The American Strategist

Obama's Second Nobel

Patrick Doherty — Sun, 11 Oct 2009 05:20:00 -0400

It's strange how partisan reactions to the Nobel Prize completely missed the common-sense rationale behind the Obama pick. According to many of my outside-the-beltway friends, President Obama won the Nobel Peace Prize for defeating President Bush and arresting the dark spiral into which his administration had set the nation and the world. That Obama did it as an African American who first had to defeat the Democratic heir-apparent was even more remarkable. The entire campaign gave the world hope that cynicism, unchecked wealth, and fear could be overcome.

For the rest of the world--and for most of America--that is enough of an accomplishment to earn the Nobel Peace Prize. But it was not all. Obama has since led the G20 to stabilize the world economy in the midst of the worst recession since the Great Depression. He reached out to the Islamic world, with an open hand and he urged the world to reduce our collective nuclear arsenal.

So the prize is clearly deserved, for President Obama turned the United States around.

But as a leader, he has much still to do, and he knows it. The nation is still in the red--progressing, but in the red. The question is, is the President thinking as seriously and as in depth about America's new role in the world as he as been triaging the world's urgent crises or planning the strategy in South Asia.

From what I can tell, the answer is still no. The default grand strategy--hegemonic assurance--remains the same, even if it is now shifted into its more liberal form. In other words, we are still saying to the world, we will address the world's greatest security threats and provide basic international security, freedom of navigation, etc, as long as great and rising powers do not challenge our military dominance. We would pay for that strategy by trading security for debt. The United States said we would be the consumption engine to fuel global growth as long as producing, or surplus nations kept buying our debt. As a hedge against the unknown reality of the Post-Cold War world, it was a decent idea. But as a long-term post-Cold War grand strategy, it was a recipe for overreach and economic collapse--and we got both.

Until we change that failed grand strategy, the other items on the President's agenda will suffer or stall. From climate change to economic growth to ending wars. It will be by leading Washington, the nation, and the world towards a new American grand strategy where the President has the opportunity to earn his second Nobel prize. This time, he will only have to articulate a powerful new domestic economic engine that will back up a principled and achievable global strategy.

And he will have to articulate it soon. Oslo would be a good place to start.

Former Sec of State George Shultz says QUOTE ME: End the US-Cuba Embargo. End the Travel Ban.

Patrick Doherty — Thu, 08 Oct 2009 21:14:00 -0400

Former Reagan Administration Secretary of Treasury and Secretary of State George Shultz thinks that the US embargo against Cuba should "simply be lifted." In a letter issued by Secretary Shultz to David Dreyer and the Center for Democracy in the Americas, Shultz writes (pdf available here):

I have long felt and have said publicly on a number of occasions that, with the cold war behind us, we should simply remove the embargo on Cuba. I'm glad to hear that you are making headway on a bill that would repeal the travel ban for all Americans. This is a step in the right direction. I am glad to be on record, and you may quote me as supporting this effort.

Shultz echoes sentiments offered by former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft who has stated that the US-Cuba embargo makes no sense in foreign policy terms. Shultz's views are not exactly new as he said that American sanctions against Cuba were "ridiculous" on the Charlie Rose Show in April 2008. His comments were not as widely reported as they should have been at that time, however.

Shultz said:

I think our policy of sanctions against Cuba is ridiculous. During the cold war it made sense because it was a Russian base. They used it for flying spying missions, and so on, but that's over. And all we do by our sanctions is allow Castro, and now maybe his brother, to blame the problems of Cuba on us. And at the same time I think particularly now that there's some transitioning of some kind probably coming about, we're much more likely to get a constructive outcome if there's a lot of interaction. And to try to prevent interaction under these circumstances, I don't think is sensible. -- former Secretary of State George Shultz interviewed by Charlie Rose, 4/24/08

President Barack Obama invited George Shultz two weeks ago to join him along with Henry Kissinger, former Defense Secretary William Perry, and former Senator Sam Nunn to observe Obama chairing a Security Council Meeting at the United Nations on the subject of nuclear non-proliferation and arms control. I watched President Obama greet Shultz and the other world leaders and special guests -- and it was obvious to me sitting in that chamber that President Obama connected with George Shultz and valued his presence that day. The Obama national security team should take stock of George Shultz's views on the only part of the Cold War that managed to get colder during the Bush administration and do much more to thaw the ice in this hemisphere. The US-Cuba embargo undermines America's position in the world. Everyone knows this. Barack Obama knows this. There will be a vote in a couple of weeks in the United Nations that has practically become ritual. About 185 nations will vote against the US, Israel, and one or two of our island protectorates on the US embargo of Cuba. It's time to end America's isolation on this anachronistic stand that mattered perhaps in the 1960s, if then, but definitely is "ridiculous" today.

