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Subsidies and Red Herrings

June 24, 2008 - 4:55pm

Student loan industry officials have been pushing Congress to revisit cuts it made last fall to subsidies lenders receive for participating in the Federal Family Education Loan (FFEL) program. They cite job losses in the industry as one reason to boost subsidies.

“How do you feel about thousands of hard-working people being laid off?” one advocate for FFEL recently wrote to Higher Ed Watch. “Because that's really the biggest tragedy of the College Cost Reduction and Access Act...FFEL lenders haven't gone away, but thousands of people's jobs have!”

There is no doubt that fewer people are employed in the FFEL industry as a result of both the subsidy cuts and credit market turmoil. But while we are sympathetic to the hardships that these job losses cause individuals and their families, we take issue with the argument that FFEL job losses represent a major public policy problem. In fact, the jobs argument confuses the real problem: the lack of an auction for setting lender subsidies makes it impossible to determine just how many FFEL jobs are actually needed.

FFEL Is For Students

Congress did not intend FFEL to be a jobs program. FFEL's sole purpose is to provide loans to college students at roughly uniform terms that are more generous than those offered in the private market. That’s it. One can debate how much lenders should be subsidized to accomplish this goal, or how generous loan terms should be for borrowers, but job creation and losses shouldn’t be part of the equation. Moreover, many FFEL supporters champion the program because, they say, it fosters competition among private lenders. If that’s true, then they have to admit that jobs will be lost when larger, more efficient lenders win more student business.

Too Many FFEL Jobs, or Too Few?

The jobs argument assumes that the "correct " number of FFEL jobs existed prior to the subsidy cuts and credit crunch, meaning any job reduction will harm the program. Herein lies FFEL’s central problem. Congress does not know how many lenders are needed to ensure all students get a FFEL loan. Congress simply makes up a subsidy rate and hopes it attracts enough loan providers to fill the need. In any given year, the subsidy is likely to be too high or too low.

Taxpayer dollars are wasted when the subsidy is higher than what is necessary to ensure all students get loans. Wastefully high subsidies encourage lenders to hire more staff to compete with one another for market share. In this regard, FFEL creates jobs -- marketing, processing, servicing, political fundraising, and Congressional lobbying jobs. But were these additional jobs necessary to accomplish the FFEL program’s goal of getting students loans with beneficial terms set by Congress? Or, put another way, is the current reduction in FFEL jobs going to prevent students from obtaining government subsidized student loans?

To be fair, Congress can easily guess a subsidy rate that is too low, where not enough lenders -- and their employees -- participate in the program to ensure all students get loans. But the point here is that if Congress continues to use the current system of guessing a subsidy number for lenders, there are likely to be too few, or too many, FFEL jobs at any point in time.

Auction Solution

Policymakers can do a better job of ensuring the optimal number of lender employees by setting the subsidy level by auction. While the PLUS loan auction, which is scheduled to begin in 2009, allows only two lenders to make loans in each state, it authorizes lenders to set their own subsidy level in the auction. If a loan company expects to need 1,000 employees to make all PLUS loans in Minnesota, then it can submit a bid for a subsidy rate it believes will support the necessary level of jobs. Unfortunately, the law creating the auction caps lenders’ bids, preventing loan providers from bidding at what might be the most appropriate rate. Congress needs to revisit that provision to ensure there is sufficient bidding in a variety of market circumstances. At a minimum, the Secretary of Education should be granted the flexibility to adjust the cap in each auction when special circumstances arise.

Make Loans, Not Red Herrings

The debate about lender subsidy levels is a healthy one as long as we look for ways to ensure that the FFEL program can accomplish its goal at the optimal price for taxpayers. The argument that job creation and preservation should somehow be a consideration in this debate is nothing but a red herring. It is a rhetorical distraction from a debate about how best to deliver federal student aid and ensure college access.

Student Loan Auction Idea: A Real Red Herring

One can only be amazed that NAF continues to argue for an auction to "reduce excessive student loan subsidies" at a time when Congress and the higher education community is worrying about whether loans will be available to students. Don't they read the newspapers? An auction mechanism is directly contrary to loan providers competing to convince individual consumers to use their products based on the quality of those products (the loan servicing) and prices. Consumer lose under an auction--arguably reducing federal costs does not get them a lower cost loan or assure them quality servicing. There are no longer "excessive subsidies" left to eliminate in the student loan program, so the only thing an auction would achieve is to further destroy any private sector participation in student loans. NAFs advocacy for an auction is just another way for it to advocate Direct Student Loans and elimination of borrower choice. It is a red herring and should be identified as such.

More Fallacies - This One's a Straw Man

As we argue explicitly in the post, an auction is a way to ensure that subsidies are not too high or TOO LOW. An auction might very well increase subsidies if lenders bid at rates higher than current law. We accept that outcome as a possibility and believe it to be superior to arbitrarily setting the subsidy. In other words, we support higher subsidies for student lenders, so long as those subsidy rates are set by some sort of competitive bidding process, not backroom political deals as they are under current law. In this very post, we argue that Congress should address the problems posed by bidding caps in the PLUS auction, allowing for subsidy rates higher than current law when bidding suggests they are necessary.

