it is easier and more effective to buy friends than to threaten them.

The choice of targeting the interests sections, however, is doubly idiotic. The Sections in Havana and Washington preserve what little formal and informal communication happens between the U.S. and Cuba. The military-military coordination on counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics is especially vital. At a time when Raul Castro is starting a series of tentative but consistent, liberalizing steps to reform the Cuban economy in the direction of free markets, and yet China and Venezuela have more influence in Havana than the U.S., this move is just further evidence of the limits of the kind of pugilistic nationalism that this White House has elevated into policy making primacy.

The next administration, if it is interested in global leadership, needs to find a vision of the world that can out-attract the other visions on offer. It also needs to end our counter-productive policy on Cuba.

Iran-Europe Gas Deals Alarm US

By Daniel Dombey in Washington, Anna Fifield in Tehran,and Haig Simonian in Zurich

Published: May 1 2008, The Financial Times

The US and its allies are worried that the sanctions regime against Tehran is under threat from a possible new wave of European investment in Iran's strategically important gas sector.

Tehran has already concluded gas deals with Chinese and Malaysian companies - ending a protracted lull in investment in its energy sector - and has alarmed Washington by reaching an agreement with a Swiss group.

The dilemma threatens to expose the limited US influence over foreign companies' strategic decisions.

Although Washington and its allies have convinced the United Nations Security Council to sign up to three sets of sanctions against Iran's nuclear and missile sectors and banks, it has been unable to broaden such international measures into the key energy sector.

Until recently, informal US pressure - combined with the difficulties associated with doing business in Iran - had appeared to dissuade many companies from signing formal contracts.

Now, the US fears that a 25-year supply agreement concluded in March between Elektrizitäts-Gesellschaft Laufenburg (EGL) of Switzerland and Iran could encourage other deals, particularly in the gas sector, despite American calls for tougher sanctions against Tehran over its controversial nuclear programme. The Swiss government says the deal could be worth up to €27bn ($42bn, £21bn).

"The worry is that the Swiss deal will lead others, such as the Austrians, to confirm energy investments in Iran, and that companies like [France's] Total could then follow suit and sign contracts of their own," said one western diplomat. He pointed out that the EGL agreement ended a period in which European energy companies had largely confined themselves to agreeing only non-binding memoranda of understanding with Iran.

He added: "There is a lot of attention on sanctions on Iranian banks, but investment in the energy sector is much more important for Iran's economy." Iran has the world's second-largest proven gas reserves, but exports far below its potential.

Flynt Leverett, a former US National Security Council adviser on the Middle East, says pressure is growing on non-US companies to conclude supply contracts with Iran in the wake of the deals already signed between Tehran and Sinopec of China and SKS of Malaysia.

So angry is Washington about the Swiss deal that it has suggested that Switzerland's role as the US representative in Cuba and Iran could be at risk.

Swiss officials reply that no international sanctions prohibit investment in the Iranian energy sector, and that the gas supply contract signed by EGL is intended to alleviate energy shortages in Italy. "For almost 30 years, Switzerland has rendered good services to the US as their protecting power in Iran," said a Swiss foreign ministry spokesman.

The website of the US embassy in Bern carries a series of questions about the gas deal, explicitly raising the question of whether Switzerland's role is "in jeopardy". Officials there merely say that Switzerland has a mandate to represent the US "at this time".

Following the deal, some European leaders have voiced concern about new investment in liquefied natural gas, the sector in which groups such as Total, Royal Dutch Shell and Austria's OMV have struck preliminary agreements but have yet to sign formal contracts. Iran has warned such companies they need to conclude deals by June or it will look elsewhere for investment.

Gordon Brown, UK prime minister, said in the US last month that he wanted to broaden sanctions over Iran's nuclear programme "to include investment in liquefied natural gas".

At present, there are no such sanctions at either UN or EU level against investment in Iran's gas sector.