-- Steve Clemons

Guest Post by Steve Clemons: Clemons, Walt, Drezner and Rothkopf Respond to Paul Wolfowitz

Andrew Lebovich — Fri, 28 Aug 2009 16:36:00 -0400

(photo of Paul Wolfowitz and Steve Clemons at Australian Prime Minister's Official Residence in Sydney -- Kirribilli House, 16 August 2009. When taken, Paul Wolfowitz remarked, "I don't know whose reputation will take more of a hit for this picture -- yours or mine. . ."

Steve Clemons directs the New America Foundation/American Strategy Program. This post originally appeared at The Washington Note.

Paul Wolfowitz penned a provocative critique of foreign policy realism in this week's Foreign Policy magazine.

Four responses to Wolfowitz were posted online last night in a series called "Is Paul Wolfowitz for Real?"

Stephen Walt, "Just Because He Walks Like a Realist. . ."

David J. Rothkopf, "A Neocon in Realist's Clothing"

Daniel W. Drezner, "Capitalization Matters"

Steve Clemons, "Failing to Note the Difference When the U.S. Power Tank Is Full or Near Empty"

Look forward to hearing thoughts of others on this discussion.

I will be at Waldens Coffeehouse in Reno, Nevada this morning.

-- Steve Clemons

Guest Post by Ben Katcher: Russia, Iran, and the United States

Andrew Lebovich — Tue, 18 Aug 2009 16:30:00 -0400

Ben Katcher is a Policy Analyst with the New America Foundation/American Strategy Program. This post originally appeared at The Washington Note.

Over at Stratfor, George Friedman has a very interesting piece on the possibility of closer ties between Russia and Iran.

Friedman lays out in detail the key geopolitical factors that are shaping the Iran-Russia-U.S. triangle.

Essentially, Friedman's tentative conclusion is that Washington's aggressive policies toward both Moscow and Tehran are bringing the two hydrocarbon exporters closer together.

Meanwhile, in a related move, Russia this month secured access to Turkish waters for its proposed South Stream natural gas pipeline. South Stream will allow Russia to export gas to Europe without going through Ukraine, with which it has very frosty relations at the moment.

The deal on South Stream comes on the heels of an agreement among Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Austria and Hungary on the Nabucco project - a pipeline intended to transport Caspian and possibly Middle Eastern gas to Europe via Turkey while bypassing Russia.

The goal of the Nabucco project is to diversify Europe's natural gas supplies away from Russia. Europe is currently dependent on Russia for 25% of its natural gas imports.

Remarkably, United States Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy Richard Morningstar is denying that South Stream and Nabucco are competitors.

Furthermore, Morningstar says that the Nabucco project - which remember was meant to be an alternative to Russian gas - should be open to Russian gas, but not to Iranian gas.

It will be interesting to watch how long Europe and Turkey are willing to follow U.S. orders and refuse to allow Iranian gas to help fill the Nabucco pipeline. Turkey already imports gas from Iran and says that Iranian gas should be allowed to help fill the pipeline.

Meanwhile, Reinhard Mitschek the managing director of Nabucco Gas Pipeline International is leaving the door open to Iranian participation. He says that It will be up to European customers to decide for themselves whether to import Iranian gas.

For all of Washington's talk about diversifying Europe's gas supply away from Russia, it appears that the one move that could actually make a difference - allowing Europe to import Iranian gas - remains off the table.

This situation cannot be sustained indefinitely. Sooner or later, Iran will increase its gas exports and Europe will not be in a position to turn them away.

-- Ben Katcher

Guest Post by Ben Katcher: The China-Russia Strategic Partnership

Andrew Lebovich — Wed, 12 Aug 2009 19:14:00 -0400

Ben Katcher is a Policy Analyst with the New America Foundation/American Strategy Program. This post originally appeared at The Washington Note.

