Slate's Timothy Noah provides a thoughtful overview of the intellectual origins and political evolution of the public option's place in health reform.

It's a complicated case, the public option. Lotta ins. Lotta outs. But Timothy Noah is the Big Lebowski of health writers, and is the man for the job to keep all these strands together. (Yes, we know we've made that joke before, but like our living room rug it really ties the blog together.)

Noah's goal was to understand why the CBO and others estimated that premiums for a so-called level playing field public option would cost more than private plans. Noah spoke with New America's Len Nichols, whose paper with John Bertko helped outline how a public option with negotiated payment rates could compete on a level playing field with private plans.

At the heart of Noah's question are the assumptions these estimates make about the nature of the public option and the potential for adverse selection between insurers (in this case more sick people choosing the public option over private plans). Noah nicely illustrates the intricacies of this debate, and we'd like to add a few more points to consider.

First, we would argue the fears that a public option will necessarily attract a less healthy (higher cost) population are overblown. Health reform legislation encompasses new insurance market regulations (community rating, affordability standards tied to actuarial values, guaranteed issue and renewal). Coupling those new rules with the requirement that all Americans purchase health insurance removes much of the ability and incentive for private insurers to engage in the kind of cherry picking and lemon dropping that the Slate article addresses. Insurers will still try to attract healthier customers through advertising and marketing, but their ability to actively select customers based on health status and other risk factors would be limited. Risk adjustment will further address variation that might arise through this sort of "soft" risk selection. 

Second, it seems unlikely that sicker individuals will drop existing coverage and flock to the public option. If they're offered coverage through an employer and that coverage is deemed affordable relative to their income, they're ineligible for the exchange. Furthermore the transition costs of switching plans when you've already set up a network of providers to care for your conditions are such that if you like what you have, you will probably prefer to keep it.

Finally, there is the question of how a public option would operate -- specifically, how would it employ methods of utilization management. Utilization management is ungainly jargon even for health policy. It should not be conflated with the cherry picking and lemon dropping of risk selection. When practiced correctly, utilization management is about delivering value for our health care dollar. It's about paying for what works, reducing unnecessary tests and procedures, and encouraging healthy behaviors. It's about avoiding the MRI when an X-ray will do, or making it easier for a diabetic to manage her blood sugar and avoid crises and complications that could send her to the ER -- or the OR. Or the ICU.  

There are many real world examples where utilization management done right both saves money and improves patient care. But the CBO and others in their estimates basically assume that a public option would ignore the examples of plans like Group Health or Kaiser, and keep paying providers along the lines of fee-for-service Medicare. Why would the Secretary of HHS design a public option to perpetuate broken payment models, when it could be a driver for innovation in payment and delivery system reform? So for all the hand wringing over a public option, when it comes to estimates of adverse selection and utilization, remember, that "yeah, well, you know, that's just, like, your opinion, man." Cost estimates are important, but implementation is what really matters.