European diplomats say it is unlikely that the EU will agree formal sanctions on the Iranian energy sector in the immediate future - instead it is concentrating on measures against Iran's Bank Melli. Foreign ministers from the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany meet in London tomorrow to discuss further action against Iran. Diplomats say Mr Brown's words are an attempt to increase the political pressure against new investment in the sector.

Under US law, investments of above $20m (€13m, £10m) in Iran's energy sector can lead to US retaliatory measures, But Mr Leverett said Washington's options were limited. "The EU would effectively take us to court [at the World Trade Organisation] and the US would probably lose," he said.

Hojatullah Ghanimi Fard, head of international affairs at the National Iranian Oil Company, said Tehran was legitimately supplying an international need. "Would it be wise to deprive common people of consuming countries of supplies from Iran?" he asked.

ASP in the News May 3-5

Faith Smith — Mon, 05 May 2008 17:48:00 -0400

Tehran Times (05/03) quotes Flynt Leverett on UN sanctions and Iran's energy contracts.
Foreign Policy (05/02) features Steve Coll and Peter Bergen discussing Bin Laden.
Russia Profile (04/30) cites Anatol Lieven on the future of US-Russia relations.

Doing the Times' Homework

Patrick Doherty — Tue, 29 Apr 2008 14:42:00 -0400

It's a curious honor to have the New York Times trolling your blog for reported story ideas. Nonetheless, that honor goes to our own Jeffrey Lewis, publisher of ArmsControlWonk.com, and director of the Nuclear Strategy and Nonproliferation Initiative here at the New America Foundation.

Here's the scoop. Published in today's New York Times, William J. Broad's article, "A Tantalizing Look at Iran's Nuclear Program," explored an intriguing new source of intelligence on the Iranian nuclear program: photographs by the official Iranian news agency of President Ahmadinejad touring nuclear facilities with his defence minister, intelligence minister, and top nuclear expert.

The highest compliment, however, was the inclusion of the Times' own annotated photograph. Showing his true geek credentials, Jeffrey's original, hand-drawn annotated picture, shown above, focused only on the hardware.

Of course there were other items of interest in the photo to the wider readership of the Times, including a few powerful individuals and a couple of flags. Jumping on the case, the Grey Lady spared no expense, and, digging deeply into the comments section of Jeffrey's blog post, rounded out it's multimedia feature with labels for the inidividuals and flags already ID'd by the dedicated team of ArmsControlWonks.

Congratulations, Jeffrey. Imitation is the highest compliment.

ASP in the News | April 23 – 28

Faith Smith — Mon, 28 Apr 2008 17:08:00 -0400

Financial Express (4/27) speaks with Parag Khanna about the decline of US influence
The Boston Globe (4/27) quotes Flynt Leverett on the dangerous alliances oil producers and despots.
The Tory Conservative (4/27) features Afshin Molavi's book, Persian Pilgrimages.
MWC News (4/25) discusses prospects for a Palestinian state with Ghaith al-Omari.
The Jewish Week (4/23) asks Daniel Levy about the Presidential candidates' Middle East Policies.

American Strategy in the News | April 18 - 21

Faith Smith — Mon, 21 Apr 2008 17:59:00 -0400

Book TV (4/21) interviews Steve Coll about his new book, The Bin Ladens.
The Washington Post (4/20) asks Flynt Leverett's opinion of UN Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad.
The Moderate Voice (4/19) quotes Daniel Levy on Israeli roadblocks as an obstacle to peace.
The Telegraph (4/19) reviews Parag Khanna's new book, The Second World.
The New Republic (4/18) follows Stephen Clemmons debate on the US response to the Beijing Olympics.
The Daily Yomiuri (04/17) features Steve Clemons analyzing Hillary’s Beijing boycott call.
PBS (4/17) speaks with Afshin Molavi about Iran's contemporary politics and culture.

