American Strategy Program

Guest Post by Steve Clemons: Clemons, Walt, Drezner and Rothkopf Respond to Paul Wolfowitz

Andrew Lebovich — Fri, 28 Aug 2009 16:36:00 -0400

(photo of Paul Wolfowitz and Steve Clemons at Australian Prime Minister's Official Residence in Sydney -- Kirribilli House, 16 August 2009. When taken, Paul Wolfowitz remarked, "I don't know whose reputation will take more of a hit for this picture -- yours or mine. . ."

Steve Clemons directs the New America Foundation/American Strategy Program. This post originally appeared at The Washington Note.

Paul Wolfowitz penned a provocative critique of foreign policy realism in this week's Foreign Policy magazine.

Four responses to Wolfowitz were posted online last night in a series called "Is Paul Wolfowitz for Real?"

Stephen Walt, "Just Because He Walks Like a Realist. . ."

David J. Rothkopf, "A Neocon in Realist's Clothing"

Daniel W. Drezner, "Capitalization Matters"

Steve Clemons, "Failing to Note the Difference When the U.S. Power Tank Is Full or Near Empty"

Look forward to hearing thoughts of others on this discussion.

I will be at Waldens Coffeehouse in Reno, Nevada this morning.

-- Steve Clemons

Guest Post by Ben Katcher: Russia, Iran, and the United States

Andrew Lebovich — Tue, 18 Aug 2009 16:30:00 -0400

Ben Katcher is a Policy Analyst with the New America Foundation/American Strategy Program. This post originally appeared at The Washington Note.

Over at Stratfor, George Friedman has a very interesting piece on the possibility of closer ties between Russia and Iran.

Friedman lays out in detail the key geopolitical factors that are shaping the Iran-Russia-U.S. triangle.

Essentially, Friedman's tentative conclusion is that Washington's aggressive policies toward both Moscow and Tehran are bringing the two hydrocarbon exporters closer together.

Meanwhile, in a related move, Russia this month secured access to Turkish waters for its proposed South Stream natural gas pipeline. South Stream will allow Russia to export gas to Europe without going through Ukraine, with which it has very frosty relations at the moment.

The deal on South Stream comes on the heels of an agreement among Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Austria and Hungary on the Nabucco project - a pipeline intended to transport Caspian and possibly Middle Eastern gas to Europe via Turkey while bypassing Russia.

The goal of the Nabucco project is to diversify Europe's natural gas supplies away from Russia. Europe is currently dependent on Russia for 25% of its natural gas imports.

Remarkably, United States Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy Richard Morningstar is denying that South Stream and Nabucco are competitors.

Furthermore, Morningstar says that the Nabucco project - which remember was meant to be an alternative to Russian gas - should be open to Russian gas, but not to Iranian gas.

It will be interesting to watch how long Europe and Turkey are willing to follow U.S. orders and refuse to allow Iranian gas to help fill the Nabucco pipeline. Turkey already imports gas from Iran and says that Iranian gas should be allowed to help fill the pipeline.

Meanwhile, Reinhard Mitschek the managing director of Nabucco Gas Pipeline International is leaving the door open to Iranian participation. He says that It will be up to European customers to decide for themselves whether to import Iranian gas.

For all of Washington's talk about diversifying Europe's gas supply away from Russia, it appears that the one move that could actually make a difference - allowing Europe to import Iranian gas - remains off the table.

This situation cannot be sustained indefinitely. Sooner or later, Iran will increase its gas exports and Europe will not be in a position to turn them away.

-- Ben Katcher

Guest Post by Ben Katcher: The China-Russia Strategic Partnership

Andrew Lebovich — Wed, 12 Aug 2009 19:14:00 -0400

Ben Katcher is a Policy Analyst with the New America Foundation/American Strategy Program. This post originally appeared at The Washington Note.

Lehigh University International Relations Department Chair Rajan Menon recently published an informative report for the Century Foundation called "The China-Russia Relationship: What It Involves, Where It Is Headed, And How It Matters For The United States."

The report provides a useful framework for conceptualizing the relationships among China, Russia, and the United States.

Menon makes a persuasive case that while the "strategic partnership" between Russia and China is based in large part on a shared aversion to unchecked American power, a full-fledged anti-American alliance is unlikely to develop.

The report refutes assertions by the British historian Niall Ferguson and others that Russia and China are engaged in a classic balance of power alliance to counter American influence.

