It seems that the vocal debate about the future of American involvement in Afghanistan and Pakistan has spilled into the hallowed halls of the New America Foundation.

 This month's issue of the Washington Monthly carries an excellent piece from Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative co-director Peter Bergen arguing against the facile statements many have made equating Afghanistan to Vietman, or persisting in the well-worn cliche that Afghanistan is the "graveyard of empires." Bergen continues, laying out a good case for continued investment and intervention in Afghanistan, in order to bolster recent security gains and the nascent Afghan security forces. He also argues that further American presence is necessary to keep Afghanistan from suffering a power vacuum as it did when Washington pulled up stakes in Afghanistan in 1989 and again in 2002 and 2003, in the run-up to the Iraq war.

 Countering this is an article released last week in Foreign Policy from New America fellows Parag Khanna and Michael Cohen. They contend that the emphasis should be on development and counterinsurgency in Pakistan, and that the US is sinking money into a nation-building effort in Afghanistan that is destined to fail. Instead of a US troop presence and nation-building effort, Khanna and Cohen argue that Al Qaeda in Afghanistan can be contained through drone strikes and cooperation with local Afghan forces.

 While I understand the very legitimate fears about mission creep and the huge cost of development in Afghanistan,  I think that a massive pullout will not help matters in Pakistan, or the region. Afghanistan's government is painfully weak, and even if the majority of Al Qaeda and the Taliban are in Pakistan, as Cohen and Khanna contend, a destabilized Afghanistan simply gives them another place to seek shelter.

Furthermore, while targeted assassinations can work to destabilize an organization, reliance on them carries great risks. These attacks work best in tandem with ground forces, as shown by recent operations by the Pakistani military in the Swat Valley. Without the pressure of ground forces, there is still a power vacuum in which other leaders can emerge to replace those killed in airstrikes and other operations, as has happened over the years in Gaza and the West Bank. And without American forces on the ground, it will be much harder to gather effective intelligence on the movements of Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders, vastly increasing the risk of civilian casualties in any subsequent operation.

For those interested in this conversation, New America will be hosting RAND Afghanistan expert Seth Jones tomorrow for a discussion of his important new book In the Graveyard of Empires. You can RSVP here.

 -- Andrew Lebovich