A New Israel Lobby

Kailash Srinivasan — Fri, 18 Apr 2008 23:54:00 -0400

In debates surrounding U.S.-Israeli relations, the role of certain pro-Israel political action committees has been heavily contested. While for some they represent the true interests of both America and Israel, New America's Daniel Levy is skeptical and instead thinks their agenda leaves both countries worse off. In an April 16th Huffington Post article, he announced J Street, a new political action committee for Americans who think to America's best interests are served by a just, negotiated two-state solution and an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Losing Control of Our Nukes ... and the World

Patrick Doherty — Wed, 26 Mar 2008 15:02:00 -0400

Leading the world towards a more secure international order requires the United States pursue our long-term interests while answering to a higer standard. The same goes for getting Iran to play by the global ruleset. Yet both have been systematically undermined by our willingness to proliferate nuclear technology to India, disregarding our leadership role in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Now, our own Jeffrey Lewis is reporting that what many thought was a one-off incident, the unauthorized movement of nuclear weapons from one military base to another, is actually part of a broader dysfunction in the management of our nuclear forces. If we cannot even control our own nuclear program, how can we expect others to?

Nothing Like This Can Happen

By Jeffrey Lewis

Er, again. Another nuclear weapons related incident:

The U.S. military has regained control of four non-nuclear nose cone assemblies for a Minuteman missile mistakenly sent to Taiwan in 2006, Air Force Secretary Michael W. Wynne said during a news conference here today.

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates learned of the situation on March 21 and immediately ordered that the United States regain “positive control” of the systems, Wynne said. He also notified the president of the situation.

It was the second incident with a strategic weapon in the past year. In August, an Air Force B-52 flew from Minot Air Force Base, N.D., to Barksdale Air Force Base, La., carrying atomic weapons. The crew did not realize they were carrying nuclear weapons until they landed.

Today, Gates signed a memorandum directing Adm. Kirkland Donald, director of Navy Nuclear Propulsion, to conduct a comprehensive investigation “to determine the facts into how this error occurred and who is accountable throughout the chain of command,” said Christopher R. “Ryan” Henry, principal deputy undersecretary of defense for policy.

There it is again, the rhetoric of personal accountability when what we have is a sick organization. I’ve said it before. I will say it again:

Continue reading in ArmsControlWonk.com...

The Next President and the Middle East

Patrick Doherty — Thu, 20 Mar 2008 16:04:00 -0400

The greater Middle East contains only six percent of the world's population but can keep the United States distracted from the bigger strategic issues: making globalization, the rise of Asia, and the American economy stable and sustainable, for instance. Writing in the American Prospect, Daniel Levy lays out a regional to-do list for the next president of the United States.

By Daniel Levy, New America Foundation

The American Prospect | April 2008

Listen carefully when a new president is inaugurated next January for the sigh of relief coming from most of those Middle Easterners whom President Bush embraced as allies. Conversely, Bush’s rivals in the region are likely to tune in to the occasion in a disgruntled mood. For them the Bush years have been good for business. The menu of grievances on which they’ve fed has become a veritable feast. Opposition to American designs in the region -- deployed with different emphases and with different goals by al-Qaeda, Iran, Hamas, Syria, and Hezbollah, to name but a few -- has been an easy sell and has won countless new adherents.

To be a friend of “Bush the Younger” in Arabia has not been such a comfortable disposition. Even the Israelis have begun to recognize the limited utility of a president, despite all his words of support, who is so vilified abroad and divisive at home that coalition-building and agenda-advancement are beyond him.

A new president can expect to be greeted by an initial spike in America’s standing in public opinion polls both globally and in the Middle East. This phenomenon will likely be magnified if a Democrat is in the White House and further embellished if that Democrat is Barack Obama. There will be a honeymoon period of openness, of a willingness to suspend judgment and to look again at America and what it stands for.

But the next administration will inherit a regional mess that will require more than some presidential goodwill and an image makeover. The president’s Middle East inbox will include Iraq, Iran, al-Qaeda, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and much more. Set alongside this, even health-care reform may take on the appearance of low-hanging fruit.