Such an alliance is unlikely for several reasons. Neither Russia nor China believes that an alliance could effectively balance American influence given the United States' extraordinary military and economic advantages, China agrees with Joe Biden that Russia is a weak and declining power, and Russia envisions itself as part of the West and views China's rise with jealousy and suspicion. Furthermore, geographical proximity makes Russia and China natural competitors in Central Asia and the Russian Far East.

The bottom line is that both Russia and China benefit more from their relations with the West than from their relations with each other.

Menon's analyses of the United States' bilateral relationships with Russia and China are strong because he avoids a U.S.-centric perspective and explains how Beijing and Moscow perceive their interests and their relationships with Washington. His acknowledgments that the United States' unilateral decision to abandon the ABM treaty and its obsessive commitment to NATO expansion have been counter-productive are particularly welcome.

One quibble I have with Menon's argument is his statement that "While talk of a Russian-American cold war is ubiquitous in Russia and the United States, there is no parallel categorization about the Beijing-Washington relationship, either in Beijing or Washington."

While you wouldn't know it from last week's Strategic and Economic Dialogue "love fest," there is in fact a large and influential group of China hard-liners based primarily at the Pentagon and in the armed services that views China as an emerging military superpower and conceives the U.S.-China relationship in zero-sum terms. While these views have been crowded out in recent years, they most certainly exist and could resurface in the event of a crisis.

Menon correctly identifies one of the main reasons that the China hard-liners in Washington have been sidelined. The enormous trade and investment flows between the two countries ensure that there are strong domestic constituencies in both countries with a stake in the relationship. The lack of these constituencies is one of the biggest obstacles to stronger U.S.-Russian relations. Menon says

The problems...are compounded by the ease with which the relationship with Russia can be damaged because of the lack of influential constituencies within America that have a strong stake in shoring it up, let alone expanding it. The pro-China business lobby in America has no pro-Russian counterpart, and while there are university professors and op-ed writers who argue strenuously that the relationship with Russia is important and should be strengthened, who has lost money betting on their lack of influence?

One other interesting insight from the article is that while much is made of Russia's dependence on arms sales to China (which make up about 10% of Russia's export earnings), China is at least as dependent on Russia in this area. Because of Washington's ban, Russia is the only place that China can buy state of the art weaponry.

The full text of Menon's article can be found here, and is well worth a read.

-- Ben Katcher

Confusion on the Durand Line

Andrew Lebovich — Mon, 10 Aug 2009 18:46:00 -0400

The news last week of the alleged killing of Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud has sparked a round of confused and contradictory messages from various parties.

American and Pakistani officials claim with more and more certainty that Mehsud is dead. Meanwhile, elements of the Pakistani Taliban admitted his death and announced a shura, or gathering, to decide a new Taliban leader, while others strongly asserted that Mehsud is alive, kicking, and making videos to prove it.

While there is at this writing no DNA proof that Mehsud is dead, the strong message from American and Pakistani officials, coupled with persistent reports of fighting between Taliban leaders Hakimullah Mehsud and Wali Ur-Rehman leads me to believe that Mehsud is either dead or out of commission.

Yet while apparently successful, strikes such as this show the potential benefits - as well as limitations - of targeted killings. New America Fellow Nicholas Schmidle explains that Mehsud has been "losing his mojo" of late, and that his killing might weaken the Taliban, but will not eliminate the organization or make Pakistan more willing to cooperate in bringing down other Taliban leaders with closer relationships to Pakistan's military. So while killing Mehsud is a good step, more will be required to effectively diminish the threat from the Taliban, on both sides of the Durand Line.

For more on the news coming out of the region, today is the launch date for a new special project from Foreign Policy and the New America Foundation, the AfPak Channel. Edited and managed by Peter Bergen, the co-director of New America's Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative, and Katherine Tiedemann, the policy analyst with the same program, as well as by Blake Hounshell and Susan Glasser at FP, the AfPak Channel carries original content and analysis from many of today's top experts on Afghanistan, Pakistan, and terrorism.

-- Andrew Lebovich

Guest Post by Ben Katcher: Obama's Russia/Georgia Balancing Act

Andrew Lebovich — Thu, 06 Aug 2009 18:54:00 -0400

Ben Katcher is a Policy Analyst with the New America Foundation/American Strategy Program. This post originally appeared at The Washington Note.

In the aftermath of Vice President Biden's visit to Georgia last month, Alexander Melikishvili over at the Jamestown Foundation's Eurasia blog provides an informative review of the Obama administration's unfolding Georgia policy.