Lehigh University International Relations Department Chair Rajan Menon recently published an informative report for the Century Foundation called "The China-Russia Relationship: What It Involves, Where It Is Headed, And How It Matters For The United States."

The report provides a useful framework for conceptualizing the relationships among China, Russia, and the United States.

Menon makes a persuasive case that while the "strategic partnership" between Russia and China is based in large part on a shared aversion to unchecked American power, a full-fledged anti-American alliance is unlikely to develop.

The report refutes assertions by the British historian Niall Ferguson and others that Russia and China are engaged in a classic balance of power alliance to counter American influence.

Such an alliance is unlikely for several reasons. Neither Russia nor China believes that an alliance could effectively balance American influence given the United States' extraordinary military and economic advantages, China agrees with Joe Biden that Russia is a weak and declining power, and Russia envisions itself as part of the West and views China's rise with jealousy and suspicion. Furthermore, geographical proximity makes Russia and China natural competitors in Central Asia and the Russian Far East.

The bottom line is that both Russia and China benefit more from their relations with the West than from their relations with each other.

Menon's analyses of the United States' bilateral relationships with Russia and China are strong because he avoids a U.S.-centric perspective and explains how Beijing and Moscow perceive their interests and their relationships with Washington. His acknowledgments that the United States' unilateral decision to abandon the ABM treaty and its obsessive commitment to NATO expansion have been counter-productive are particularly welcome.

One quibble I have with Menon's argument is his statement that "While talk of a Russian-American cold war is ubiquitous in Russia and the United States, there is no parallel categorization about the Beijing-Washington relationship, either in Beijing or Washington."

While you wouldn't know it from last week's Strategic and Economic Dialogue "love fest," there is in fact a large and influential group of China hard-liners based primarily at the Pentagon and in the armed services that views China as an emerging military superpower and conceives the U.S.-China relationship in zero-sum terms. While these views have been crowded out in recent years, they most certainly exist and could resurface in the event of a crisis.

Menon correctly identifies one of the main reasons that the China hard-liners in Washington have been sidelined. The enormous trade and investment flows between the two countries ensure that there are strong domestic constituencies in both countries with a stake in the relationship. The lack of these constituencies is one of the biggest obstacles to stronger U.S.-Russian relations. Menon says

The problems...are compounded by the ease with which the relationship with Russia can be damaged because of the lack of influential constituencies within America that have a strong stake in shoring it up, let alone expanding it. The pro-China business lobby in America has no pro-Russian counterpart, and while there are university professors and op-ed writers who argue strenuously that the relationship with Russia is important and should be strengthened, who has lost money betting on their lack of influence?

One other interesting insight from the article is that while much is made of Russia's dependence on arms sales to China (which make up about 10% of Russia's export earnings), China is at least as dependent on Russia in this area. Because of Washington's ban, Russia is the only place that China can buy state of the art weaponry.

The full text of Menon's article can be found here, and is well worth a read.

-- Ben Katcher

Confusion on the Durand Line

Andrew Lebovich — Mon, 10 Aug 2009 18:46:00 -0400

The news last week of the alleged killing of Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud has sparked a round of confused and contradictory messages from various parties.

American and Pakistani officials claim with more and more certainty that Mehsud is dead. Meanwhile, elements of the Pakistani Taliban admitted his death and announced a shura, or gathering, to decide a new Taliban leader, while others strongly asserted that Mehsud is alive, kicking, and making videos to prove it.

While there is at this writing no DNA proof that Mehsud is dead, the strong message from American and Pakistani officials, coupled with persistent reports of fighting between Taliban leaders Hakimullah Mehsud and Wali Ur-Rehman leads me to believe that Mehsud is either dead or out of commission.

Yet while apparently successful, strikes such as this show the potential benefits - as well as limitations - of targeted killings. New America Fellow Nicholas Schmidle explains that Mehsud has been "losing his mojo" of late, and that his killing might weaken the Taliban, but will not eliminate the organization or make Pakistan more willing to cooperate in bringing down other Taliban leaders with closer relationships to Pakistan's military. So while killing Mehsud is a good step, more will be required to effectively diminish the threat from the Taliban, on both sides of the Durand Line.

For more on the news coming out of the region, today is the launch date for a new special project from Foreign Policy and the New America Foundation, the AfPak Channel. Edited and managed by Peter Bergen, the co-director of New America's Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative, and Katherine Tiedemann, the policy analyst with the same program, as well as by Blake Hounshell and Susan Glasser at FP, the AfPak Channel carries original content and analysis from many of today's top experts on Afghanistan, Pakistan, and terrorism.