The temptation will be to focus on improving the mechanics of making and implementing decisions and treating each problem separately, with various regional issues being compartmentalized. Some cosmetic changes might also be thrown in. One could envisage, for instance, the appointment of a special envoy to oversee an Iraq international support group and another for the Middle East peace process. That first appointment would be new; the latter has not existed for the past eight years, and its reintroduction would signal serious intent. A new American ambassador could be appointed to Damascus, symbolizing reengagement in dialogue with adversaries. The last ambassador, Margaret Scobey, was recalled from Syria on Feb. 15, 2005, after the assassination of Rafik Hariri in Lebanon.

Such moves should be welcomed and might even be helpful, but capacity and cosmetics are just the beginning. As Daniel Kurtzer, a former U.S. ambassador to Israel and Egypt, concludes in a recent article, “better a policy without an envoy than an envoy without a policy.”

Policies will have to change. But so too will the framework of understanding from which those policies are derived. Take, as an example, the Israeli-Palestinian Annapolis peace process, launched in November 2007. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice managed to lead a change in policy within the administration and to renew efforts toward a permanent-status peace deal after a seven-year hiatus. She probably deserves credit for even getting this far, but the Annapolis process was straitjacketed from the start by its framing. Even when a breakthrough document on Israeli-Palestinian peace has become a priority, the kinds of policy initiatives that could lead to this goal were rejected at the outset for ideological reasons. Just before the Annapolis gathering, 66 former U.S. senior officials and experts, spearheaded by Brent Scowcroft, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Lee Hamilton, sent a letter to the president and secretary of state welcoming the new effort and counseling that an “inclusive” process that would involve (even indirectly) and incentivize actors such as Syria and Hamas would be much more likely to succeed than one that excluded them. (In the interest of full disclosure, the New America Foundation -- my employer -- and I were involved in organizing and promoting this letter.) That counsel was not heeded. Syria was indeed invited but not engaged. The policy -- no peace effort -- was changed, but the framing -- Israel/Palestine is part of the war on terror, so one must isolate Islamists, Iran, and their ilk -- remained the same. The Annapolis exercise was thereby handicapped from the start.

Similarly on Iraq, Rice moved to engage with all the neighboring nations in February 2007, but within a mandate so narrow that it severely limited the regional push for a settlement in Iraq. At the micro-level, the U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq (and Afghanistan) successfully demanded that they be authorized to work with a broad cross section of local actors, including those with problematic histories and Islamist credentials. Likewise, the increasing reliance of U.S. forces on local Sunni Awakening Councils was a new direction. However, none of this led to a reframing of the narrative at the meta-level. The U.S. view on whom to bring into the Iraqi political dialogue -- from both inside and outside the country -- remained prohibitively blinkered. As a result, political progress remains painfully elusive.

Iraq’s more troublesome neighbors, some U.S. allies, some not (Turkey and Saudi Arabia in the former camp, Iran and Syria in the latter), cannot wave a wand and magically end the Mesopotamia mess. They can be instrumental, though, in helping to stabilize the situation. That requires incentives, constant prodding, and a comprehensive rethink from the U.S.

Accordingly, a new administration Middle Eastern “to do” list that amounts just to isolating the issues, managing the processes efficiently, keeping ambitions modest, and throwing everything at Iraq, would be wholly inadequate to the task ahead. The first priority should be to connect the dots of regional issues to reflect the realities and interdependencies on the ground. One cannot solve anything in the Middle East (including Iraq) without looking afresh and trying to solve just about everything.

Change must begin at the Department of Deep Narrative Framing (DDNF). Absent a new narrative for the Middle East, a Democratic administration will inexorably, even unintentionally, slide into the grip of the liberal hawks. The equation will look something like this: unreconstructed narrative + good liberal interventionist inclinations = a more competent (perhaps) but equally misguided (and perhaps therefore even more dangerous) version of neoconservatism, albeit wrapped in a more palatable sales pitch. If the Democrats seize the reins of government next January, they should not forget to grab control of the DDNF. Barack Obama’s claim that he would not only “end the war in Iraq” but also “end the mind-set that got us into that war” indicates that one candidate at least is eyeing up the DDNF for change. What might a reshuffle at the department produce?