Citing a variety of recent congressional testimonies, Melikishvili makes a persuasive case that the Obama team intends to exercise more caution than the Bush administration in terms of the kinds of military assistance that it is prepared to provide to the Saakashvili regime.

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia Celeste A. Wallander's stated this bluntly in her recent congressional testimony:

But Georgia is not ready for the kind of weapons acquisitions that the President [Saakashvili] floated. In the future, that's not off the table, but certainly the United States is not in the position of believing that Georgia is ready for that kind of defense acquisition.

While I find his conclusion to be a bit alarmist, Melikishvili provides a bevy of useful quotes and links. You can read the entire post, called "Parameters of U.S. Military Assistance to Georgia Emerge from Congressional Hearings," here.

Tempering our support for Georgia is sound policy and appears to be the lowest hanging fruit as the Obama administration aims to reset relations with Russia - but our Georgia policy needs to be part of a broader conversation with both the Russians and the Chinese about our ambitions in the post-Soviet space.

-- Ben Katcher

Guest Post by Col. Lawrence Wilkerson: Open the Door, Mr. President, to Latin America

Andrew Lebovich — Tue, 04 Aug 2009 15:29:00 -0400

President Lula of Brazil meets with President Obama. Official White House photo.

Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson (ret.) served as the Chief of Staff to Sec. Colin Powell at the State Department. He is now the Pamela C. Harriman Professor of Government at the College of William and Mary. This post first appeared at The Havana Note.

London's International Institute for the Study of Cuba recently carried this announcement on its web page:

HAVANA, Cuba, June 29: The Cuban Council of State passed on June 26th, 2009, a new Decree-Law number 268 entitled: "Reform of the Labor Regime" which was published by the daily Granma newspaper as an Official Note…. The law allows for workers to have more than one job and for students to work in part-time jobs. It also frees up enterprises in Havana to hire workers from other provinces directly instead of them having to be hired through the state employment agency.

Thus we see Raul Castro proceeding with his agenda to make small changes that will lead to greater decentralization, more empowerment of state/ministerial and provincial authorities, greater productivity and, finally, higher living standards for the Cuban people. All this while the U.S. makes joyful noises about a fresh policy, lifts some travel restrictions and remittance limits on Cuban-Americans, proffers telecommunications flexibility, and reopens immigration talks. But no real substantive changes in U.S. Cuba policy have been made. Even one of the most meaningful actions is being billed as serendipity, i.e., the shutting down of the idiotic billboard on the U.S. Interests Section building in Havana is touted as a result of a technical malfunctioning and not of a sound decision to shut down the stupid thing. How timid we soaring eagles are!

On the same International Institute webpage, there was this as well:

The Conservative Party leadership in the UK is calling on President Obama to lift the half-century old American blockade of Cuba, in an attempt to pressure the Communist regime to change its ways, according to a report published in the Times newspaper today. William Hague, the Shadow Foreign Secretary, became the first senior British politician to visit Cuba for many years this week, holding talks with the new foreign minister and other senior figures. He found that far from weakening the hardline Communist tendencies of the Cuban Government, the American blockade was continuing to reinforce them, and was being used as an excuse by ministers for the poor state of the economy and the locking up of dissidents. (my emphasis)

In short, one of our closest allies' conservative party believes that U.S. Cuba policy is counterproductive.

In October, the United Nations will hold what has become an annual ritual in USA-bashing, a vote in the General Assembly on the U.S. Cuba embargo. Once again, the world—minus Israel and some other one or two states that can't escape the compulsion of U.S. power—will line up and resoundingly condemn the U.S. policy. Last year's vote, for example, was 185 to 3. That was the 17th vote in 17 years, with an increasingly larger number of countries condemning the policy—for example, the vote against included 179 countries in 2004; in 2005 there were 182; and in 2007 there were 184. Soon it will likely be unanimous. Even the Israelis are operating in Cuba now, so it is doubtful how much longer we have their vote.

What is driving this idiocy? Actually, several things.

Normally in the past, one would lead off with the Cuban-American lobby who, for over 45 years, have had an iron grip on U.S. Cuba policy, though several presidents have tried to break it. But that's no longer the case. President Obama is the first to win the White House without needing the Cuban-American vote. While Cuban-Americans of the hardcore variety are still a formidable force, they are no longer the central factor in U.S. Cuba policy.