-- Andrew Lebovich

Guest Post by Ben Katcher: Obama's Russia/Georgia Balancing Act

Andrew Lebovich — Thu, 06 Aug 2009 18:54:00 -0400

Ben Katcher is a Policy Analyst with the New America Foundation/American Strategy Program. This post originally appeared at The Washington Note.

In the aftermath of Vice President Biden's visit to Georgia last month, Alexander Melikishvili over at the Jamestown Foundation's Eurasia blog provides an informative review of the Obama administration's unfolding Georgia policy.

Citing a variety of recent congressional testimonies, Melikishvili makes a persuasive case that the Obama team intends to exercise more caution than the Bush administration in terms of the kinds of military assistance that it is prepared to provide to the Saakashvili regime.

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia Celeste A. Wallander's stated this bluntly in her recent congressional testimony:

But Georgia is not ready for the kind of weapons acquisitions that the President [Saakashvili] floated. In the future, that's not off the table, but certainly the United States is not in the position of believing that Georgia is ready for that kind of defense acquisition.

While I find his conclusion to be a bit alarmist, Melikishvili provides a bevy of useful quotes and links. You can read the entire post, called "Parameters of U.S. Military Assistance to Georgia Emerge from Congressional Hearings," here.

Tempering our support for Georgia is sound policy and appears to be the lowest hanging fruit as the Obama administration aims to reset relations with Russia - but our Georgia policy needs to be part of a broader conversation with both the Russians and the Chinese about our ambitions in the post-Soviet space.

-- Ben Katcher

Time to Focus on the Great Powers

Patrick Doherty — Wed, 05 Aug 2009 15:45:00 -0400

By Patrick Doherty and Ben Katcher

While the media are drawn to the story of the day, which today means the killing of Baitullah Mehsud in Pakistan and the longevity of the "cash for clunkers" program here at home, it is essential for the Obama administration to keep its eye on the strategic ball. In short, while the administration was absolutely right to triage the domestic economy and global crises like Iraq and Afghanistan during its first six months, the President and his most senior advisors must now turn to the great questions of statecraft: great power relations and America's role in the world.

The reality is that the post-war global order, in which the United States asserted a de facto strategy of hegemony, is now irretrievably dysfunctional and, when it comes down to it, triggered the domestic and foreign crisis that consumed the president's agenda until now. That old strategy, as our colleague Michael Lind has written, was founded on a simple bargain: Washington would let the rest of the world export to the American consumer, hollowing out our own manufacturing base but subsidizing our consumer lifestyle. In return, we would assert a kind of global hegemony, using the tools of foreign policy to dissuade the rise of peer competitors (our military budget and capabilities), to reassure the world's powers that we would take care of common threats (Iraq, Afghanistan, Serbia), and in those cases of resistance to our hegemony, to coercively disarm them (Iran, North Korea).

It was always a time-limited gambit and time finally ran out a year ago when the economic foundation of the strategy collapsed spectacularly in the U.S. housing crisis. Addicted to the false security of bundled American home mortgages, Wall Street built a house of un-priceable derivatives on the sand of irresponsible sub-prime mortgages -- fueled by easy access to credit provided by exporting nations like China, Japan, Germany and the Gulf States. Borrowing against rising home prices to keep consumption high, American households lost trillions in home value and cut back dramatically on consumption--such that Chinese exports fell 30 percent.

At the same time, our over-stretched military was finding it harder and harder to find the budget and the manpower to match the operations tempo that hegemony required. And despite today's confirmation of Baitullah Mehsud's death, it looks increasingly like that operations tempo will only remain high, if not get higher.

Furthermore, the basic strategic facts on the ground have changed dramatically since the early 1990s when hegemony was proffered during the George H. W. Bush administration. China is now a massive economy whose GDP is more about building China then exporting cheap goods to the West. Russia is no longer the post-Soviet basketcase it was under Boris Yeltsin, for Vladimir Putin has marshalled its energy resources and nuclear arsenal to make it a real force in the many strategic issues along and beyond its incredibly long frontier. Europe, meanwhile, used the last two decades to absorb Eastern Europe and along the way avoided getting into a balance of trade trap with Asia. Japan remains a major creditor of the United States and is increasingly concerned that American security guarantees in East Asia are not what they once were. Indeed, the combined economies of Russia, China, India and Brazil are likely to outstrip those of the G-7 in twenty years time, according to Goldman Sachs Chief Economist Jim O’Neil.