Start by redrawing that map of issue interconnectivity, retiring the current war on terror paradigm, and rethinking the appeal to hearts and minds. Cranking up the use of soft power and aid programs and reducing the military footprint is not enough. At least three epiphanies are required of the next president to go forward: First, recognize that certain widely held grievances in the Middle East -- the Palestinians’ most particularly -- are both legitimate and solvable. Second, understand that political Islamists are not all the same, are not all al-Qaeda, and that building a policy based on these differences is crucial to resolving the region’s problems. And third, comprehend that regional stability demands inclusivity and a commitment to multilateralism.

The global war on terror and the democratization narratives that the Bush administration has propagated are irredeemably discredited in the Middle East. They are most commonly seen as a war on Islam and a hypocritical and inconsistent application of a “freedom” agenda that protects autocratic friends and punishes democratic opponents.

A recent sporting episode demonstrates the global resonance of a grievance largely ignored in the U.S. The Africa Nations Cup, a continent-wide biannual soccer tournament (a mini World Cup) was hosted in Ghana this January and February. Egypt emerged victorious, guaranteeing massive interest not only throughout Africa but also across the Middle East on the Arabic satellite channels. The matches coincided with the Gaza siege and Rafah border breakout, and on scoring the tournament’s winning goal, Egypt’s star striker, Mohamed Aboutrika, lifted his national team jersey to reveal a T-shirt bearing the inscription, in English and Arabic, “Sympathize with Gaza.” America’s media was totally oblivious to these goings-on, but for vast areas of our world this simple gesture of solidarity echoed louder than a dozen presidential speeches about why the Palestinians must first recognize their Israeli occupiers and reject the Hamas party that they voted for in free elections.

Travel almost anywhere in the Arab or Muslim world and you will hear the same refrain, including from America’s most ardent friends in the business community and civil society: “Why do you allow or even encourage such things to happen to the Palestinian people? How can we stand with you on this?”

Most Middle Easterners who have no sympathy with al-Qaeda and extremism do nonetheless identify with the Palestinians’ grievances. The sense of U.S. indifference to such grievances and unwillingness to address them is a source of great sustenance to al-Qaeda and their ilk. Recognizing and removing those grievances, where possible, has to be part of an effective al-Qaeda push-back strategy. It has not been thus far.

That does not require abandoning Israel. It does mean delivering on a decent and viable two-state solution that is already, for what it’s worth, official U.S. and Israeli policy. Implementing this perspective does not guarantee that al-Qaeda will disappear overnight. Much of the swamp of anger from which it draws support and recruits will be drained, however, and al-Qaeda-type groups will have to then appeal to a set of grievances that have far less resonance.

The DDNF must also stop viewing political Islamists as one undifferentiated sea of green hostility. This view is utterly self-defeating, artificially increasing the size of the enemy while unnecessarily limiting the pool of potential allies. It also displays a woeful ignorance of the internal debates and harsh fissures among Islamist groups. What has happened locally and of necessity in developing a more discerning approach to Islamists in Iraq and Afghanistan must percolate to the level of big-picture framing.

Finally, the DDNF’s directives must begin to build a new and inclusive regional security architecture. As a prerequisite the U.S. should both repair its image as an international leader that plays by the rules (no Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, or extraordinary renditions) and that embraces multilateralism. Ultimately, the region in general (and post-Iraq stability in particular) requires a security framework that makes stakeholders of all the major actors. That will take time, but as policies shift from “no talking to bad guys” to “tough problemsolving diplomacy,” so the language of “axes of evil” and “pariah states” should be buried.

Even adversaries have legitimate interests. Accept these, reject what is illegitimate, and build buy-in from the broadest array of regional actors.