What is then? First and foremost—after all, the Dems won in 2008—it's Democratic fear of being seen as weak on national security policy, coupled with Republican reluctance to act on a bipartisan basis. The Dems have shown some national security ankle on Iraq, on Iran, on Syria and are holding their breath on North Korea—so, the rumors go, why should they show any ankle on such an insignificant issue as Cuba policy? The Dems believe that Republicans, even those with better sense (see the next paragraph), would pounce on them if they did. In short, Republican leaders would accuse the Dems immediately of being soft on national security instead of joining them in changing a bankrupt Cuba policy. Moreover, the Dems would be accused of reversing themselves on one of their perceived pet priorities, human rights.

Second, it is Republican angst—and outright trepidation—about being out of step with their "instincts" about their party and their colleagues (we won't call it lack of courage—yet.) Otherwise, why are people such as Brent Scowcroft, George Shultz, Colin Powell, Richard Armitage, and a few other Republicans who have sound views on foreign policy, reluctant to speak out forcefully about the utter inanity of U.S. Cuba policy? They will pronounce upon it in private but not in public. If there are other reasons, I would love to hear them. And let's reiterate: we can't cite national security; Cuba poses no threat whatsoever to the United States. Nor can we cite human rights because we deal with China, Vietnam, Saudi Arabia, et al, every day—and, besides, groups such as Human Rights Watch have said that engagement with Cuba would be more successful with regard to human rights than the current isolation policy.

Lastly, there's the very real—and understandable—reason that since Cuba is so low on the priority list, why waste the political capital, energy, or time? Let's forget for a moment that a country 90 miles off the coast of Florida, thoroughly divorced from contact with the U.S., is a ripe plum to be picked (lest we forget the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962). Let's forget that we need to reverse the Myers Lansky/Fulgencio Batista legacy we left in Cuba, our un-American detritus, if you will, which still fouls our relations with the region. Let's forget these and concentrate on today's and tomorrow's Latin America alone. It's for certain that others are.

Take China, for example, and this recent article on the Council for Hemispheric Affairs' website:

On November 5, 2008, the Chinese government released a policy paper on Latin America and the Caribbean, as it had previously done so for Europe in 2003 and for Africa in 2006. Although it may not come as a huge surprise that Latin America is the most recent region for which China has formally spelled out its foreign policy position, the region has been historically perceived as being under the United States’ sphere of influence. Perhaps the importance of the Chinese policy paper lies in the timing of its release. The release of the paper deliberately coincided with the unfolding of the current financial crisis; this congruence of events has allowed China to expand its influence in this somewhat neglected region without attracting any lasting venom from the U.S. China’s policy paper formally evidences the importance of Latin America and the Caribbean as part of China’s growth plan for its long-term strategic interests. Most of all, this includes access to raw materials as well as a plethora of natural resources, the infiltration of new foreign markets, the reduction of diplomatic support for the Republic of Taiwan, and the strengthening of Beijing political standing on the global stage through strong alliances cemented with the developing world.

The policy paper explicitly states its main objective is to "clarify the goals of China's policy in this region, outline the guiding principles for future cooperation" and "sustain the sound, steady and all-around growth of China's relations with Latin America and the Caribbean." In the economic realm, China expresses an interest in investing in energy, mineral resources, forestry, fishing, and agriculture, areas important to expanding China’s productivity. Additionally, the Chinese government seems to show interest in infrastructure projects not directly related to its economy, albeit essential in the transportation of natural resources, and proposes to fund these projects in order to be perceived as a partner in development.

Furthermore, China expresses its desire to increase military diplomacy and sale of equipment to the region. Although many of the report’s statements are merely rhetoric and general in scope, the paper helps formalize China’s economic, diplomatic and military ties with Latin America, which were first proposed by then President of China Jiang Zemin in 2001.

Recently, I was on a panel at the New America Foundation where one of the members spoke of the U.S. political neglect of Latin America as inevitable because the region was simply unimportant. While I have respect for most of the views of this particular individual, on this he was very much mistaken.

I was just in Sao Paulo, Brazil, where the dynamism is palpable. Blessed for almost eight years now with the best leadership in our hemisphere from President Lula da Silva, Brazil is on the move. That movement can and will occur with or without the United States. Better that it be in cooperation with the United States. Similarly, whether it's immigration, narcotics, planetary warming, energy resources, or global disease, we divorce ourselves from our own hemisphere at our imminent peril. In brief, we had best begin caring about Latin America (even as we ourselves transform in just a few short years into a majority minority country with Hispanic-Americans composing a huge chunk of that majority).