Luckily, this new reality points directly to the major issues that require a new great power agreement: global macroeconomic rebalancing, the need to adapt and manage global energy markets, and establishing global and regional collective security architectures.

The most immediate challenge is to begin rebalancing the global economy in a way that promotes sustainable global growth. The American consumption-led model of global growth is not coming back. The great powers must work together to create and balance new sources of domestic demand within their own territories. The United States and China in particular must conceive a new economic relationship that reduces the massive trade and capital flow imbalances at the root of the present economic recession. This will require a combination of policies that reorient China’s economy toward domestic demand and develop a new economic engine to power the United States for the coming decades.

Of equal importance is energy. The United States’ Energy Information Agency 2009 Energy Outlook predicts that global energy consumption will increase 44% from 2006-2030. Anticipating this increase in demand and the corresponding increase in prices, the great powers have so far conceived of energy security as a largely zero-sum game, and competed with one another for access to hydrocarbon resources from Africa to Central Asia to the Arctic Pole.

Russia, China and the United States all rely on a highly volatile and fragile global energy system. Such volatility, however, has had negative impacts in each of the great powers in recent years. The rise in oil prices accellerated the financial crisis in the United States, in China, high energy prices forced government energy subsidies that, for a while, took the profit out of their export sector. While in Russia, falling prices undercut government subsidies to its uncompetitive industries and massive pensioner class.

With Russia and Europe competeing over access to Caspian and Central Asian energy, with Russia, China, and the United States competing over Iranian energy resources and the U.S. and China signing a memorandum of understanding committing both to work towards a "low carbon economy," the geopolitics of energy will continue to shape the strategic outlook of great powers unless something changes. A new energy order that allows economies to develop, transform and function while facilitating global stability and prosperity is in all the powers' interest but as of yet is hard to discern.

Finally, the security arrangements and institutions that guided the United States through the Cold War must be updated to reflect current power realities. This requires a serious effort at global institutional reform as well as the creation of capable regional security structures that allow for rules-based regional resolution of threats to international security. At the global level, the UN Security Council and the International Financial Institutions need to reflect the realities of today, not 1945. Looking to models like NATO and the EU, regional organizations like ASEAN, the African Union, and the Rio Group need to increase their capability to promote regional stability and sustainable economic integration. Governor George W. Bush was right: the United States should not be the world's policeman.

As President Obama emerges from his first six months of domestic and global triage, conventional wisdom believes that his next priorities should be the usual laundry list: health care, climate change, Iran, Afghanistan, and North Korea. But a deeper look at these issues, we believe, reveals that most of them can be made much more tractable if the President first strikes a durable great power bargain with Russia and China.

The reasons for focusing on Russia and China should be clear. Russia because of the leverage provide by its energy resources and infrastructure and its nuclear arsenal, and China because of its rising economy and massive population. Europe, Japan, India and Brazil are, of course, real or rising world powers and must be accommodated in any new global concert, but their interests, capabilities, outlook and strategies are simply do not cross the great power threshold.

Of the three great powers, the United States is in the strongest position to lead such an agenda. Our post Cold War grand strategy has met its natural death and the Obama administration came into office with a mandate to not only deliver change we can believe in, but specifically to "change the mindset" that led the United States to war in Iraq. Meanwhile, China and Russia are in the opposite position: their ability to adapt their grand strategies to a new American agenda is extremely limited, giving the United States a significant silver lining.

But there is not much time. Grand strategy must be conceived of and executed well in advance of political judgment days. There are less than three years before the Obama administration must report on its progress to the American electorate and Russia and China's current strategies are every day reducing American maneuverability and options. It's time to focus.

Guest Post by Col. Lawrence Wilkerson: Open the Door, Mr. President, to Latin America

Andrew Lebovich — Tue, 04 Aug 2009 15:29:00 -0400

President Lula of Brazil meets with President Obama. Official White House photo.

Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson (ret.) served as the Chief of Staff to Sec. Colin Powell at the State Department. He is now the Pamela C. Harriman Professor of Government at the College of William and Mary. This post first appeared at The Havana Note.