In reality, of course, there is no government department known as the DDNF (at least not since Doug Feith retired). There is, though, an echo chamber, which can amplify the new president’s perspectives and facilitate a new approach to the Middle East.

How would this translate into specific areas of policy content and presentation? Here are a few ideas.

The new president should dust off one Bush-era relic and reconvene the members of the Iraq Study Group for a widely publicized final meeting. The theater of the occasion would broadcast that the new policies are solidly rooted in the findings of a grand, bipartisan group, whose recommendations were ignored by an excessively partisan predecessor. The ISG report recognized that “all key issues [in the Middle East] are inextricably linked.” It argued for unconditional engagement with Syria and Iran and pushed for a diplomatic surge. Despite a costly two-year delay, the time would arrive for the “New Diplomatic Offensive” envisaged by Baker, Hamilton, and Co. Even the name, New Diplomatic Offensive, might be worth recycling.

Some might see America’s Israeli relationship as the Achilles’ heel of the new strategy. It need not be. The new president would be well advised to explain early and often how the policy shift would protect and carry forward the U.S.-Israel special relationship. Indeed, it’s the policy of “more of the same” that threatens that relationship. For almost a decade the Israeli consensus has been to accept the creation of a Palestinian state. That now needs to happen, urgently, on reasonable terms and with attention to Israel’s real security concerns. Israel also has an interest in strengthening America’s regional standing and coalition-building capacity, something the U.S. cannot do until it addresses the Palestinian predicament. The challenges that America, Israel, and others face, from al-Qaeda’s successful attacks in Jordan and the Egyptian Sinai to its putative presence in Lebanon and Gaza to the threat of growing instability and weapons proliferation -- all this and more should no longer be overshadowed by an argument over a few kilometers of land in the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem. America should work closely with Israel in designing a new regional security architecture. Even if Benjamin Netanyahu is again Israel’s prime minister in January 2009, it is worth remembering that he, too, often with American encouragement, handed over land, shook the hand of Chairman Arafat, and secretly negotiated with Syria. Israel would be a beneficiary of the new U.S. policy even if some might be reluctant to accept it.

Turning to Iraq, the U.S should not isolate that nation’s challenges from others in the region. It should not be blaming Iraqis for their inadequacies, nor arming various sides for a potentially bloodier phase of the civil war. The new president needs to state clearly America’s commitment to end the military deployment that began in March 2003, and pledge not to maintain military bases there. This policy would focus the thinking of Iraqi factions on the political compromises necessary in a post-occupation Iraq. Second, the U.S. should make an “outside in” effort with all of Iraq’s neighbors to create the optimal conditions for externally assisted stabilization.

This regional rethink would come at a delicate time in the Iranian election calendar. Iran’s presidential ballot is scheduled for June 2009, and nothing should be done in the preceding months that might strengthen Ahmadinejad -- neither saber-rattling nor White House invitations. Better to sit this one out. The most elegant proposal would be to announce a six- to 12-month policy review on Iran -- avoiding heavyhanded (and probably counterproductive) election interference while gently hinting at future possibilities. After elections, and almost regardless of the results, the new administration should test the option of an unconditional and multi-issue political dialogue. The kind of grand bargain that was apparently offered by Iran and summarily rejected by the U.S. in 2003 (well documented by Flynt Leverett among others), should be re-examined. Israel’s former Mossad chief, Efraim Halevy, an advocate of hard negotiations with Iran, has argued that religious regimes can be the most flexible of creatures, as God is always with them whatever they decide. If a grand bargain or even ad-hoc understandings are unattainable, then Iran’s regional reach can be challenged more effectively by trying to bring actors like Syria and Hamas inside the tent. The peace process and Gulf policy should not be Irano-centric, thereby magnifying Iranian pretensions to hegemony. Containment and mutual deterrence, not pre-emptive military action, must be the fallback policy should all else fail.