The door to a wiser, more productive foreign and national security policy vis-à-vis Latin America is easy to discern in the foreign policy mists: it is normalization of relations with "that infernal little Cuban Republic" off our southeastern shore.

-- Lawrence Wilkerson

Guest Post by Steve Clemons: China-US Strategic & Economic Dialogue Discussion

Andrew Lebovich — Thu, 30 Jul 2009 21:39:00 -0400

Steve Clemons standing next to statue commemorating Xu Xiake (1587-1641), who chronicled his travels throughout China during the late Ming Dynasty. This picture was taken at Liyuan Park on the edge of Lake Taihu in Wuxi, Jiangsu Province, China. (photo credit: Peter Pi)

Steve Clemons directs the New America Foundation/American Strategy Program. This post originally appeared at The Washington Note.

For those interested in US-China relations, here is a digital clip of a discussion in which I participated on the Diane Rehm Show yesterday.

Others on the panel including Albert Keidel, former acting director of the Department of Treasury's Office of East Asian Affairs; Ambassador Stapleton Roy who now directs the Kissinger Institute on China and the US at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and myself.

Susan Page of USA Today moderated the discussion.

-- Steve Clemons

Recalling the Benefits of Turkish Integration

Andrew Lebovich — Thu, 30 Jul 2009 20:31:00 -0400

Much of the news and analysis regarding Turkey's negotiations to enter the European Union for the past few years has been increasingly negative and doubtful of Turkey's quest for admittance. But my colleague Benjamin Katcher offers a great reminder of why it is important for both sides to patiently pursue Turkey's accession in his article today in the World Politics Review.

Katcher indicates that the current negative feelings between Europe and Turkey as well as Turkey's recent economic success should not imply that Turkey would be better off without Europe, and Europe better off without Turkey. He writes:

...these positive developments have led to an inflated sense of confidence in Ankara. Turkey lives in a dangerous neighborhood in which it has no natural allies. And the deep mistrust between the government and the military, as well as the fact that Turkey's economy contracted 13.8 percent in the first quarter, reveal that both Turkey's political and economic systems rest on shaky foundations. In 10 or 20 years, those foundations are likely to be much sturdier should Turkey remain committed to the accession process. And Ankara is likely to find itself in a stronger international position if it enjoys the security and stability that Europe provides.

Things may look different from Europe's perspective in a decade or two as well. Europe's population is declining, and economic growth among the developed, Western European states is likely to be low. Turkey will be in a position to provide the labor that Europe needs, while serving as a destination for investment and an engine for economic growth.

But the benefits that Turkey offers Europe go beyond economics. Turkey's army -- the second-largest in NATO -- could play an increasingly significant role as the United States gradually pulls back from its overseas security commitments, at the same time that European governments struggle to modernize their militaries while providing for aging populations. Incorporating a Muslim country may also help Europe to integrate its large and growing Muslim minority.

Most importantly, Europe will have to engage with Turkey as a large, influential country on its borders whether or not it becomes part of Europe. The accession process offers Europe the opportunity to ensure that its southern neighbor is as stable, prosperous, and friendly as possible.

It's important to remember that both Europe and Turkey can benefit greatly from accession or simply closer ties, and that isolation or trying to shunt Turkey off to the side will only damage Europe, at home and in the Middle East.

-- Andrew Lebovich

Guest Post by Steve Clemons: The US-China Strategic & Economic Dialogue Power Dinner: Love Fest Clarifies Obama Priorities

Andrew Lebovich — Wed, 29 Jul 2009 21:49:00 -0400

Steve Clemons directs the New America Foundation/American Strategy Program. This post originally appeared at The Washington Note.

Former AIG Chairman Maurice "Hank" Greenberg waited outside the Ritz Carlton in a very long line of well-heeled Washingtonians waiting to be allowed by the organizers to access air-conditioning and get into the event ballroom. I clicked my iPhone weather application and it was 89 degrees outside -- high humidity. Lots of old people in that line.

The event was organized by the National Committee on US-China Relations, the US-China Business Council and a long roster of co-sponsoring groups.

Some DC political players in the line deserved the heat -- others didn't.

But what the powerful and connected were there for was the power dinner of the two day long US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue.