London's International Institute for the Study of Cuba recently carried this announcement on its web page:

HAVANA, Cuba, June 29: The Cuban Council of State passed on June 26th, 2009, a new Decree-Law number 268 entitled: "Reform of the Labor Regime" which was published by the daily Granma newspaper as an Official Note…. The law allows for workers to have more than one job and for students to work in part-time jobs. It also frees up enterprises in Havana to hire workers from other provinces directly instead of them having to be hired through the state employment agency.

Thus we see Raul Castro proceeding with his agenda to make small changes that will lead to greater decentralization, more empowerment of state/ministerial and provincial authorities, greater productivity and, finally, higher living standards for the Cuban people. All this while the U.S. makes joyful noises about a fresh policy, lifts some travel restrictions and remittance limits on Cuban-Americans, proffers telecommunications flexibility, and reopens immigration talks. But no real substantive changes in U.S. Cuba policy have been made. Even one of the most meaningful actions is being billed as serendipity, i.e., the shutting down of the idiotic billboard on the U.S. Interests Section building in Havana is touted as a result of a technical malfunctioning and not of a sound decision to shut down the stupid thing. How timid we soaring eagles are!

On the same International Institute webpage, there was this as well:

The Conservative Party leadership in the UK is calling on President Obama to lift the half-century old American blockade of Cuba, in an attempt to pressure the Communist regime to change its ways, according to a report published in the Times newspaper today. William Hague, the Shadow Foreign Secretary, became the first senior British politician to visit Cuba for many years this week, holding talks with the new foreign minister and other senior figures. He found that far from weakening the hardline Communist tendencies of the Cuban Government, the American blockade was continuing to reinforce them, and was being used as an excuse by ministers for the poor state of the economy and the locking up of dissidents. (my emphasis)

In short, one of our closest allies' conservative party believes that U.S. Cuba policy is counterproductive.

In October, the United Nations will hold what has become an annual ritual in USA-bashing, a vote in the General Assembly on the U.S. Cuba embargo. Once again, the world—minus Israel and some other one or two states that can't escape the compulsion of U.S. power—will line up and resoundingly condemn the U.S. policy. Last year's vote, for example, was 185 to 3. That was the 17th vote in 17 years, with an increasingly larger number of countries condemning the policy—for example, the vote against included 179 countries in 2004; in 2005 there were 182; and in 2007 there were 184. Soon it will likely be unanimous. Even the Israelis are operating in Cuba now, so it is doubtful how much longer we have their vote.

What is driving this idiocy? Actually, several things.

Normally in the past, one would lead off with the Cuban-American lobby who, for over 45 years, have had an iron grip on U.S. Cuba policy, though several presidents have tried to break it. But that's no longer the case. President Obama is the first to win the White House without needing the Cuban-American vote. While Cuban-Americans of the hardcore variety are still a formidable force, they are no longer the central factor in U.S. Cuba policy.

What is then? First and foremost—after all, the Dems won in 2008—it's Democratic fear of being seen as weak on national security policy, coupled with Republican reluctance to act on a bipartisan basis. The Dems have shown some national security ankle on Iraq, on Iran, on Syria and are holding their breath on North Korea—so, the rumors go, why should they show any ankle on such an insignificant issue as Cuba policy? The Dems believe that Republicans, even those with better sense (see the next paragraph), would pounce on them if they did. In short, Republican leaders would accuse the Dems immediately of being soft on national security instead of joining them in changing a bankrupt Cuba policy. Moreover, the Dems would be accused of reversing themselves on one of their perceived pet priorities, human rights.

Second, it is Republican angst—and outright trepidation—about being out of step with their "instincts" about their party and their colleagues (we won't call it lack of courage—yet.) Otherwise, why are people such as Brent Scowcroft, George Shultz, Colin Powell, Richard Armitage, and a few other Republicans who have sound views on foreign policy, reluctant to speak out forcefully about the utter inanity of U.S. Cuba policy? They will pronounce upon it in private but not in public. If there are other reasons, I would love to hear them. And let's reiterate: we can't cite national security; Cuba poses no threat whatsoever to the United States. Nor can we cite human rights because we deal with China, Vietnam, Saudi Arabia, et al, every day—and, besides, groups such as Human Rights Watch have said that engagement with Cuba would be more successful with regard to human rights than the current isolation policy.