Iranian cooperation would have immediate repercussions in the Lebanon-Syria arena. Bush’s policy exacerbated Lebanese internal divisions, eschewed any incentives for Syrian good behavior and discouraged the resumption of Israeli-Syrian talks. In the Israel-Lebanon-Syria triangle the U.S. was part of the problem, not part of the solution. Loyalty to the Cedar Revolution assumed a higher priority than prevention of a renewed Lebanese civil war. The new president should be guided by the principle of no return to Syrian occupation of Lebanon. Beyond that, America needs the good sense to allow flexibility on the Hariri Tribunal if there are important quid pro quo’s to be gained. Its strategic objectives should be to promote internal accommodation, not conflict within Lebanon, to renew Israeli-Syrian negotiations, and to resume its own high-level bilateral dialogue with Syria.

The hobby of regime change should also be abandoned on the Palestinian front. The Bush administration made a dizzying three attempts at shaping the Palestinian Authority leadership. The end result is a Palestinian house so divided that it complicates peace efforts, perhaps fatally, and weakens the political as opposed to militant tendency within Hamas. The opportunity presented by a Palestinian government of national unity, with Hamas endorsing both a ceasefire and Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, needs to be resurrected in some fashion.

Recalibrating policy toward Hamas has become central to progress on resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Contrary to popular misperception, Hamas and al-Qaeda are adversaries, not allies. Hamas is about ending the occupation and reforming Palestinian society; al-Qaeda, about opposing the West per se and spreading chaos in the Muslim world and beyond. One is reformist, the other revolutionary; one nationalist, the other post-nationalist; one grievance-based, the other fundamentalist. Hamas has signaled that it will accept a Palestinian state alongside Israel. It can be worked with, albeit indirectly for political reasons. Under a new administration, U.S. policy toward Hamas should enter a period of deniable ambiguity, as third parties (principally Arab and European) explore a series of propositions with the Hamas leadership.

The Hamas question, though, is about more than the West Bank and Gaza. It touches on whether political Islamists, the Muslim Brothers among them, can be allies and even play a pivotal role in the struggle against al-Qaeda. These non-takfiri Islamists (takfiris, al-Qaeda among them, support an extreme interpretation of Islam, and offensive, not defensive, Jihad) are embroiled in their own bitter fight with the radicals. Democratic Islamists tend to be the big winners when free elections are held in the Arab world, and their very participation in such elections is considered kufran abomination to Islam -- by the takfiri jihadists. They are religiously conservative, sometimes oppressively so, but they are not at war with the West, and America’s unwillingness to enter into a dialogue with them over rules of the game for co-existing and rooting out al-Qaeda has been perhaps the most glaring and stubbornly shortsighted omission in U.S. post-September 11 policy.

These divisions within political Islam are an unexploited opportunity. Lumping all Islamists together is politically and intellectually lazy and dishonest, helping al-Qaeda to portray America as anti-Muslim. It also exacerbates American reliance on repressive regimes fearful of democratic elections that might displace them. The reality is that most Islamists are mainstream, non-takfiri. At the very least, the alternative of a dialogue with non-takfiri political Islam should be explored. Can, for instance, the Turkish model of an Islamic but pro-Western polity be reproduced in the Arab world, and if so, under what circumstances? Which is why a blue-ribbon commission on “Reducing al-Qaeda and Takfiri Influence in Islamic Societies” should be constituted to report to the new president by autumn 2009.

A triangle can be drawn on the map of the world that runs from the Hindu Kush to the Atlantic Coast of Morocco to the Horn of Africa. I haven’t touched on all the problems in that triangle -- Pakistan and Afghanistan or energy policy, for instance. Nor does that triangle encompass all of the Muslim world. This triangle contains only about 6 percent of the planet’s population. The next president will have to focus on relations with China, protecting our environment, and tackling global human security, and rightly so. But this triangle, if irresponsibly managed, has a proven ability to suck America in and leave little oxygen for anything else. But that’s a fate the next president can avoid.

Copyright 2008, The American Prospect