A better compromise

An auction is a fine Goldilocks solution NAF. Too bad it’s pure fantasy. The government could very easily switch gears and guarantee lenders 100% reimbursement for default losses on their FFELP portfolios and then leave the lenders free to set the interest rate on their loans. Of course that means that there will be variability amongst different FFELP providers with regard to the interest rates they charge borrowers. Nevertheless, FFELP borrowers would still enjoy rates that would be lower than they’d otherwise be since the government is footing 100% the cost of defaults on behalf of the lenders / borrowers. No command and control auction, no command and control subsidies, and no disruptions in service since the lenders would be free to pass along to the borrower their cost of funds (a fixed subsidy, and fixed borrower rate doesn’t allow that NAF—a problem you’ll note was responsible for the mass FFELP lender exodus). Also, since the government guarantee is 100%, there would be little incentive for lenders to not lend to higher default institutions. Competition among lenders determines their profits from the program, not the “back-room” deals you purport to decry (although as per the norm, you supply nothing more than hearsay to support your claim of impropriety).  So there you have it NAF, a KISS solution (of the kind you supposedly favor) to the ‘problem’ you’ve identified.

Sophomoric Straw Man

No responsible official from the student loan community has ever asserted that the loss of jobs, as tragic as it is for the families involved, is the primary reason Congress should recognize it went too far in its cuts last fall.

It's sophomoric for Delisle to pick one response among dozens and argue against it as he did, devoting an entire column and using it as another opportunity to toot his auction horn. This device allows NAF to once again avoid addressing the real issues.

Auctions are for Monets, used cars, foreclosed properties and T-bills. No one has ever shown them to be much good at anything else.

What About the Students

Go NAF go!! Too soon, too often and all too tragically we forget that it is all about providing access for students. Keep speaking for those who are trying to get an honest education.

Default city?

For those out there who still believe in economic incentives, a 100% default guaranty would result in massive increases in student loan defaults. Lenders would have little incentive to prevent defaults. Regardless of whether a 100% default guaranty would increase the already-existing incentive to lend to all types of borrowers (this is a social welfare program, after all!), a 100% default guaranty would markedly increase the incentive to let the smaller loans from community college students default while focusing on collecting the larger, more profitable loans -- where the lender would in theory be losing out on a default, even with a 100% default guaranty, due to not receiving interest income from the borrower over a long repayment cycle on a large loan.

Propaganda City?

I didn't realize that lender default reimbursement and borrower behavior were perfectly correlated?  That's a new one!  I guess when we go from a 97% reimbursement to a 100% reimbursement it's a signal to the borrowers who pay attention to this kind of stuff to not pay their loans in "massive" numbers?  Fascinating!  Or, on the flip side, it's a signal to lenders to stop the minimum government-mandated due diligence (collections activities) that they must perfom in order to be eligible to receive a 97% or a 100% reimbursement?  Indeed, lenders would be worse off if on the margin they suddenly decided not to collect on certain loans (thereby foregoing the reimbursement) when going from 97% to 100% guarantee!  But don't take my word for it, lenders who were designated "exceptional performers" (and most were) at one time received 100% guarantee and interestingly enough, the default numbers did not go through the roof!  You did get one thing right though, lenders do have an incentive to keep the loans performing as long as possible.  It would seem like that would align all parties' incentives/interests perfectly (borrower/taxpayer/lender). 

They went up

Not a lot, but default claims did go up. It was one reason the continuation of "exceptional performer" could not be justified. Moving the 100% from an "extra-legal" (subregulatory) maneuver to something across-the-board, written in stone would change loan holders' behavior far more.

Even the most hard-core supporter of the guaranteed program would say 100% would be a green light to let more loans default. There is a reason why a 97% guaranty is called 3% risk sharing. The lender needs to have some skin in the game and share in the risk. No one is saying it is a signal to borrowers. It is a signal to loan holders.

What about Uncle Sam giving lenders a chunk of change when the loans are disbursed but no money at all for default claims or special allowance? They would have to manage the funds to support the life of the loans -- almost like a real bank! That would provide more incentive for default aversion. Sure, some would over-use deferments and forbearances, but that only gets you so far.

Or what about block granting the program? Surely an idea with broad libertarian and conservative support . . . . Schools would have to put up a match amount, just like they do in some other federal programs. This would reduce the participation of institutions who are only in existence to get the federal student aid monies.

It depends what you mean by "performing." Loans in forbearance are not "performing."

The biggest red herring in lender interviews over the decades with Treasury, GAO, etc., is that "if you miss one phone call, your claim goes bye-bye." Any real evidence of this? Are guarantors -- many of whom have business relationships with the lenders -- denying default claims en masse? Or is DoEd overruling the guarantors en masse when they miss gaps in due diligence and making them put the money back? This is all automated, right? There's no guy with green eyeshades reviewing due diligence and saying "yes, pay this one, no don't pay that one"? They all get paid, bottom line. The only example in the press was Corus Bank many years ago, and that was not one single claim; it was some type of a pattern of not following due diligence. The onesies and twosies surely slip through.

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