Lastly, there's the very real—and understandable—reason that since Cuba is so low on the priority list, why waste the political capital, energy, or time? Let's forget for a moment that a country 90 miles off the coast of Florida, thoroughly divorced from contact with the U.S., is a ripe plum to be picked (lest we forget the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962). Let's forget that we need to reverse the Myers Lansky/Fulgencio Batista legacy we left in Cuba, our un-American detritus, if you will, which still fouls our relations with the region. Let's forget these and concentrate on today's and tomorrow's Latin America alone. It's for certain that others are.

Take China, for example, and this recent article on the Council for Hemispheric Affairs' website:

On November 5, 2008, the Chinese government released a policy paper on Latin America and the Caribbean, as it had previously done so for Europe in 2003 and for Africa in 2006. Although it may not come as a huge surprise that Latin America is the most recent region for which China has formally spelled out its foreign policy position, the region has been historically perceived as being under the United States’ sphere of influence. Perhaps the importance of the Chinese policy paper lies in the timing of its release. The release of the paper deliberately coincided with the unfolding of the current financial crisis; this congruence of events has allowed China to expand its influence in this somewhat neglected region without attracting any lasting venom from the U.S. China’s policy paper formally evidences the importance of Latin America and the Caribbean as part of China’s growth plan for its long-term strategic interests. Most of all, this includes access to raw materials as well as a plethora of natural resources, the infiltration of new foreign markets, the reduction of diplomatic support for the Republic of Taiwan, and the strengthening of Beijing political standing on the global stage through strong alliances cemented with the developing world.

The policy paper explicitly states its main objective is to "clarify the goals of China's policy in this region, outline the guiding principles for future cooperation" and "sustain the sound, steady and all-around growth of China's relations with Latin America and the Caribbean." In the economic realm, China expresses an interest in investing in energy, mineral resources, forestry, fishing, and agriculture, areas important to expanding China’s productivity. Additionally, the Chinese government seems to show interest in infrastructure projects not directly related to its economy, albeit essential in the transportation of natural resources, and proposes to fund these projects in order to be perceived as a partner in development.

Furthermore, China expresses its desire to increase military diplomacy and sale of equipment to the region. Although many of the report’s statements are merely rhetoric and general in scope, the paper helps formalize China’s economic, diplomatic and military ties with Latin America, which were first proposed by then President of China Jiang Zemin in 2001.

Recently, I was on a panel at the New America Foundation where one of the members spoke of the U.S. political neglect of Latin America as inevitable because the region was simply unimportant. While I have respect for most of the views of this particular individual, on this he was very much mistaken.

I was just in Sao Paulo, Brazil, where the dynamism is palpable. Blessed for almost eight years now with the best leadership in our hemisphere from President Lula da Silva, Brazil is on the move. That movement can and will occur with or without the United States. Better that it be in cooperation with the United States. Similarly, whether it's immigration, narcotics, planetary warming, energy resources, or global disease, we divorce ourselves from our own hemisphere at our imminent peril. In brief, we had best begin caring about Latin America (even as we ourselves transform in just a few short years into a majority minority country with Hispanic-Americans composing a huge chunk of that majority).

The door to a wiser, more productive foreign and national security policy vis-à-vis Latin America is easy to discern in the foreign policy mists: it is normalization of relations with "that infernal little Cuban Republic" off our southeastern shore.

-- Lawrence Wilkerson

Guest Post by Steve Clemons: China-US Strategic & Economic Dialogue Discussion

Andrew Lebovich — Thu, 30 Jul 2009 21:39:00 -0400

Steve Clemons standing next to statue commemorating Xu Xiake (1587-1641), who chronicled his travels throughout China during the late Ming Dynasty. This picture was taken at Liyuan Park on the edge of Lake Taihu in Wuxi, Jiangsu Province, China. (photo credit: Peter Pi)

Steve Clemons directs the New America Foundation/American Strategy Program. This post originally appeared at The Washington Note.

For those interested in US-China relations, here is a digital clip of a discussion in which I participated on the Diane Rehm Show yesterday.

Others on the panel including Albert Keidel, former acting director of the Department of Treasury's Office of East Asian Affairs; Ambassador Stapleton Roy who now directs the Kissinger Institute on China and the US at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and myself.

Susan Page of USA Today moderated the discussion.

-- Steve Clemons