The luminaries were out in full force. One seasoned observer of American foreign policy and a probable heavyweight Obama emissary one day told me before the dinner began: "Never have so many of the great and mighty been assembled to hear so little. . ."

Another Democratic national security icon there told me before the dinner doors finally opened after an extensive reception, "Very little will be said here -- but what is more interesting is to note what is not said. . ."

Those I connected with or saw at the dinner included Ambassador designate to China and Utah Governor Jon Huntsman, Jr., former US Ambassador to China and Indonesia and Wilson Center Kissinger Institute Director Stapleton Roy, Henry Kissinger himself, former Beatles super aide and global impresario Peter Brown, US Institute of Peace chief and key player in opening China Richard Solomon, uber political/poll commentator Charlie Cook, Carlyle Group co-founder David Rubenstein, former Secretary of the Treasury and chief spear-carrier for hyper-neoliberalism (aka "Rubinomics") Robert Rubin, State Department Policy Planning Director Anne-Marie Slaughter, former State Department Chief Legal Counsel and David Addington-foe inside the Bush administration John B. Bellinger III. . .

. . .former New Jersey Governor and "What Happened to my Republican Party" Republican moderate Christine Todd Whitman, former AID Deputy Administrator Ambassador Hattie Babbitt and her former presidential candidate husband Bruce Babbitt, newly appointed IFES President William Sweeney, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chief International Economics Advisor to Senator John Kerry Heidi Crebo-Rediker, former Hong Kong Chief Executive and CPCC Member CH Tung, Center for Non-Violent Conflict patron Peter Ackerman, former US Trade Representative Carla Hills, Peterson Institute for International Economics President C. Fred Bergsten, former Middle East Quartet Chief and World Bank President James Wolfensohn (who was also out in the stultifying heat in a long line outside the Ritz for a long time), global finance expert and former Citigroup Vice Chairman Michael Klein, US-China Business Council Chair and Dow Chemical CEO Andrew Liveris, Former State Department Counselor and Clinton Envoy for North Korea negotiations Wendy Sherman, National Journal economics columnist Bruce Stokes, and a whole slew of others. . .

I took a bundle of notes for the dinner -- hoping something memorable worth writing about would be said.

It happened only once in real terms. China Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Dai Bingguo said:

Don't Lose Any Sleep over China!

The crowd sort of chuckled, and that was the most tense moment of the evening. The rest was an incredibly upbeat, tummy-rubbing night of mutual admiration.

But it was valuable to be there and to see starkly clarified what the priorities of Barack Obama and China President Hu Jintao are: make the US-China relationship as smooth as possible -- no public expression of distance or difference on anything from climate change to human rights to defense concerns to currency levels.

Both Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Secretary of the Treasury Timothy Geithner shared charming vignettes about their counterparts -- Dai Bingguo in Clinton's case and State Council Vice Premier Wang Qishan. Clinton talked about agreeing with Dai to always bring pictures of their kids and grandkids to these meetings to remind themselves and their delegations of the importance of what they were discussing and its impact on the future.

Geithner, whose father Peter Geithner used to be the Ford Foundation's China director and was known to Wang Qishan, laid out the only substantive note of the evening. He said that the US and China coming together the way it had in the last two days would send "positive market signals" to the rest of the world -- and that America knew that it could no longer live beyond its means while China would have to rewire its economy to boost domestic consumption, expand services, and build greater basic demand there.

Wang Qishan commended the US for finally fully committing to have a national pavilion at the 2010 World Expo in Shanghai as Wang Chairs the World Expo Committee much like he chaired the 2008 Beijing Olympics Committee.

Hillary Clinton in one of the funnier moments of the night talked at substantial length about the US Pavilion that she'd been working hard to encourage private sector support of -- thanking General Electric, Pepsico (I saw the Coca-Cola rep at the dinner shift in her seat at that moment), Marriott, Chevron, and other firms for supporting the project. She said that she was going to build the Pavilion herself if that is what it was going to take to get the thing done on time. Ambassador Elizabeth Bagley was saluted by Clinton for getting this all together.

And Clinton who apologized for going on so long about the Shangai Expo US Pavilion said:

Shameless I know -- but that is part of the job. . .

Henry Kissinger, who was on the edge of sentimental tear-ing up while reflecting on China's opening nearly 40 years and where the relationship has come through eight presidents and four generations of Chinese leaders, was treated by both sides as the Deng Xiaoping of the night -- the elder whose vision started it all.

This was a remarkable night when compared to the high-stress start in US-China relations under Bill Clinton's term when Warren Christopher was hammering on human rights issues, or the equally stressful start under George W. Bush who ratcheted up tensions quickly (because Paul Wolfowitz pushed it) with China in April 2001 when an American EP-3 spy plane collided with a Chinese jet fighter.

Last night was a love fest -- and it is clear that unlike what Barack Obama said the other day: "the US-China relationship is as important as any other of our bilateral relationships," there is no doubt that Obama and Hu Jintao and their retainers across the political spectrum view the US-China relationship as the single most important relationship of the early 21st century.

The next of these high level dialogues will be held in Beijing -- and Dai Bingguo expressed concern about being able to generate the same level of warmth, hospitality, and good feeling that was abundant during the last two days and last night at the Ritz Carlton.

In my view, the US-China relationship needs to be central, but we need to discuss problems in the broad context of both the bilateral game and global challenges. Issues of concern -- about currencies, manufacturing, strategic objectives, non-proliferaton, economic management, human rights, and the like -- should be there along with the pleasantries.

That kind of approach wasn't accomplished last night -- but hopefully there was some serious talk behind closed doors that we didn't get much access to at the gala.

-- Steve Clemons

Progress on our Common Interests

Andrew Lebovich — Mon, 27 Jul 2009 22:34:00 -0400

The recently turned-off ticker sign at the U.S. Interests Section in Havana. This post originally appeared at The Havana Note.

I want to share a little nugget of my analysis that helps to get past the zero-sum conditionality question that my colleagues John McCauliffe and Phil Peters have recently posted on.

I think we can describe the current U.S. policy as having the following attributes:

1. Rhetorical Caution
2. Regulatory Inertia
3. Operational License

Here's what I mean. When the Obama administration has discussed the future of U.S.-Cuba relations, it has generally indicated that it will fulfill two campaign promises: to allow unrestricted family travel and remittances and to engage in talks with all of America's adversaries. And from a declaratory perspective, Obama has done just that. Having announced these two policy changes, it is apparently comfortable standing pat, at least from the podium in Washington. There are a lot of other issues that the Administration is, rightly or wrongly, more concerned about, and until a crisis or incredible breakthrough opportunity presents itself, I anticipate little effort will be expended by the White House on Cuba.

That little bit of change, however, has angered at least one important Senate Democrat, Senator Bob Menendez, who chairs the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee. So, in a sop to the senior senator from New Jersey, the Obama administration has played a little shell game, and has not yet implemented the changes in policy that the President announced back in April around family travel, remittances, and trade. Even though many Cuban Americans are under the impression that the policy has changed, technically, if they travel or remit more than they were allowed under President Bush, they could be fined. By holding the bureaucracy back, the administration can have it both ways. For a while.

The final characteristic of the present policy is as operational license. Here's what I mean. There are at least three offices with responsibilities that place them in contact with Cubans: the JTF commander at Guantanamo, the principal deputy assistant Secretary of State who is negotiating the migration and mail talks, and the chief of the U.S. Interests Section. In each case, these offices have been given the space to move the relationship forward in public ways. The JTF Commander in Guantanamo conducted a joint U.S.-Cuban mass casualty exercise earlier this month. The PDAS conducted successful negotiations around migration and mail service with talk of more meetings in Havana in December, and the Interests Section has turned off the 24-hour ticker sign that went up in the Bush administration. All pragmatic confidence-building measures that signal a willingness to make progress on common interests.

And that's where I think this administration is headed. There are many issues that the two governments can work on that will build trust, build a working relationship and actually contribute meaningfully to the economic, security, and environmental interests of these two neighbors. Where we will not see progress, at least at this stage, is on "full normalization" or "ending the embargo" on the U.S. side or on "democracy" or "human rights" on the Cuban side.

That's because the politics of Cuba in the United States have shifted in Miami and Washington but have not yet been fully consolidated. That is happening and will continue to advance, short of North Korea putting nuclear missiles into Cuba. On the Cuban side, they will simply never negotiate their political order and they believe that human rights is larger than freedom of speech and must include economic and social rights.

What is interesting is that this framework policy allows for other actors, such as Congress, to change the situation, such as the travel ban, and receive a positive response and for progress on many bilateral issues to be advanced without crossing into the current red zones of the embargo and democracy/human rights. In other words, there is enough room to get things done, but little for major headlines.

-- Patrick Doherty